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The Liberal Arts College Journal

Volume 1 Issue 1 – May 2018

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Volume 1, Issue 1
May 2018

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

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

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

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The editors would like to thank the following people for their practical and moral support:

Sophie Bisping
Chris Jones
Mark Russell
The whole team at Rubik's
Hannen Sabean
Bruce Taylor
Ayesha Jane Wright

The editors would like to thank the following organizations for their fincancial support:

Université Concordia University
STUDENT SERVICES
Concordia Council on Student Life

Arts and Science Federation of Associations

sophia

The image on the cover is of the Mississipi Delta, taken by the ALOS satellite. © JAXA 2009

Typeset in Cardo. Printed at Rubik's.

Corrections and alterations undertaken by Nelson in October 2019 for web publication. The pagination of the 2018 print edition has been more or less conserved. I take full responsibility of all remaining errors in style, spelling, and formatting.

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Editor's Preface

To bite an apricot, or sail
a complicated little boat,
or tune a drumskin, is to fail
to have a use for words
like love, fortuity,
forgiveness, or the future.
It is to not need something
said another way,
or to be stirred
to capture some elusive
feature of it, to evade cliché,
or, falling short, to have to say
"the thought falls short"
or "words cannot convey,"
and let the facts collapse
upon themselves
yet not regret some
lapse of aptness
in the scattered wreck,
or feel the damp hand
or an unarticulated something
settle on your neck.

But now, suppose you stroll
across a dam at night,
a humid summer night,
a little wind in your sleeves,
and stop to lean across the rail
to look down at the stream,
pulled placid and black
up to the worn concrete lip,
and you can just make out
the rafts of foam
and the sliding skin
being sucked calmly
over the edge in the dark
and hear from somewhere below
the roar as it shatters
itself and is pulled apart,
the black river rumbling
in the shins of your legs.
It turns out you do
need words for that,
or somehow none of it is
really there.

–"Really There", Bruce Taylor

If you are reading this long past 2018, you may not recall Professor Mark Russell's speech at Orientation in September of 2017. "Humanists cannot be trained" he said, quoting Erwin Panofsky, "they must be allowed to marinate."

This journal, dubbed *The Liberal Arts College Corpus*, has been marinating as an idea for about a year, and we are proud and excited to see its first ever issue published. We would like to thank everybody who helped along the way. To all who submitted, thank you for believing in the journal. To our generous funders, thank you for making this possible. To our guest editors, delegates, assistants and supporters, thank you for your hard work.

This is an undergraduate journal containing essays exclusively from students and alumni of the Liberal Arts College at Concordia University. We hope that it lives to marinate for many years to come and that it represents the students as the students choose to represent themselves. We expect it to take on the functions of gazette, lit mag, comment section, yearbook, 'zine, and pamphlet if and when it seems fit, and to shed them as need be. We regret and acknowledge that this issue is almost entirely in English, and hope that future editors will publish in a way that reflects the presence of Francophone students at this college.

A programmatic preface here would be out of place. We did not specify a theme for our contributors, and it would be a mug's game to spin a common thread between the essays at this point. We have ordered the essays in a somewhat thematic flow, but we also hold that they can stand on their own.

Aloyse Muller (former General Co-ordinator, now graduated) warns us that institutional memory "or rather the lack thereof" is a major structural issue in student-run, and especially undergraduate-run, initiatives. The editors of Corpus are aware that the desired longevity of the journal constitutes our biggest challenge. We stand before four

decades of displaced or discontinued student publications of the Liberal Arts College: recall *The Rose*, *Harmonia Mundi*, *The Owl of Minerva*, *Another World*, *At an Uncertain Hour*, *A Liberal Arts Travelogue*, *The Void* (it's true!), *Reminiscences*, and *Epigraph*. What will make us different when push comes to shove two years from now and the original team have graduated? I cannot say. What can we do at this moment? Besides setting up something foundational, all I can propose is patience.

Patience is necessary for any substantial marination, and scholarly marination requires a patience of the highest order. Not merely a passive patience, which is apathy (the sustaining force of a Liberal Arts student is after all their interest); nor even an active patience is what is required.

Maybe patience implies too much of a temporal dimension. Courage, humility, vulnerability, Sitzfleisch, or endurance could also, in their own ways, describe what I'm prescribing, but I feel that those words somehow do not have much of a resonance with kids my age. The patience that is required in reading our canon is not a patience wherein one waits for a certain aim to be realized, but rather waits indefinitely to know *what that aim will be*.

The more we map the influence of an author through the canon, the more I regret that I had not taken the time to build a better foundational understanding of them. Similarly, I sometimes find myself wishing we would read the books of the canon backwards, starting from the texts that are the most like to myself, historically, progressing to the most unlike.

This coming-short of complete understanding is of course unavoidable. Anyone could have told you that. Reading always borders on an anthropogenic mysticism when you aim to understand the author or the text. And it requires a lot patience to push on through those lapses, the always merely provisional understandings, that anything but a lifelong study of a subject will impart. Students of a BA in Western Society and Culture know this well; it can take years for a datum's relevance to unfold completely in our syllabi. I say this in the hope that being consciously patient will make the experience of 'getting it' all the more satisfying.

That being said, I fear that if we know that it is impossible to form a complete and unbiased understanding of a text, especially on our first introduction to it, we will read too freely. The habit we will form is to only read the parts that are like to ourselves, to recognize ourselves in these texts wherever we may. What could happen is that all we understand, wir Enkennenden, is ourselves to ourselves. Which is commendable, sure. But that is not the aim of this program, not to me anyhow. I'm dead tired of finding myself, personally. The most immediately pleasurable reading of the corpus is the one in which you see what sticks and offer fresh contemporary automatic reflexions on the texts. This is also the reading that is the least likely to shape you.

Maybe it is helpful to say that for most of the texts and chapters you will read, it will be the only time in your life to read them. This time is yours to make the most of. The promise holds fast, I am told, that "we are always rewarded in the end for our good will, our patience, our fair-mindedness and gentleness with what is strange, as it gradually casts off its veil and presents itself as a new and indescribable beauty." It is this adoption of patience which I unsolicitedly advise to future first-year students. I also think it fitting to inaugurate this new undergrad journal under these hopes of patience.

✌,

Nelson Duchastel de Montrouge

God Is Dead, Now What? Searching for Solutions in Durkheim's Suicide and Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals

Zoe Lambrinakos-Raymond

The anxiety created in the nineteenth century by the slow decay of religion can be seen in multiple works by not only philosophers, but also scientists. In this paper, I will explore Durkheim's conception of the function of religion within society, as well as science's ability to replace religion as a system of values, as explained in his book, S*uicide*. Furthermore, I will use Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* in order to demonstrate that, although Durkheim rightly believed that science would replace religion, science is not capable of fully replacing religion in society since it operates on the same foundation as religion, but lacks morality and meaning. Lastly, I will explore other possible solutions put forth by Durkheim and Nietzsche in order to ascertain whether a system exists which is able of fully fill the void left by religion.

Before attempting to answer the question of whether science is capable of systemically replacing religion, it is necessary to first understand what role and functions religion fulfills within a society. For Durkheim, an individual within a society is necessarily part of three spheres of social life (religion, family, and the State) and his propensity towards suicide is inversely proportional to his integration within each of these spheres. As such, the more integrated an individual is within these spheres, the less likely he is to commit suicide, and vice versa. As Durkheim is a sociologist, he does not examine the specific dogmas or doctrines pertaining to different religions, but instead examines religion as a society within society[1]. With these points in mind, it is then clear that religion functions by "socializ[ing] men only by attaching them completely to an identical body of doctrine".[2] Furthermore, this socialization is more successful the more cohesive and firm the body of doctrine is. This is because, unlike the State or familial life, religion "does not unite men by an exchange and reciprocity of services, [or] a temporal bond of union which permits and even presupposes differences" but through "a collective *credo*" that "makes individual wills converge".[3] Therefore, religion's main function is "supporting a sufficiently intense collective life".[4] One of the main ways religion integrates the individual into the collective group is by limiting individual freedoms. This limiting of individual consciences may be accomplished a number of ways, such as complicated and numerous doctrines which must be interpreted by religious authorities or doctrines which "minutely govern all the details of life".[5] In

1 Durkheim 159
2 Durkheim 159
3 Durkheim 159
4 Durkheim 170
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essence, the more "highly developed traditionalism always more or less restricts activity of the individual"[6], thus more fully integrating him into the collective consciences and therefore providing better protection against suicide.

For Nietzsche, however, religion cannot be examined solely through its function in society. In order to fully understand the role of religion, it is necessary to understand its origin and, consequently, its lasting effects. Nietzsche's explanation of the origin of God begins in first looking at what he calls "the original tribal community".[7] In this community, living generations "always recognized a juridical duty toward earlier generations"[8], placing significant importance on the earliest founding ancestors, since they are viewed as the reason the tribe exists. As such, living generations have "to *pay* [their ancestors] *back* with sacrifices and accomplishments"[9], thus making themselves the *debtor* and the founding ancestors the *creditor*. With the continued success of the tribe comes the continued growth of the debt, and ultimately, "the *fear* of the ancestor and his power" grows to such a point where the "ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a *god*".[10] However, this explanation is deceiving. Nietzsche states that although this is what appears to have occurred, the true creation of God and religion lie far "*beneath* all this".[11]

Having been appointed Extraordinary Professor of Classical Philology at Basle University at the age 25[12], it is no surprise that Nietzsche bases his examination of the origin of religion and morality in the root of words. Recall his theory of the transvaluation of "good and bad" and "good and evil". Having thus established the imagined origin of religion and morality, as well as what Nietzsche believes to be the true origin of religion and morality, it is possible now to move on to the function of religion within a society. Since the individual is responsible for their sins, they are also responsible for their guilt and suffering. Religion, for Nietzsche, "has interpreted a whole mysterious machinery of salvation into suffering"[13] and therefore made it meaningful. As such, the ascetic ideal which springs forth from this system is "an artifice for the *preservation* of life"[14] insofar as it serves to guide the herd of suffering individuals away from hurting themselves and offers them "*anaesthesia*"[15] for their suffering. As such, the ascetic ideal, embodied in the priest, "does *not* aim at curing the sickness but at combating the depression by relieving and deadening its displeasure".[16] This system "improves" the sick in that it tames them, and makes them dependent on this system of narcotics through cyclical recurrence of contrition, repentance, and redemption.[17] According to Nietzsche, the success of the ascetic ideal is evident in that the "sickness" has almost completely infected Europe.[18]

While Durkheim and Nietzsche hold opposing views on the utility of religion, the former stating that it creates a cohesive society for the individual to be contained within and latter stating that it provides meaning to suffering, they are in agreement that religion is fundamentally necessary to society since it prevents people from falling into the abyss i.e. suicide. Durkheim and Nietzsche are subsequently in agreement that religion's previously strong grip on society is faltering. Furthermore, their reasons for the dissolution of religion are strikingly in accordance with one another. For Durkheim, religion is failing because "instinctive sentiments which have hitherto adequately guided conduct … have lost their efficacy".[19] For Nietzsche, God has died because "Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness taken more and more strictly"[20] has made truth its ultimate goal. This becomes

6 Durkheim 161
7 Nietzsche *Genealogy* 88
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problematic when the pursuit for truth "forbids itself the *lie involved in belief in God*".[21] In essence, the pursuit of knowledge and truth has ultimately killed God.

The dissolution of religion can first be seen in religions where individual free-thought is encouraged. When comparing the propensity to suicide in the practitioners of Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, Durkheim states that "Protestants show far more suicides than the followers of other confessions,"[22] followed by Catholics, and then Jews. This is because the Protestant religion allows more room for free individual inquiry. As previously stated, the more freedom an individual has within their religion, the more their propensity to commit suicide increases. When the individual must fill the gaps in their religious doctrines themselves, he begins to recognize "the loss of cohesion in his religious society".[23] Once these established beliefs have been weakened, "they cannot be artificially re-established".[24] Religion may only exert a strong hold if free-thought is limited.[25] Since a strong faith "does not establish "truth" … [but] a certain probability of *deception*",[26] the individual that seeks truth cannot believe in religion. The more the individual thinks on his own accord, the further he gets from religion and its group cohesion. Both Durkheim and Nietzsche recognize the extremely problematic direction of modern society "which, while able to uproot the institutions of the past, has put nothing in their place".[27] For Durkheim, "man cannot live without attachment to some object which transcends and survives him,"[28] since man is not an end in himself. If left to his own devices, man realizes that his "efforts will finally end in nothingness, since [man himself] disappears".[29] Essentially, Durkheim is voicing the same concern that Nietzsche feels in regards to nihilism.

The question then becomes, for both Durkheim and Nietzsche, what system could possibly take the place of religion and God? Durkheim believes that the answer is the very same system which caused the question to arise, namely the pursuit of knowledge i.e. science. Moreover, Durkheim suggests that science "is the only weapon for [the] battle against the dissolution which gives birth to science itself".[30] Durkheim places a great amount of optimism in this new system, stating that "representatives of the new science are increasing in number"[31] and the public feeling towards it is favourable. Furthermore, Durkheim's belief that "the progress of a science is proven by the progress toward solution of the problems it treats"[32] is the basis for his writing *Suicide*. As such, not only is Durkheim in favour of science, but sees it is the only possible solution in regards to the death of religion.

However, while Nietzsche agrees that Science has indeed replaced religion in society, he does not agree that it is capable of properly filling the void left by religion. Like the ascetic ideal, science "rejects, denies, affirms, and sanctions solely from the point of view of *its* interpretation".[33] In addition to this, science "clearly believes in itself alone"[34] and in the "absolute value of *truth*".[35] As such, Nietzsche states that "it first requires in every respect an ideal of value … – it never creates values".[36] This invalidates science as a system for Nietzsche since it requires a system outside of itself to function. Furthermore, Nietzsche takes issue with the fact that, for science, "truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized".[37] The idea of "pure reason" or "knowledge in itself" cannot exist, since that would remove knowledge from any attachment to man, and therefore the will. Will is an inherently necessary part of

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knowledge, and to suspend it would be to "*castrate* the intellect".[38] Moreover, the fact that science prides itself on being "objective"[39] further complicates it as a system. Nietzsche places a great deal of value in the subjective, since he believes that humans are necessarily subjective. If an objective lens is being used, it is preferable to use as many different objective lenses as possible in order to achieve a clear, well-rounded point of view.[40] To regard anything from a purely intellectually objective standpoint, devoid of "active and interpretive forces," would be "an absurdity and nonsense".[41] Nietzsche states that "the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be".[42] Science also makes man "an *animal*" when, previously with the ascetic ideal, man was "almost God".[43] Therefore, while science "rests on the same foundation as the acetic ideal"[44], it makes man's existence "more arbitrary, beggarly, and dispensable in the *visible* order of things".[45] Unlike Durkheim, who believes that science will give society a cohesive system to believe in, Nietzsche believes that the pursuit of knowledge will lead the individual to further alienation, since it makes his "irreplaceability in the great chain of being"[46] a thing of the past . As such, science further enables man's downward path "into nothingness"[47], and, while it is "to a high degree ascetic … it is to an even higher degree *nihilistic*".[48]

Therefore, although Durkheim believed science to be a fitting replacement to fill the void left by religion, Nietzsche's complete refutation of science as a capable system cannot be ignored. Luckily, science is not the only candidate put forth by Durkheim. As previously stated, an individual must be well integrated in regards to religion, familial life, and the State in order to be protected from suicide. With the rapid growth of cities and urban centers, societies organized on the family basis, "formed by the union of a number of smaller societies"[49] or occupational organization, have disappeared. The one collective form that has been able to survive has been the State[50], but only in an imperfect way. The State, being the lone surviving system of organization, "was compelled to assume functions for which it was unfitted and which it has not been able to discharge satisfactorily".[51] As such, the State only serves to alienate individuals, since it is an intrusive force that is essentially as omniscient as it is impotent. What Durkheim means by this is that, by extending itself as an all-encompassing umbrella over individuals, the State makes itself known but fails to except any control. This results in the individual being unable to submit to the State since "he sees nothing above him to which he belongs".[52] Durkheim's proposed solution to this issue is to reinstate the previous system of local autonomous groups, which he calls "decentralization".[53] However, Durkheim makes clear that previous systems, such as local patriotism,[54] cannot be reinstated, since they are outdated and "no longer [have] any foundation"[55] in modern society. Durkheim suggests instead that "*occupational decentralization*"[56] be implemented. Occupational decentralization would consists of a "center" which would "focus on special, limited activity," thus allowing the individual to form attachments to the centers without "becoming less solidary with the [state]".[57] In essence, occupational decentralization would

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be based "not by sections of territory but by corporations" and would function based not on "convention" but as "a definite institution, a collective personality, with its customs and traditions, its rights and duties, its unity".[58] Moreover, Durkheim specifies that occupational decentralization should be centered primarily on "moral individuality," lest it should become another "external and artificial subdivision"[59] of the State. However, when it comes to defining what is meant by occupational decentralization more precisely, Durkheim is unable to provide an answer, stating that "[determining the details of] this cannot be attempted within the compass of [Durkheim's sociological] work".[60] Instead, "a special study of the corporative regimes and the laws of its development" would be necessary in order to implement such a system since "social reality is not neat enough and is too little understood as yet to be anticipated in detail".[61] Therefore, although this may be a viable option in the future, it is not yet a possibility.

Although not a solution in itself, a possible aid to counteract the abyss left by religion lies in the overlap between religion and familial life as they relate to the individual. The individual must be well integrated in his religion, his family, and the State in order to be protected from suicide and, as I have stated, Durkheim explores the shortcomings of each of these spheres in the face of modernity. However, when dealing with the family and the individual, Durkheim makes the distinction between the family unit and the marital unit, but fails to see its importance. Durkheim states that, while the family consists of two groups, "the conjugal group and the family group proper"[62], both groups function differently in that "the latter is as old as humanity, the former was organized at a relatively late date".[63] Therefore, it should not be surprising that the dissolution of religion is, by proxy, the dissolution of marriage, since marriage is a component of religion. Furthermore, Durkheim explicitly states that marriages that produce children have almost double the protection from suicide than families without children have. As such, it would seem evident that the power of the family does not lie solely within marriage, but essentially within the creation of offspring. Furthermore, this immunity "increases with the density of the family".[64] Therefore, children may offer the individual protection from nihilism and suicide by providing the individual with constant meaning that is outside of themselves. Furthermore, this meaning is universally acknowledged by the individual's society as being valid, which helps the individual who is struggling to finding meaning in their lives. While the seeds for such a system may be found in Durkheim, Nietzsche did not place much value in the familial unit and rarely discusses it in his philosophy. This may be attributed to the fact that Nietzsche suffered the traumatic death of his father and brother as a young child.[65] Moreover, Nietzsche's relation with both his mother and his sister, the only two remaining members of his immediate family, was strained to the point that he cited them as the sole components that made affirming his individual eternal reoccurrence painful.[66] As such, it is not surprising that Nietzsche does not acknowledge the potential for creating meaning outside of the individual that may be found in creating offspring and which Durkheim alludes to. In addition, it is problematic to consider creating offspring separately from marriage as a viable solution to the void left by religion, since it is more an option than a solution in itself.

While Nietzsche does not endorse procreation as a means to avoiding nihilism, the solution he does offer shares its roots quite closely in that it deals with creation. This solution, which I will argue is the most viable solution to the impending spread of nihilism, is found in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In this book, Nietzsche advances three of his most intriguing and important concepts: the Overhuman, the will to power, and eternal recurrence. In order to fully understand how the Overhuman is a solution to slave morality, religion, and subsequently nihilism, it is necessary to briefly explain the first part of *Thus*

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Spoke Zarathustra.

Zarathustra, a 30 year old man who has lived in a cave for the past ten years, wakes up one morning and decides to break his isolation. He makes his way to the nearest town in order to tell the townspeople of the Overhuman. The word Overhuman, as explained by Nietzsche in *Ecce Homo*, is "the designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed to 'modern' men, to 'good' men, to Christians and other nihilists".[67] The Overhuman is attained "through an *overcoming* of the human"[68]; it is a going beyond of man. What is particular to the Overhuman is that he "makes believe in *himself*"[69], thus creating a meaningful world that is entirely subjective. The Overhuman, therefore, affirms his life by saying *Yes* to "the play of creating," thus allowing his spirit to "will *its own* will".[70] The Overhuman is similar to the noble man of the system of *good* and *bad*; he is a man that "wants to create what is new".[71] The *good* man of the system of *good and evil* stands directly in opposition to the Overhuman in that he "wants what is old".[72] Nietzsche explicitly states that it is the creative ability of the Overhuman which makes him capable of affirming life for himself and creating meaning. Moreover, the Overhuman is capable of exercising his will to power, which Nietzsche states is "the happiness of a man".[73]

The will to power in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is similar to the will as explained by Arthur Schopenhauer in *The World as Will and Idea*.[74] However, unlike Schopenhauer's manifestation of the will, Nietzsche's concept of the will to power is grounded in creation, which ultimately elevates the Overhuman to a god in himself.[75] It is the affirmation of life to such a degree that if one were forced to relive their entire existence for all eternity, they would continually say yes to all happiness and suffering.[76] This is what Nietzsche means by eternal recurrence. Therefore, the way to overcome nihilism is by creating a subjective world, complete with its own morality, and to affirm life with laughter and dance.

While Nietzsche's Overhuman may hold the components to overcoming nihilism, it does not offer any clear path as to how one actually becomes the Overhuman. However, the answer to this problem may be contained within Nietzsche's writing, not at the level of philosophic instruction, but simply at the level of the line. Nietzsche states that "of all that is written, [he] loves only that which one writes with one's own blood".[77] In essence, Nietzsche loves writing, and art, created in the blood of the spirit. If this statement seems to be in direct contradiction to Nietzsche's earlier statement in the *Genealogy of Morals* that "artists… do not stand nearly independently enough … to deserve attention *in themselves*"[78], it is only because artists from Nietzsche's period produced art for primarily for patrons, rather than art for art's sake. Furthermore, as previously stated, Nietzsche's will to power is essentially a complex variation of Schopenhauer's will, which Schopenhauer states is most successfully channelled through the Arts.[79] For Schopenhauer, art is everywhere at its goal, and makes the will to power communicable. While Schopenhauer was an important influence of Nietzsche as a young adult, Nietzsche ultimately rejected his philosophy due to its heavy pessimism and emphasis on ascetism as a solution to suffering. However, it would be rash to disregard all of Schopenhauer's philosophy based solely on his pessimism. As such, through the reconciliation of Schopenhauer's idea of the manifestation of the will through art with Nietzsche's affirmation of life, one can hope to truly overcome nihilism. Moreover, both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer believe in the truth contained within the beautiful, which is most clearly expressed through Art. For Nietzsche, "the beautiful promises

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70 Nietzsche *Zarathustra* 24
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happiness"[80] while for Schopenhauer it expresses the Platonic idea "of man in a definite individual manner".[81] If the Overhuman affirms his life through his will to power, and art is the ultimate representation of the will, it then becomes evident that Art is the solution to overcoming nihilism, in that it places the artist at the helm of his world as the creator of his own subjective reality. Moreover, this reality, while being intrinsically subjective, also contains the objective, since "the artist lets [others] see into the world through his eyes".[82]

By combining Schopenhauer's view on the arts with Nietzsche's life affirming Overhuman, it is possible to achieve a cohesive, well-rounded philosophy which offers the individual a viable solution to avoiding nihilism. Furthermore, this synthesis eliminates problematic elements from both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, respectively. In regards to Schopenhauer, the prevailing pessimistic attitude of his philosophy is mediated by Nietzsche's Overhuman, who loves both the suffering and happiness of life wholeheartedly. In addition to this, Schopenhauer's problematic emphasis on the objective in art[83] has been refuted, and amended, by scholars. While it is true that the will manifested in art represents the objective whole through the forgetting of individuality by the artist[84], "[artwork] remains a manifestation of human ideation".[85] Therefore, "[art's] individuality, which remains within and indeed can be the only *object* of representation"[86] necessarily remains subjective while displaying the objective. This reconciliation helps to make clear Schopenhauer's view on art "as a recognition of the collective (if not the objective) significances that might be culturally attained when artistic representation achieves a measure" or a release from the strictly individual.[87] Furthermore, the ability to understand the objective through the subjective filter of art helps to remedy Nietzsche's extremely subjective, and perhaps egoistic, Overhuman. Lastly, if any more evidence is needed to demonstrate that Nietzsche and Schopenhauer contain the solution to nihilism when synthesized, it may be found in their views on music. For Schopenhauer, "music is as *direct* an objectification and copy of the whole *will* as is the world itself".[88] As for Nietzsche, Zarathustra states that "[he] should only believe in a God who knew how to dance".[89]

While *Suicide* is an innovative book in regards to the field of sociology, it fails to innovate on a practical level. Published in 1897, Durkheim only hints at the dissolution of religion while, for Nietzsche, God has already been dead for ten years.[90] It is perhaps this inability to clearly discern the issue at hand that prevents Durkheim from offering a viable solution to fill the void left by religion. Nietzsche, however, is able to offer a solution through the creation of the Overhuman, for who creation provides the ultimate meaning. While Nietzsche's solution does benefit from being synthesized with key components of Schopenhauer's philosophy, it is only because he so staunchly revolted against this philosophy, and therefore abandoned important components with the whole of Schopenhauer's work. As such, by combining Nietzsche's Overhuman with Schopenhauer's conception of art as pure will, the individual is left integrated but subjective, able to create meaning without having to validate it to others, and ultimately protected from nihilism, and therefore suicide.

80 Nietzsche *Genealogy of Morals* 105
81 Schopenhauer 144
82 Schopenhauer 118
83 Davis 67
84 Schopenhauer 102
85 Davis 72
86 Davis 72
87 Davis 72
88 Schopenhauer 164
89 Nietzsche *Zarathustra* 36
90 Nietzsche *Genealogy of Morals* xliii, published in 1887 in a new expanded edition

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A Manifestation of the Multitude

Dylan Hunt



Please remove your pocket edition of *The Communist Manifesto* from its hiding place on your person, and open it to the first chapter. Following along with the original text will aid in understanding this exercise and see the subtle comments and criticisms contained within this essay. I believe I have used enough creative liberty to avoid being called a plagiarist, and in order to maintain the form of the original text, footnotes have been used to expand on certain key points that would not fit into this framework.

A frightful hobgoblin has been stalking the stairwell of the liberal arts college -- The hobgoblin of anarchism. Many of the authors on our syllabus have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise the idea that people can self-govern: the social contract theorists, the economists, and those with aristocratic tendencies. Where are all the philosophers who have been decried as anarchists by the intellectual elite? What philosopher might fling from his name the reproaches of those who believe that mankind must be lorded over by external forces? The ideas of Kropotkin here may take the reigns of our minds, and from his lecture, two facts become clear;

1. Mutual Aid is already indirectly acknowledged by many philosophers on our syllabus to be a powerful force in society.
2. It is high time that those in favour of adding an anarchistic flavour to our college should speak up, and meet these children's stories of hobgoblins with a manifesto for those who consider Kropotkin's ideas as a useful extension of those already contained in our curriculum.

To this end, a single person has put himself together in front of his computer to sketch out a manifesto, to be published for his professor and distributed to anybody who doubts in the essential ideas outlined in *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution.*

The history of our college is the history of class discussions. People of all walks of life come to the college to learn from those who hold knowledge, in a word, students and teachers, who stand in somewhat of an opposition as to what our school should encompass in its scope. In the earlier epochs of history contained within our syllabus, we find almost everywhere complicated arguments for how society should be ordered: in Burke we find the ideas of conservatism; in Mill, liberalism; and in Smith, Capitalism. Our modern society of teachers which sprouts from the ruins of a once radical student body, has completely done away with classes on anarchism.[1] It has established classes decrying oppression, and analysing problems within the framework of mutual struggle, in place of understanding the age old factor of evolution: mutual aid. Our epoch, the epoch of technology and corporatism more

1 As far as I know, there never were any, I just like the intensity of the phrase from the Manifesto, so I kept similar wording.

than ever is in need of an injection of anarchism. The community of our college is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps in our many classes; those who see our syllabus as containing a well rounded variety of books, and those who see that there is something major missing.

From our lack of concentration on the Middle Ages springs a nearly complete ignorance of life in early European towns. From this era, one can see firsthand how community driven systems developed. The later discovery of the Americas, and the colonization of Canada opened up fresh ground in which the principles of mutual aid could rise[2]. The opening of Eastern European and Australian markets, the increase in trade with small communities, and the increase in the exchange of foreign commodities generally, gave the West a connection to cultures never before fully known, and thereby provided an understanding of how mutual aid worked in 'underdeveloped countries'. This offers us a window into the early development of Europe.[3] Mutual aid is even visible in the feudal system of skilled workers, in which the means of production were kept safe through the cooperation of communally created guilds. Though these were no longer respected with the development of worldwide markets; a system of profit driven manufacturing took its place. The guilds were pushed to one side by the manufacturing middle class. The artistic properties[4] of the mutually beneficial guilds vanished in the face of capitalistic governing bodies who worked to dismantle the community-driven work ethic.[5] Meantime philosophy kept ever growing, and the ideas of anarchism falling into the background. The concept of mutual aid almost completely disappeared from mainstream philosophy.

Thereupon, such revolutionary ideas were no longer studied. The place of this important factor in human nature was taken by the philosophical giants' theories of modern intellectualism: the idea of the self-made man, the criticisms of industry, individualism, and the understanding of economic theory. Within this framework, the theories of Smith helped established the functioning of markets, which were used all over America to pave the way to a trumped up dream. This free-market capitalism gave an immense development to commerce and inequality, and caused the destruction of many communal lands. This development of an unhealthy extension of industry, lead to many of the ideas within our curriculum; communism, decentralization, social malaise, modern economic theory and moral philosophy, but unfortunately discards to the background all ideas of anarchism. *We see therefore, how both our curriculum and mutual aid itself are products of a long course of development; both being revolutionary and the products of similar criticisms.*

Each author on our syllabus is accompanied by their own schools of thought, which we learn of in their respective classes. Many of the ideas brought forth in these classes can be associated to the ideas of self-governing, and the criticisms of our development outlined in *Mutual Aid*: economic relations for the benefit of the whole (as in Locke and Smith), the state of nature (as in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau), decentralization (as in Durkheim), criticism of our development as a species (as in Rousseau), communally held ethical maxims (as in Kant), and political equality through community (as in Marx). Historically, these authors have played the most revolutionary part.

John Locke put an end to the feudal idea that kings are idyllic descendants of God in his *First Treatise of Government*. And in his *Second Treatise of Government*, he pitilessly tore asunder inequality by setting up his famous "natural rights"[6], and described a nexus

2 The early cooperation of colonists is a well documented and wonderful part of our Canadian history. The erection of barns, clearing of land, and the building of a homestead were done by new settlers with the support, effort and help of the community in rural areas, such as the one in which I spent my teenage years.

3 Kropotkin (in chapter 3 of *Mutual Aid*) shows through a Darwinian examination of archeology that the development of most cultures begins similarly in clan-like structures, using similar tools. He thereby draws a connection to between the 'savages' he describes and the past societies in Europe.

4 "The immensity of progress realized in all arts under the mediaeval guild system is the best proof that the system was no hindrance to individual initiative" (*Mutual Aid* Chapter 6)

5 Such as "In Great Britain… we see the Parliament beginning the destruction of the guilds as early as the fifteenth century." (*Mutual Aid* Chapter 6)

6 "Being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,

of men which satisfy their self-interest through trading objects with which they "mixed their labour".[7] Is this idea of individual trade for the sake of mutual benefit not drawn from the same pond as Kropotkin's idea of mutual aid, but with added elements of egoism? This idea of mutual exchange is meant to resolve the many problems inherent to mutual struggle. However instead of the sharing communal property, he sets up another method of overcoming the icy cold waters of nature – free trade.[8] Locke describes an environment free of exploitation where religion is personal and the political ordering of society is agreed upon communally, all growing out of a naked, shameless, and free species.[9] Like Kropotkin, Locke strips humanity of its Hobbesian demeanor, and instead looks with awe at their ability to come together and make decisions which benefit the whole. Locke shows how a community of farmers, builders, workers and judges can mix their labour and trade amongst themselves in order to achieve mutual support. However this idea takes the sentimental, communal and familial bonds in which the sharing of property occurs, and reduces it to mere trade relations. However, Locke's ideas of independent trade and labour may lead to a fitting criticism of Kropotkin's reverence for the mutual aid in medieval cities, for he ignores humanity's slothful indolence.

Both authors demonstrate and revere what the industrious sort of man's activities can bring about. The coming together of these sorts of men created the great "[Gothic] cathedral symbolizing the union of parish and guild in the city"[10], but what of those who sat in the shade and simply watched such a thing being done, are they simply to be put into exodus? A community supported through mutual aid relies on the constant participation of the instruments of production, and thereby the addition of each person's individual effort affects the productivity of the whole society. However the age old instinct to conserve one's energy varies across individuals, and can run completely contrary to productivity, which leads to differing amounts of industriousness in different classes of people. These varying levels of productivity and laziness can disturb the social bonds and cause agitation between those who are distinguish themselves in terms of their efforts and those who do not.[11] If this inconsistency is not fixed, relations can be damaged, prejudices can be formed, negative opinions may ossify and jest may lead productivity to slow. All that was solid in the community may melt into air, bonds that were once holy may become profaned. When man is compelled to face at last with sober senses his compatriot's lazy lifestyle, it can damage relations of all kinds.[12] This may explain why there are constantly expanding world markets which now covers most all of the globe, yet anarchism remains repressed. But nestled within this framework, settled in smaller communities, the connections of mutual aid are still visible everywhere.[13]

Corporatist capitalism has through its exploitation of world markets given a cosmopolitan character to many of the societies of the West. To the great chagrin of many people, it has drawn from under the feet of the public the societal and cultural relations upon which they stood. Old established national mentalities and communities have been destroyed

health, liberty, or possessions" (*Second Treatise of Government* Chapter 2)

7 "Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property" (*Second Treatise of Government* Chapter 5)

8 This may be unclear. The connection is in the reason behind these two practices; the benefit of the group. Locke's view of trade allows all parties to mutually benefit from the interaction, which causes a net increase in the communities ability to survive, which is the base motive of mutual aid; to help one another live.

9 To exit this state of nature, Locke says they must agree "together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic" (*Second Treatise of Government* Chapter 2)

10 *Mutual Aid*, chapter 5

11 Whereas Locke's system would tend to avoid this, since one's industriousness only really affects himself.

12 Yes, this is a slippery slope argument, I acknowledge that. But I just had to incorporate Marx's poetic language here.

13 What community does not participate in some form of mutual aid? From the wonderful town halls of the country, to volunteer organizations in major cities, Kropotkin's idea of mutual aid can be seen across the globe even today. Though it may not be the guiding principle of these places, it is still there.

or are being destroyed. The people's minds became discombobulated by industrialization, whose introduction made people question their life and consider death as an alternative in many civilized nations. Through the analysis of raw data drawn from zones which have been consumed by capitalism, Durkheim draws one of the same conclusions as Marx as to what is plaguing the globe.[14] "In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations."[15] This same criticism is the product of many different intellectuals[16], many of whom see solutions in both community and property. Both Durkheim and Kropotkin can see that a failing national identity, problems of ego and a disconnection from local community is what has arisen from the world's increased rate of development and interconnectedness.

Kropotkin, instead of looking at the areas where things have rapidly developed to find a solution, looked at places with strong ties to community: the actually quite civilized 'barbarian' nations. There, commodities are priceless, and their villages are not secluded by stone walls. These free barbarian nations lack the same kind of hatred and lust for capital.[17] Kropotkin argues that, rather than face extinction, all early humans adopted communal modes of production; compelling them to build their civilizations on the principle of mutual aid, in one word, to create anarchist communes. Most Western countries have made such small congregations subject to the dominion of large government. They have created enormous cities and increased the depressed urban population, thus removing the population from their ability to self-govern in rural towns. Just as it has made its own villages dependant on the cities, Europe has invaded and subjugated the 'barbaric' and 'semi-barbaric' nations, and made them into the working hands of the bourgeois in the east and west. The major governments of the *fin de siècle* era did away with the scattered state of many populations, robbing them of their self-sufficiency and introducing them to private property.[18] "It has agglomerated population, centralised the means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralisation"[19] This idea of centralization strongly connects Kropotkin with Durkheim, who both come to a similar conclusion separately.

The lumping together of government, taxation and laws in a capital, removes them from the communities who must be subjugated by their dealings. Durkheim, through analysing data collected throughout many years has found many different forces producing a net increase of suicide in his generation: being subject to the forceful needs and wants of capitalism, being disconnected from the community, being disconnected from yourself and your dreams, and casting away religion without sufficient knowledge with which to replace it.[20] But Durkheim conjured up a sentiment that he believed could revert this process;

14 "Thus, the more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs" (*Suicide* 209)

15 *The Communist Manifesto* Chapter 1

16 Here is a similar sentiment from Freud; "the programme of becoming happy, which the pleasure principle imposes on us, cannot be fulfilled; yet we must not — indeed, we cannot — give up our efforts to bring it nearer to fulfilment by some means or other." (*Civilization and its Discontents* 14), and similar idea from Rousseau; "excesses of every kind, immoderate transports of every passion, fatigue, mental exhaustion, the innumerable pains and anxieties inseparable from every condition of life " (*Discourse on inequality* 14)

17 Of course there is a lot of nuance to these nations, as is described throughout chapters 2 and 3 of mutual aid. I'm sure some actually do have walls, but I liked the image from the Manifesto.

18 Western colonialism is another concept I find strangely lacking from our syllabus. Though certain modes texts (like Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*) do touch on it, it seems like a rather major concept to skip over in terms of economic, political and philosophical theory. Kropotkin has an extremely interesting and pertinent discussion on the colonisation of the Bushmen (*Mutual Aid* Chapter 3)

19 *The Communist Manifesto* Chapter 1

20 "Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding a basis for existence in life; altruistic suicide, because this basis for existence appears to man situated beyond life itself. The third sort of suicide… results from man's activity's lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings" (*Suicide* 219)

decentralization.[21] We see then: the means of organization must change- a foundation must be laid in order for smaller communities to build themselves up as they once did in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of our modern world, though it may appear as though we have seen an increase in our living conditions, capitalistic society has lead us astray. A reorganization of modern agriculture, manufacturing, and industry must occur, in one word[22], it must be decentralized. Private property, centralization of power and the development of productive forces have become fetters. They needed to be burst asunder in the times of these authors, and they still need to be burnt asunder.

A similar sentiment can be seen far before Durkheim, through the eyes of Rousseau. He was able to see that the bourgeois society of his day had conjured up such terrible powers from the nether world that it turned against them, bewitching them into thinking they were actually a part of progress. He was able to divine that the history of industry, commerce and 'progress' is nothing but the history modernization. He saw that this force was unproductive; removing us from our original conditions and plaguing us with property and class relations, only improving the conditions of the bourgeoisie and its rulers but not actually improving human existence itself. It is not enough to simply mention these criticisms brought forth by Rousseau, for truly he put nearly the entire progression of human evolution on trial well before the time of Darwin and Kropotkin. In these criticisms we find a great analysis of modern existence, and a gaze towards previous periods which the forces of modernization have destroyed. He came to the same epitome as those mentioned from later epochs, which to this day is viewed as an absurdity[23]- that the idea that progress is a malignant epidemic. Is the state which society finds itself in not worse than barbarism? Famine, disease, war and devastation still cut off the means of subsistence to people in the name of industry and commerce, leading to entire peoples to be destroyed[24], and why? Because, as all of these authors have shown, there is too much civilization, too much industry, too much commerce, and not enough humanity.[25] This collection of authors disposed of the idea that society needed to further its development and thus adding to the property and control of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they make the powerful argument that these conditions fetter us, and that we must overcome these fetters in order to bring disorder to bourgeois society and bring an end to the existence of private property.[26] However, these simple comments on society are far too narrow to comprise the wealth of ideas created by these revolutionary authors.

And how does one solve these problems? On the one hand, you have revolutionary ideas of the destruction of the forces behind mass production[27], on the other you have ideas for creating new communities free of exploitation, based on age old principles of mutual aid. That is to say, paving a way forward and avoiding destruction by decentralizing the means by which governing takes place. Through legislation and large scale change, the solid ground of individualism and democracy must be turned against capitalism itself. But not only has capitalism forged a society that increasingly wishes to bring death to itself, but it has created a group of people who may be unable to revert back to what these philosophers deem to be a better era of human existence: the modern unskilled laborer. In order to split off from centralized systems of capitalism, something important must be developed in the modern laborer: instead of seeking work to increase private capital, he must work for the benefit of the whole. He must not view other people as a commodity, and then consequently be enveloped by competition and market values. Owing to the monotonousness of working

21 "The only really useful decentralisation is one which would simultaneously produce a greater concentration of social energies" (*Suicide* 357) This Idea of decentralization is central to Durkheim's conclusion and seems to be a major factor in his idea as to a solution for the epidemic of Suicide.

22 I have noticed that whenever marks says "in one word", he tends to use quite a few of them.

23 Not by all of course, but by most of our modern political landscape.

24 Simply look to the middle east.

25 I realize this is quite overly dramatic, but I think it retains much of the sentiment of both the text upon which this essay is based as well as the other authors incorporated.

26 As Marx will later argue.

27 Such as those outlined in Marx.

with machinery, and the division of labour and power into classes, the common workman has lost his individual sense of morality. He becomes an appendage to the machine, obeys simple moral practices parroted down from those above, and gets into the knack of acting according to the morality required of him. Hence the ability for the workman to produce his own ethical maxims is restricted almost entirely. As such he lacks the means required for the maintenance and propagation of mutual aid. The morality of a mutually beneficial community is only equal to that of the individual labourer. Therefore the morality of both the community and the individual increase and decrease in proportion to one another. Nay more, in proportion to the corruption of an individual in a community, in the same proportion does turmoil spring forth and increase, whether from the propagation of skewed morality or evil drawn from the depths of a man's soul. Modern industrial workers therefore must be converted to listen not to their patriarchal masters, but to practice the theology of the great master of morality; Kant.

Moral maxims must not be dictated to crowds as though they were soldiers. As private citizens, and not an army, they must be placed under the command of their own minds by practicing the categorical imperative. Not only to free themselves from the slavery of the bourgeois state, but to daily and hourly, when overlooking all things, to manufacture his own decisions, and hold himself in the ranks of his brethren. The more this deontology gains momentum towards the kingdom of ends, the more likely anarchists are of reaching their aim. With the right skill and amount of exertion, the certain strengths of the manual labourer can be cultivated. This, added to the skills and productivity of of the common labourer creates the perfect breeding ground for mutual aid, in other words, as Kantian morality spreads amongst working class men and women, the more likely mutual aid practices are to be developed.[28] As democracy has already provided us with with a theoretical outlook that decries that differences in age and sex no longer hold any valid social validity, the instruments for composing a mutually beneficial community of labourers are already within our grasp. No sooner than the labourer understands his exploitation, wishes for the kingdom of ends, and understands his democratic power over the bourgeoisie, than mutual aid may have a place to grow.

The lower strata of our middle class–the hard working people who keep our society on its feet–and all of its capabilities and sufferings are better understood by nobody other than Marx.[29]

> Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population… At this stage, the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition… But with the development of industry, the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more... The increasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious... The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding union of the workers… organisation of the proletarians into a class, and, consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier… These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress. Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class... The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern

28 This is because the categorical imperative is strongly based on a sense of community and empathy.

29 To rewrite Marx in order to explain him in this sort of creative exercise seems redundant to me. I should rather let him speak his own words. In order not to elongate this essay well beyond the 15 page upper limit of this essay, I shall use actual excerpts from the text which specifically explain the proletariat.

Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.[30]

The lower middle class are not only the perfect candidates to fight against the bourgeoisie, but they are also the largest and most important fraction of the population who would benefit the most from mutual aid practices. Kropotkin's concept isn't revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, it simply wishes to roll back the wheels of history and take lessons from the previous organization of the common man. If there was to be a revolution in the name of mutual aid, it would not be Marxian, it would simply transfer power to local authorities, and have societies defend their own present and future interests by placing themselves firmly into the bonds of their communities, thereby aiding all those a part of it. Rather than dangerous social upheaval, mutual aid seems to lend itself to more of a passive rejection of the powers of society, and working together to improve one another's condition of life rather than being a bribed tool of industry.

With the extensive scope of our syllabus, students are already virtually swamped with ideas about the organization of society. Our curriculum contains many theories on the ideas property, the role of women, the rearing of children, communal and family relations, modern industrial labour, capitalism, and the history of England, France and America, but it is stripped of an understanding of the common person's character and ways of living. The study of law, morality, religion, and philosophy tend to have a certain prejudice lurking in their analyses of the masses and their interests.[31] Nevertheless, some of the authors we read seek to give a hand to the everyman, by fortifying their status, allowing society to think freely, and seeking to improve living conditions. However the only text which advocates for the population to become its own master also advocated for violent abolition of the power structures behind production, and thereby replacing them. However Kropotkin's view is much more secure; he seeks to fortify traits that already exist in society rather than destroy all sense of security and abolish private property. He draws from a historical current to which most of our authors have shown a relative lack of interest. The philosophical current of self-interest has taken up the immense majority of philosophical discussion, for it is the current of the intellectual.[32] The current of mutual aid has been practiced by the majority of common people for the majority of history, and understanding where it comes from would be in the interest of our program. Kropotkin provides a view of the 'lower' societies and raises them up by showing that they don't need to be superincumbent on an exploitative and stratified social structure. Kropotkin provides many unique nuances, yet he also analyses many of the same struggles pointed out by authors we already read.

In depicting the most general phases of the development of mutual aid, we traced the veiled but raging problems within society, which had boiled up to the point where people began to violently throw themselves into the void of death in ever increasing number wherever capitalism laid its foundation. Hitherto all modern society has been based on an oppressive regime plagued by class antagonism. But to understand how to change these conditions, Kropotkin provides us a new tool with which to ameliorate this slavish existence. Looking at earlier periods, we see how the individual can be raised up through the membership to a commune, rather than being put under the yoke of petty bourgeois absolutism. The modern labourer, instead of sinking deeper and deeper into the disillusioned society of industry, should instead raise himself up morally by helping his fellow man. Together, wealthy countries could rapidly bring entire populations out of pauperism. And here it becomes evident that Kropotkin is a perfect fit to be integrated into our classes; to show how we can improve our conditions as a society, and to show and explain the overarching theme of mutual aid which lurks in the background of books we already read. It is a perfect fit because it competently shows an existence outside of the

30 *The Communist Manifesto*

31 Which I think Kropotkin lacks. He is able to see people as they really are through his use of anthropological study.

32 "it will probably be remarked that mutual aid, even though it may represent one of the factors of evolution, covers nevertheless one aspect only of human relations; that by the side of this current, powerful though it may be, there is, and always has been, the other current – the self-assertion of the individual… the conflicts which resulted therefrom, have already been analyzed, described, and glorified from time immemorial." (*Mutual Aid* Conclusion)

master-slave dialectic into which our modern states feed into. Society does not need to live under the bourgeoisie, and our existence is not contingent on modern society. The only essential element for existence is the construction of community for the augmentation of living conditions, in other words; mutual aid. Wage labour and capitalist competitions puts all of the weight on the shoulders labourers, while removing it from others. The advance of industry, whose voluntary promoter was the bourgeoisie places the labourers in isolation and unneeded competition. This needs not be changed by revolution, but rather by strengthening associations. The development of Mutual aid therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie stands. What mutual aid therefore produces is a grave for exploitation. Its fall and its victory are in the hands of the proletariat, but hopefully its propagation is inevitable.

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Close

Logan Pelletier

So I was told that we never actually touch anything
that there is always negligible space between objects

Still I will emphasize the concept of physicality.
human beings as apparatuses. emotional fixations on comfort

If I were transmuted into neutrinos, every bit of me would spread out over time. I could pass through you but never touch. I could get so close.

Photo by Hailey Oldfield

Dawn of Nuclear War, or How the Nazis Gave Nuclear Weapons to the Allies

Cedric Lowe

It goes without saying that war is a complex subject with numerous factors that contribute to its development. Large-scale things such as grand strategies, including which weapon systems to be used and how, and small-scale things, like the ethnicity of a country's physicists, can play equally decisive roles in determining who lost a war, and why. In the case of the Second World War, the extreme hatred of Jews with which the Nazi party fueled its political power would be the driving force determining why the Allies gained nuclear weapons before the Germans by the end of the war. It is fascinating how the extremity of anti-semitism enabled the Nazis to maintain such a powerful hold over Germany, while also being the very thing that ultimately destroyed both the Nazi Party and the Third Reich. The fact that a large number of Germany's best physicists, particularly those studying the emergent field of nuclear physics, would be Jewish, and thus would be among those targeted by Nazi policies, is significant. They would play a large role in reshaping the strategic plans across both the European and Pacific theatres of WW2. While this seems like an unlikely scenario, this paper will show the veracity of this situation by exploring how the use of anti-semitism by the Nazis as a political tool would effectively give to the Allies nuclear weapons on a silver platter.

German anti-semitism: why the Nazis wanted to expel the Jews

When Adolf Hitler promulgated anti-semitic rhetoric, laws, and actions he was not breaking entirely new ground (though he will for the attempt at the systematic destruction of Jews). Hitler was tapping into an existing current of anti-semitism in Germany and Austria:

> By and large, then, the Jewish story in the late nineteenth century was a success story, and Jews were associated above all with the most modern and progressive developments in society, culture and the economy. It was developments such as these that made the Jews the target for disgruntled and unscrupulous agitators like Hermann Ahlwardt. For the disaffected and unsuccessful, those who felt pushed aside by the Juggernaut of industrialization and yearned for a simpler, more ordered, more secure, more hierarchical society such as they imagined had existed in the not-too-distant past, the Jews symbolized cultural, financial and social modernity.[1]

After a depression in Germany political parties began to pop up on platforms against the Jews and to 'redress' the financial disparity with the Jewish minority and the rest of the German population. Those who supported these parties tended to be Germans who had been hit the hardest by the depression of 1873 and were not pleased at seeing the Jews faring much better than they did. Most of these parties would fade away in the pre-Great War period, but two managed to gain enough support to enter parliament with a few seats between them. The Christian Social Party by Karl Lueger was using the antisemitism undercurrents opportunistically to gain support while the group led by Georg Schönerer was truly anti-semitic[2]. Neither party was particularly influential in politics, but they showed that anti-semitism was a viable path to gain support for new political parties if channeled properly.

1 Evans 24
2 Evans 42f



Art by Zoe Lambrinakos-Raymond

The anti-semitic parties were largely ineffective in inspiring nationalism among the populace but the aftermath of the Great War helped them complete their work. Many veterans felt like they had been stabbed in the back from a Jewish controlled government who surrendered while the soldiers were still unbroken (every part of the angry veteran's theory of backstabbing is historically incorrect).[3] In addition to this backstab theory, there was general discontent at the impoverished economic conditions of the average German as a result of the Versailles Treaty. "Antisemitism had always surged at times of economic crisis, and the economic crises of the Weimar Republic dwarfed anything that Germany had witnessed before".[4] In addition, there was a flow of Jewish immigrants/refugees from eastern Europe as a result of increased Russian violence amidst the civil war into Germany. A growing anti-semitic rhetoric centered around the idea of a betrayal to Germany spread across the Weimar Republic.

3 Evans 150
4 Evans 151

"There were large swathes of the German electorate on the right and in the center that fervently desired a rebirth of German national pride and glory after 1918. They were to a greater or lesser degree convinced as a result that this had to be achieved by overcoming the spirit of 'Jewish' subversion that had supposedly brought Germany to is knees at the end of the war".[5] That's not to say that all Germans were anti-semitic, that's far from the case. As Ian Kershaw writes in his paper entitled "Popular Opinions During the 'Final Solution":

> The lack of uniformity in reaction, which had been perceptible in the pre-war era in popular responses, for example, to the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, or the *Reichskristallnacht* pogrom in 1938, is still plainly discernible in the period of the Final Solution. On the One hand, there are reflections in the available sources of a hardening of attitudes towards Jews in verbal expressions of hatred and approval of Nazi policies … Contrasting reactions — verbal expressions of sympathy and solidarity with Jews, existing amid the general climate of hostility — were also registered among a small minority of the population.[6]

Granted, Kershaw is referring to the period immediately before the second world war, but it is fair to assume that the same would have been true during the Weimar Republic in the years immediately after the end of the first world war. The only problem was that there were more anti-semitic attitudes and rhetoric going around that than the voices that were sympathetic to the Jews. This, combined with the models provided by previous anti-semitic parties, allowed a disgruntled veteran of the Great War - who believed in the Jewish backstab of the German Reich - to create a party that would have the removal of Jews from Germany.This one had as one of its core tenets the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (Nationalist Socialist German Worker's Party), more commonly known to people outside Germany as the Nazi Party.

From their inception, the Nazis had a strong belief in the idea that to make Germany stronger it had to be internally purified so that it could resist outside forces. This stems from the Backstab theory of the German defeat at the end of the First World War, and it would lead to changes to the inner workings of Germany throughout the period before the Second World War. The Nazis created on February 24, 1920, a program that aimed to implement these changes in order to purify Germany. Four points of this program were focused on this aim and made it clear that Jews would not be welcome:

> Points 4, 5, 6, and 8 [of the 25-point Nazi party program of 1920] dealt with concrete aspects of the 'Jewish Question.' Point 4: 'Only members of the nation may be citizens of the State. Only those of the German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. Accordingly no Jew may be a member of the nation.' Point 5: 'Non-citizens may live in Germany only as guests and must be subject to laws for aliens.' Point 6: 'The right to vote on the state's government and legislation shall be enjoyed by the citizens of the state alone.' Point 8: 'All non-German immigration must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who entered Germany after 2 August 1914 shall be required to leave the Reich forthwith.[7]

This program outlined that a pure Germany would be composed of the German race, and everyone else would not be full citizens and would remain in Germany at the pleasure of the State. Discriminatory policies for non-citizens can be inferred from Point 5 and Point 8 indicates a vague action plan on how to start the purification process. This program, while clear in its ideals, was not constructed as a comprehensive plan of how to actually implement its points. After Hitler's unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch in 1923 and his subsequent arrest, the

5 Evans 152f
6 Kershaw 146
7 Friedländer 26

ideals of the program would be put on hold as the Party had to reorganize from a paramilitary organization into a political party. Throughout the 1920's the Nazi Party would gain greater influence in State politics and support from the general populace until they were able to convince President Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor on January 30, 1933, in a cabinet reshuffle. The Nazis were now in a position where they could begin to implement their 1920 program and begin the process of cleansing Germany.

Nazi anti-semitic laws and Jewish physicists

If the Nazis in 1920 had, among others, a goal to remove the Jews from Germany but not a clear plan of how to do so, then by their rise to power in 1933 they certainly had developed something much more concrete that would lay the foundation for later discriminatory actions and the eventual "Final Solution." In 1932 the Nazis began their official state discrimination against Jews with passing laws that were meant to deal with the encroachment of "Eastern Jews," but anyone who knew better saw these laws as the start of an action against all Jews. The following year Hitler was Chancellor and his party had enough power to openly disregard the "Eastern Jew" pretense. This led to laws enacted against all Jews living in Germany restricting their rights in all facets of life throughout 1933. As Saul Friedländer puts it, "[in] Nazi racial thinking, the German national community drew its strength from the purity of its blood and from its rootedness in the sacred German earth. Such racial purity was a condition of superior cultural creation and of the construction of a powerful state, the guarantor of victory in the struggle for racial survival and domination".[8] This was something that the Nazis hinted at in 1920, and the 1933 laws were the start of the Nazi reshaping of German identity into one based on racial superiority. This, of course, did not bode well for those who were not among the chosen Germans, as they would have to be managed, at first by the use of laws and later though outright extermination.

Saul Friedländer describes the general situation and the extent of how many people were affected by the end of 1933 in this manner: "The April laws and the supplementary decrees that followed compelled at least two million state employees and tens of thousands of lawyers, physicians, students, and many others to look for adequate proof of Aryan ancestry".[9] This statement is striking since it shows two things: first that the laws were racial in nature (in that they specified non-Aryans not by religion but by blood relations, which sets a precedent for later racially-based policies), and second that the number of people that were affected by these laws was enormous. The point about state employees, in regards to the topic of this paper, is also significant as among that category was the subcategory of university professors. This is due to a quirk of higher education in Germany at the time whereby university level professors were paid by the state and therefore were technically civil servants. This is important because since they were civil servants they too fell under the purview of the April 7, 1933 law that the Nazis passed, the "Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service" (with an amendment on April 11 to remove any room for discussion on the matters pertaining to the Law).

The Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service sought to define who was qualified to hold a civil service position - from posts like police positions, to government jobs. In typical Nazi fashion, those who could hold such positions were to be of the German race ("Aryan") and supporters of the Nazi regime. Those who most definitely could not hold a civil service job were the non-Aryans, which included Jews. University professors had to be screened for the purity of their blood. As it turns out, and this was something that the Nazis and Germans and general knew, many university professors were Jewish, either religiously or 'racially' in the eyes of Nazi racial laws. As such, these Jewish professors immediately lost their positions at the moment the Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service was passed. "On April 8 all Jewish teaching assistants at universities in the state of Baden were to be expelled immediately,"[10] and throughout 1933 "about twelve hundred Jews holding academic positions would be dismissed".[11] Not everyone left immediately,

8 Friedländer 33
9 Friedländer 31
10 Friedländer 36f
11 Friedländer 50

but a culture of suspicion, dismissal of Jewish academic achievements, and anti-semitism of varying degrees among the staff and student bodies among most of the major universities[12] would push out any Jew that found a way to stay in their posts.[13]

Where this tangent into university professors being civil servants becomes fundamentally important is that a significant number of Germany's theoretical physicists and the budding group of theoretical nuclear physicists were Jewish. The Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service "abruptly stripped a quarter of the physicists of Germany, including eleven who has earned or would earn Nobel prizes, of their positions and their livelihood. It immediately affected some 1,600 scholars in all".[14] Great minds that were acclaimed around the world and in their fields, such as Albert Einstein, were unwanted by the Nazi government and thrown out of their research centers. This law and the ongoing mass emigration of Jews from Germany meant that German physics research plummeted and was willingly given over to other countries. Amongst these Jewish physicists who left Germany were Albert Einstein, Hans Bethe, John von Neumann, Leo Szilard, and Enrico Fermi and his wife Laura, among many others, were all directly involved with the Manhattan Project in some capacity. These Jewish physicists who fled Germany and the territories it conquered and occupied, pushed out of their home country that no longer wanted them, took the nuclear research that they had started in Germany and completed it within the Allied powers to further their war efforts.

The race to the bomb

On September 1, 1933, the German Jewish physicist Leo Szilard was in London when he had the following thought:

> It … suddenly occurred to me that if I could find an element which is split by neutrons and which would emit *two* neutrons when it absorbs *one* neutron, such an element, if assembled in sufficiently large mass, could sustain a nuclear chain reaction. … In certain circumstances it might be possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction, liberate energy on an industrial scale, and construct atomic bombs.[15]

Szilard would prove to be following the correct line of thought, for this is in fact how nuclear weapons function on a fundamental level. This prompted him to hunt for the ideal element to run this process (which would later be called fission) and to have his physicist and chemist acquaintances, who happened to also be fellow German-Jews who had left Germany, help in the search for a fissionable material. Together they would stumble across uranium, and with the help of the American government, weaponize it. Though they tried to keep this knowledge limited to the Allied countries, some of their contemporaries did not agree and published their own findings. This inevitably led to Germany and the Soviet Union to race the Allies to discover a fissionable material and to turn into a viable weapon system.

The general consensus among the Jewish scientists and researchers who left was that Germany had become too toxic an environment for them to work on their research in peace. The laws that started in 1933 directly hampered their workflow as they no longer had

12 For the sake of brevity only a few of the responses to the sacking of Jewish professors are presented here, but the full overview by Friedländer can be found in the second part of chapter 2, pp 50-60.

13 In order to pacify German President Paul von Hindenburg and not lose their hold on political power the Nazis were forced to include clauses in their 1933 laws whereby Jews who had served in the military with distinction or who had greatly benefitted Germany in some way could get around the discriminatory laws. This was mainly done to recognise the service of Jewish soldiers who fought in the First World War and their children, but such considerations for these veterans would be done away with after Hindenburg died in 1934. Even though some Jews used these provisions to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the laws, the culture in many professions and areas was far too toxic for them to continue making use of these exemptions.

14 Rhodes 185

15 Rhodes 28

access to their research facilities and archives. In addition, there was a dangerous rhetoric that came from the upper echelons of the Nazi Party, which included comments such as this one from Hitler after he was asked about the Jews, such as Einstein, who had contributed to German society: "Everything that they have created has been stolen from us. … Everything that they know will be used against us. They should just go and foment their unrest among other peoples. We do not need them".[16] The first part of the statement holds an obvious bias against the Jews, but the latter part is interesting to dissect. In the case of Leo Szilard who will come up with the basic process for fission and spend several years finding a fissionable material and building a network of fellow researchers to study the problem, he will prove Hitler's comment of "Everything that they know will be used against us" to be prophetic. The end of that statement shows the disdain that Hitler has for the Jews' capability to contribute to Germany. When Szilard will present a preliminary fission process to the British government, the Brits will prove to be more than happy to cooperate on giving him a secret military patent and leeway to research fission to greater depth. The same will be true of the Americans who would hire as many of the Jewish physicists and chemists that left Germany that they could get their hands on to work on the Manhattan Project after Szilard moves to the United States. What the Jews fomented in the Allied countries was not unrest, but a new zeal for research on nuclear physics to develop a new weapon system that would prove to be instrumental.

Szilard's somewhat controversial decision to get patents on his research was critical in buying nuclear researchers outside Germany time to advance their work and keep the Germans in the dark. He argued to his colleagues and friends that to avoid the German government from getting wind of a potential new super-weapon, nuclear research had to be kept as much as was possible under control in terms of who knew of the latest developments. "Secrecy was the way to achieve such control: first by winning agreement from the scientists involved to restrict publishing, and second, by taking out patents".[17] As an alternative to publishing their research, Szilard recommended that nuclear researchers send each other copies of their work by letter and make an informal network outside of the public academic channels to limit how much the Germans knew. Many agreed with him as by this point the Nazi Party was proving itself to be dangerous. Some though refused to cooperate on the grounds that everyone ought to be able to keep pace with science as restricting knowledge was antithetical to the scientific project of advancing human knowledge. Szilard's attempt to restrict the dissemination of nuclear research delayed the official start of the German nuclear program to 1937, by which time the German "War Office would [finish taking] over the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics, finished in 1937 and beautifully equipped. Adequate funds would be forthcoming".[18] The Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan for their parts started looking into nuclear fission in 1940 after some of the research had finally trickled to them.

In 1942 the German high command would finally take greater notice of nuclear research when Heisenberg sent a detailed petition to Speer for more funds. After a conference between the German physicists and Party representatives, there would be more State involvement in the German nuclear program and its military applications (such as propulsion and energy systems, and bombs). That is until Speer brought the matter up with Hitler. Speer wrote of the meeting with Hitler:

> Hitler had sometimes spoken to me about the possibility of an atom bomb, but the idea quite obviously strained his intellectual capacity. He was also unable to grasp the revolutionary nature of nuclear physics. … on the suggestion of the nuclear physicists we scuttled the project to develop an atom bomb . . . after I had again queried them about deadlines and been told that we could not count on anything for three or four years.[19]

At this point, it appears as if the Nazis were doing everything in their power to not have nuclear bombs and deliberately give as much help to the Allied nuclear program, both in

16 Rhodes 184
17 Rhodes 223f
18 Rhodes 312
19 Rhodes 404f

terms of capable researchers and the crucial amounts of time needed for development. As Roosevelt wrote in a response to Vannevar Bush's report on the estimate that the nuclear weapon system would be functional by 1944, "I think the whole thing should be pushed not only in regard to development, but also with due regard to time. Time is very much of the essence".[20] Time is something the Manhattan Project would have in abundance as the German nuclear weapons program had been throttled by Hitler and Speer.

The Americans for their part took the opposite approach. Robert Oppenheimer and General Leslie Groves would team up to form a central nuclear research facility to accelerate development at Los Alamos. Groves would handle the liaison work with the American government, construction of the required facilities, and an environment where the scientists could discuss theories without security restrictions. Oppenheimer dealt with the science and getting as many of the leading physicists who had emigrated to the States to join the project. The Manhattan Project was aided by the fact that the Allied powers did their utmost to delay German nuclear efforts as much as possible by targeting German heavy water, an important base material for producing fissionable uranium, production in Norway and its shipment to the German mainland research facilities.

In February 1944 the British were informed that a Norwegian ferry was transporting a significant amount of heavy water to Germany and decided to send in a commando to sink the ferry. Kurt Diebner of the German Army Ordnance spoke after the end of the war about the sinking of this ferry and Allied bombing of Norwegian heavy water production sites in this way: "When one considers that right up to the end of the war, in 1945, there was virtually no increase in our heavy-water stocks in Germany . . . it will be seen that it was the elimination of German heavy-water production in Norway that was the main factor in our failure to achieve a self-sustaining atomic reactor before the war ended."[21] In effect, "[the] race to the bomb, such as it was, ended for Germany on a mountain lake in Norway on a cold Sunday morning in February 1944".[22]

Brighter than a thousand suns

Whenever a discussion about the Nazis ends, the tendency is to conclude by saying that if the Nazis had not been Nazis and/or so extreme in their ideology then things would have been different. While this is somewhat of a cliché at this point, this general statement of the extremity of Nazism is very applicable in the case of the development of nuclear weapons. Had the Nazis not hated the Jews to such a degree then the race for nuclear weapons would have been radically different. Just the fact that Leo Szilard restricted the dissemination of advances in nuclear research, both in theoretical and in the manufacture of research equipment, put the Germans behind the curve. If Szilard had not done this, then the Germans would have kept pace, or worse, probably would have used all the Jewish physicists that left in a German equivalent to the Manhattan Project. In many ways, German and Nazi anti-semitism brought the Nazi Party to power but also undermined them so completely that it would lead to their defeat in the Second World War. The anti-semitism of the Nazis made them lose, no, give away the potential of nuclear energy to their future enemies. The thought of someone like Hitler or Speer victoriously proclaiming the now famous Oppenheimer quote, "Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds"[23] in a propaganda speech is terrifying. Fortunately, this scenario is fictional for the reasons discussed in this paper. But it could very well have come to pass if Szilard and the other German-Jewish scientists had not been forced out of Germany by the Nazis.

20 Rhodes 406
21 Rhodes 517
22 Rhodes 517
23 This quote is from a 1965 documentary where Oppenheimer was interviewed. He is describing the general mood of the Manhattan Project team after they contemplated what they had successfully created. The full quotation can be viewed here on youtube: www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8H7Jibx-c0

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THE POETIC GARDEN

A collection of symbols

a treasure

At times mazelike, a labyrinth,

a sacred grove where all mythmaking and symbol-forging

is drawn to and made eternal

here

the muses talk about art,

the Greek artists the aesthetic,

the Futurists the tradition

man's experience

as labyrinthine language

as mind and imagination,

as a metaphor for art

Art by Cedric Lowe

Poetry From My Road Trip Written on the Move

Alienor Dufetel

Chicago, the windy city

Chuchottements d'Hemingway à ton oreille, tes yeux s'émerveillent
Hûme la brise du lac
Infiniment détendu il souffle dans l'ombre
Chicago lui prête allégeance
Ambrée l'aurore y songe
Grâce, à vous éternellement je pense
Ou O'Leary t'embrasera

Nouvelle-Orléans

Nuits humides au-delà des jardins suspendus
Olympe du Jazz, loin de son pays natal,
Ulysse y serait sans voix, perdu.
Vierge l'archipel floral
Évite les méandres de langueur.
Loin le fleuve s'éloigne,
Libres les gens de couleur.
Élégant le Quartier Français rappelle l'Andalousie
Oubliée la culture créole saigna.
Rancoeur et tristesse de Poseïdon murit,
L'inoubliable Katrina s'avanca
En vain déstabilisa l'invasion anglo
Arracha la vie, l'espoir.
NOLA s'est relevé de parmi ses lambeaux,
Souvenir d'un soir.

Utah

Un canyon s'ouvrit devant moi, infiniment silencieux
Tendrement orangé,
Au clair de lune il miroite
Humble il gronde, le baridon entame l'hymne de la Terre, poussé par les vents.

Un canyon s'ouvrit devant moi, dans un silence profond
Terre à terre il m'affronte
Aspirée dans l'absence de bruit, je glisse
Humblement distant il repose dans la nuit.

Art by Zoe Lambrinakos-Raymond

The expression of an ideal draws nourishment from Memory

or complimentary drinks,

Art by Nikitas Vekris

Reappropriating Symbols in Art History: From the Swastika to the Pink Triangle

Callum Boog

The exponential growth of commercialization over the last two centuries has produced countless instantly recognizable images that carry with them some form of impression and collective social response. This societal fixation on icons long predates our ad-riddled, visually-obsessed 21st century. Besides the commercially significant logos of our day, symbols have also functioned within religious and political communities for centuries. In fact, one of the most instantly recognizable and visually powerful graphic symbols of all time has operated in religious and political contexts, and I only need to briefly describe it to incite recognition and visceral emotional response: an equilateral cross tilted on its axis, each of its legs bent at 90 degrees against a black and red background: the swastika.

Steven Heller traces the history of the transformation of the swastika in his book *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?*. Before it became the symbol of the Nazi party in 1920, the symbol was used as "religious phylactery, occult talisman, scientific symbol, guild emblem, meteorological implement, commercial trademark, architectural ornament, printing fleuron, and military insignia"[1]. In short, prior to 20th century Germany, the swastika had not held any negative connotations. Heller suggests that the swastika's potency as a graphic symbol even half a century after the end of the Second World War is rooted in the idea that any symbol is a weak or as strong as what it represents at a given time[2]. In this instance, the swastika is emblematic one of the most powerful and authoritative political parties in human history and thus assumes part of that power dynamic. Willhelm Deffke, a graphic designer who worked on German government propaganda during the Third Reich and who was partially responsible for the creation of the Nazi icon, found success in his understanding of German industry identity needs. He created what Heller describes in *Design Literacy: Understanding Graphic Design* as an "easily comprehensible mnemonic symbol".[3] The Nazi party took Deffke's original design, reversed it, and the history of symbolic graphic design was forever changed.

Consider, however, that a symbol may not be inherently good or bad in and of itself, but rather that its end use might determine its perception.[4] Indeed, the "rhetorical metamorphoses"[5] of the swastika from a sacred religious symbol signifying good fortune into an emblem of hate and oppression is the prototypical example of a positive graphic symbol changing after becoming imbued with political and dogmatic power.

The infamy of the swastika is due in part to its incorporation into Nazi propaganda. Declaring it the fulcrum of propaganda and the graphic embodiment of heinous dogma[6], Heller cites Leni Reifenstahl's revolutionary 1935 propaganda film *Triumph of the Will* as an example of the swastika as interchangeable with that of Adolf Hitler. Even in black and white film, devoid of the striking red-white-black coloring of the Nazi party, the swastika is recognizable three-quarters of a century after the end of the Third Reich. It is the graphic and artistic qualities of the swastika that prove most significant, despite its clear political and social significance. Heller refers to the swastika as "representative of how line, shape, mass, and color can be influential on popular perception when manipulated to serve an idea and

1 Heller "Swastika" 20
2 Heller "Swastika" 5
3 Heller "Design" 5
4 Heller "Swastika" 6
5 Heller "Swastika" 2
6 Heller "Swastika 10

promoted vociferously as a brand".[7]

Heller is ultimately interested in a question concerning the reappropriation of icons: "[if a] formerly positive icon temporarily represented evil deeds, can it never again be seen in its original context?"[8] I will further probe Heller's hypothesis to determine whether art can act as a mediating principle on the negative or positive mass perception of a visual symbol.

Yet instead of probing the history and use of the swastika, I will instead examine another mark that the Nazis claimed and made symbolic: the pink triangle. Originally used in concentration camps in during World War II to identify homosexual prisoners—much the same way the star of David was used to identify Jewish prisoners—the pink triangle has in the last half of the 20th century become a positive symbol associated with both the gay rights movement, and as a sign of protest and empowerment against the AIDS crisis of the 1980s. This reclamation of the pink triangle from a symbol of oppression and hate into one of empowerment demonstrates, as we will see, that art can be used as a means of reappropriating social ideas.

The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, better known as ACT UP, is an advocacy group formed in 1987 in New York City by a lesbian and gay community services group in response to the AIDS crisis. From its inception, the movement has sought to help those diagnosed with AIDS and HIV with treatment and medical research, as well as tackle discriminatory political policies and legislation that affect the LGBTQ community. Ultimately, ACT UP is working towards the end of the disease, by means of treatment, cure, and preventing loss of life.[9]

Throughout the last two decades of the 20th century, ACT UP practised civil disobedience and protest. These campaigns frequently made use of visual media and graphics. Jennifer Brier, a scholar interested in the political history of the AIDS crisis, writes:

> ACT UP relied on the political and rhetorical power of art and the media. Artists-activists illustrated each ACT UP protest and infused AIDS education with provocative images and graphic design. […] In ACT UP, politics and art intermingled, giving way to an aesthetic and structural critique of local and national governments.[10]

The use of art and graphic symbols were rhetorically significant for the success and influence of the ACT UP movement, none more so than the pink triangle. The political climate and general outrage from the LGBTQ community at the time ushered in artists who sought higher visibility on issues like identity politics, and institutional critique, and who did not fit into the mold of straight, white, middle-class America. A lot of art produced during the late 1980s became inextricable from the AIDS crisis itself.[11] Not for the first time in history, art began to reflect widespread social turmoil.

In *A Disease of Society: Cultural and Institutional Responses to AIDS* Dorothy Nelkin and David P. Willis describe ACT UP as an art collective that produces symbols often used in street demonstrations and protests.[12] Of these symbols ACT UP is perhaps most famously recognized for its *SILENCE=DEATH* poster (see fig. 1). The poster, which features the pink triangle on a stark black background with the slogan in block white capital letters, was designed by New York artist Keith Haring.[13] His artwork, which quickly became available on t-shirts, pins, and banners, still functions as an emblem of the AIDS movement and has been displayed at formal art exhibitions.[14] Nelkin and Willis attribute the ubiquity and success of Haring's *SILENCE=DEATH* image to aesthetic ties

7 Heller "Swastika"
8 Heller "Swastika" 8
9 ACT UP Archive Database
10 Brier 160
11 Pollack 60-63
12 Nelkin and Willis 36
13 Bastos 44
14 Bastos 36

to advertisement and commercial design.[15] ACT UP's message of dissent was disseminated not unlike propaganda: viz. through mass media by way of posters, stickers, banners &c. targeted at a commercialized and consumerist 20th century audience.

The political inclinations of ACT UP played a notable role in the design aesthetic of its posters. Jason Baumann, the coordinator of Humanities and LGBT collections at the New York Public Library, is one of the founding members of ACT UP and was directly involved with the design of the *SILENCE=DEATH* poster. He describes the primary objectives of the image in two parts: first, he and Haring sought to incite the LGBT community to engage politically with AIDS; and secondly, they wished to signify to others outside of the LGBT community that ACT UP was a politically-engaged group.[16] Recalling Heller's hypothesis that a symbol is as weak or as strong as what is represent at a given time, the strength of the pink triangle as a logo might then be rooted in its strong political affiliations—operating much the same way as the swastika, though less insidiously.

Nelkin and Willis describe Keith Haring's iconography as a struggle against stigma, in that he delivered a message in "ambiguous codes of popular design".[17] Similarly, Baumann stresses the need for a densely-coded design in order to effectively communicate to a wide range of audiences, both in and out of the LGBT community.[18] What better way to communicate to a mass audience obsessed with consumerism than to "sell" an idea? Baumann again emphasises that Haring's work was a kind of advertising: the image was plastered alongside other commercial posters to signify that ACT UP was a wide-reaching organization and movement.[19] The image itself is unquestionably striking and designed to be provocative. It stimulates inquiry for an audience in much the same way regular product advertisement is often designed to be eye-catching and provoke curiosity,[20] The *SILENCE=DEATH* image thus engaged people who might otherwise have ignored anything to do with AIDS protest movements. The accessible and oftentimes cartoonish approach that Haring took with his AIDs artwork effectively helped disseminate for a wider audience subversive and transgressive subject matter.[21] The pink triangle, then, was a fitting symbol to represent difficult and controversial subject matter. Recognizing the negative connotations the triangle typically provoked for those familiar with World War II, human rights, or LGBTQ history, Baumann states that he and the other members of the early ACT UP group initially rejected the use of the pink triangle because of its links to the Nazi concentration camps. Significantly, he writes,

Figure 1: Keith Haring/ACT UP, SILENCE=DEATH, 1987. Offset lithograph.

> We realized any single photographic image would be exclusionary in terms of race, gender and class and opted instead to activate the LGBTQ audience through queer iconography. […] We eventually returned to [the pink triangle] for the same reason [we initially rejected it], inverting the triangle as a gesture of a disavowal of victimhood.[22]

This passage recalls Stephen Heller's hypothesis on the reappropriation of symbols. Even

15 Bastos 37
16 Baumann
17 Baumann
18 Baumann
19 Baumann
20 Baumann
21 Woubshet 106
22 Baumann

the *reversing* of the pink triangle mirrors Deffke's inversion of the traditional swastika as an appropriatory move. The artists and activists involved in the conception of the SILENCE=DEATH poster were keenly aware of the negative associations the pink triangle carried, but deliberately chose it for that very same reason. In a subversive move that proved both effective and iconic, they used Haring's challenging artwork precisely because it demonstrates that art always has the potential to be political and flexible. The pink triangle is graphically potent: it is simple, striking, and comes already charged with emotion. By incorporating the triangle into a positive, powerful, and provocative movement, Haring channeled a new rhetoric into the pre-existing dynamism of the symbol, and imbue it with new purpose.

This does not, however, mean that the original meaning and context of the pink triangle is completely removed today. In *The Calendar of Loss: Race, Sexuality, and Mourning in the Early Era of AIDS* Dagmawi Woubshet suggests that Haring's use of the pink triangle might be read as "an allusion to the oppressive regime and concentration camps from which it is derived" and might be suggestive of the idea that "AIDS is itself a kind of genocide or holocaust".[23] Art is rarely interpreted in a singular fashion, and in the multiplicity of interpretation exists the possibility for reappropriation. Heller's concept of taking back an idea originally meant to instill fear and stigma, and using it instead to garner support and change overarching attitudes toward the same cause bolsters Woubhet's theory. The pink triangle does not represent a single idea or evoke a single uniform response, because interpretation of visual art is never static.

In an article about Haring's artwork titled "From Haring to Condom Man: Art as Weapon in the War Against AIDs", originally published in *The Atlantic*, Hans Villarica makes a point not dissimilar to Stephen Heller's argument about the swastika as a pervasive globally recognized symbol:

> The way that symbols work is that they already have some sort of universal meaning affixed to them. They come coded. They count on the viewer being able to place those in a larger context. The banana and the David, they do that. The early ACT UP image pink triangle was certainly one of them too. Everyone knew what that triangle stood for at a certain point in time. They allow the poster to communicate that message about AIDS but also bestow a sense of knowing into the viewer, so they're able to look at it. It's not as scary. Putting art there soft-ens it in a way. […]. People get curious when they see it, and it makes the problem not as medical.[24]

Evidently, Villarica recognizes the malleability of both images and sociocultural perceptions of images. Whether the ACT UP image really "softens" the image of the pink triangle or not is ultimately left up to the viewer to decide. The focus is primarily on creating an accessible image that triggers powerful familiar associations—that is, with homosexuality, gay rights, and the AIDs movement, but further framing them in a more positive light.

Recognizing its initial success as the emblem of the AIDs crisis, Keith Haring reworked the pink triangle in late 1989 and merged with it other elements from his popular artwork: the most striking example incorporates neon-pink human silhouettes against the pink background of the triangle, and white silhouettes against the black background of the poster (see fig 2). Woubshet describes this later artwork as yet another form of social protest in which Haring makes a statement about AIDS that reflects an entire generation of young Americans.[25] The way that some of the cartoon figures are excluded from the triangle highlights those who are trapped within it, representing the exposure and imprisonment of AIDS victims facing shame and being ostracized from the rest of the public.[26] Pop art and the cartoonish mass-media graphic appeal of Haring's other artwork rendered the pink triangle synonymous with a social justice cause and highlighted significant political undertones. It was pop-art as politics, propelled by the near instant ubiquity of the pink triangle after the

23 Woubshet 108
24 Villarica 2
25 Woubshet 106
26 Woubshet 109

success of the first *SILENCE=DEATH* poster.

Haring's success with the use of the pink triangle is closely tied to the visually explosive nature of commercialization in the 1980s and early 1990s Nelkin and Willis best describe the use of the pink triangle in the ACT UP posters as a synthesis between mass culture, fine arts, and popular culture.[27] They further emphasise that this kind of art "helped dispel stigma by deconstructing it".[28] The act of deconstruction is made possible in part by the consumable nature of the art in question. People accustomed to an onslaught of commercial and rapid-fire visual media on billboards, in magazines, or on television, and who might not otherwise be inclined towards political art or social justice causes can quickly recognize a simple graphic symbol and then infer meaning. Furthermore, the process of "deconstruction" happens by way of reappropriation: using what was once held as an oppressive symbol in a newly commercial but equally authoritative style, presents the opportunity for positive re-interpretation of previously held stigma.

The tense social and political atmosphere of the late 1980s was also influential on the use of art during the AIDS crisis period. Dagmawi Woubshet discusses the way that resistance and forward momentum toward the acceptance and visibility of queer people, started by gay communities, manifested itself through Keith Haring in the "cacophony of symbols and images" in his visual artwork.[29] For example, in 1989 Haring produced a work titled *Ignorance = Fear* (fig. 3). Included within the work are references to ACT UP, including the pink triangle logo and slogan. The three figures represent the pictorial maxim of the three wise monkey: see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. This was surely intended as a political barb geared toward the unmindful attitudes of both the US public and government during the AIDS crisis. Indeed, Woubshet writes that Haring "aligns the proverbial image with AIDS activism, signifying both the public's act of willed ignorance, fear, and evasion of AIDS, and the countervailing forces of knowledge, power, and the engagement that AIDS activism brought to bear".[30] The inclusion of a political play on another widely-recognized visual image demonstrates that Haring was keenly aware of the power of reusing and making art with images to promote new or subversive ideas.



Figure 2: Keith Haring, Silence = Death, 1989. Acrylic on Canvas. Poster for ACT UP, 40x40. Keith Haring artwork © Keith Haring Foundation

David Frankel perceives Keith Haring not so much as an appropriator of earlier works, but more as a synthesist of early Pop Art visual form and neo-expressionist contemporary social issues.[31] Likening Haring's work to the neo-expressionist movement is apt insofar as many neo-expressionists sought to portray recognizable objects emotionally, often by using vivid color and violent imagery.[32] Haring's work is a subtle yet powerful blend of visually emotive pop art and connotations of the violence experienced by the LGBT community during the AIDS crisis (see fig. 2). Frankel also describes Haring as acutely aware of the slow-going institutional responses to the AIDS crisis.[33] Haring's approach to art was an intentional cultural response, with an aim to demand attention and defeat stigma, and this tactic in fact proved highly effective: coupled with the political activism of ACT UP, his approach contributed to the decrease in AIDS infection rates in large cities.[34] Art, even that which is geared towards a consumer audience, is not merely a passive subject that

27 Nelkin and Willis 39
28 Nelkin and Willis 39
29 Woubshet 110
30 Woubshet 110
31 Frankel
32 Cilvers and Glaves-Smith 503f
33 Nelkin and Willis 35
34 Nelkin and Willis 37

exists in the world. Combined with specific implications—such as the pink triangle—it acts as an active influential force in the social and political world.

The key to Haring's success in incorporating an oppressive symbol into his artwork is perhaps rooted in the fact that he allowed both the form and substance of his work's imagery to reflect his social views with little compromise.[35] Consider the way *The Queer Encyclopedia of the Visual Arts* writes about the *SILENCE=DEATH* posters: "These materials, especially their typography and layout, became immediately associated with gay activism, public declarations of gay identity, and proactive campaign to gain access to political power".[36] This demonstrates that the "rhetorical metamorphoses" as discussed by Stephen Heller are indeed possible. I have already examined the way in which the Nazi party successfully reclaimed a symbol through political campaigning. The use of the pink triangle initiated a similar rhetorical metamorphosis, but towards a positive change. Even though the main visual feature of ACT UP features a once-oppressive icon, the associations and connotations that come with it have since shifted, not only with the help of contemporary artwork and political activism, but through blending it with the appeal of contemporary mass-media. In both cases, engaging graphics and artwork with the contemporaneous social and political realities proved to be an effective strategy for rhetorical shift.

Figure 3: Keith Haring, IGNORANCE=FEAR, 1989. Poster for ACT UP, 24x43 Keith Haring artwork © Keith Haring Foundation

In an article written for a 1997 issue of *Vanity Fair* titled "Kid Haring", Ingrid Sischy comments that "Haring's art is so at ease it doesn't look like stuff for the history books" and then calls it "the ultimate subversion".[37] We would be remiss to overlook the irony in Sischy's evaluation of Haring's work. While much of it features stick-figure silhouettes and cartoon-like characters, a great deal of his chosen imagery features the pink triangle (see fig. 3). Of course, the pink triangle found its place in the history books as early as the mid 20th century, when the Nazi party used it as a degrading means of identification in concentration camps decades before any associations with gay liberation or AIDs protest. Thus Haring's work is a subversion of the history books. It is a take-back, a queer reclamation on positive terms. Art is by nature contentious, and artistic interpretation is always up for grabs. When Nelkin and Willis write that "there is an ongoing tension between those who think that art […] must empower the afflicted, and those who insist on a more subjective […] response"[38] we must remind ourselves that art can, in fact, stimulate both responses at once. I have mentioned only two examples of the way that different artists, political campaigns, and audiences alike have reclaimed artwork for their own respective purposes, but there are surely more examples of this process throughout art history. The swastika and the pink triangle demonstrate the scope and power of art throughout history that has allowed individuals and communities to participate in visual rhetoric and change. To engage with art is to constantly engage in the process of semiotics, and to make meaning with what we find visually emotive and striking. Today, the pink triangle stands as a meaningful example of the potential for artistic appropriation and re-interpretation.

35 Frankel 3
36 Summers 85
37 Sischy 4
38 Nelkin and Willis 37

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Extraits de Ma Solitude Est Toujours Grosse

Étienne Gélinas

Traité voluptueux

La volupté est un terme imprécis, ce qui en fait toute sa substance. Ni sauvage, ni crue, elle n'ose jamais la disgrâce. La volupté semble aérienne, idéale, évasive, en retrait du corps; elle s'adresse sensuellement à l'esprit. Elle ne dresse aucun portrait et tend plutôt à ce qu'il y a de moins tangible entre deux corps. En cela elle est la fière opposante des pédants paradigmes pornographiques.
Que peut elle imposer sinon le vif acharnement qu'ont deux êtres à s'aimer ?
Que peut elle décrire sinon ce qui ne mérite aucun mot ?
La volupté est la dernière chose qui mérite d'être pensée, la dernière chose qui mérite d'être écrite, car rien ne pourrait traduire ce qui en fait réellement la vaporeuse substance.
Ce n'est point la volupté qui s'affale sur le lit ; ce n'est point la volupté qui baise le sein.
Ce n'est pas elle non plus qui cherche à tirer une larme au plaisir ou à provoquer l'essoufflement charnel, le tressaillement épidermique ou les sons qui ramènent à l'envie conquise.
La volupté ne se tient point sur l'amante et ne referme pas l'étau du corps.
Volupté n'est ni jouissance, ni désir, ni sexe, ni sueur.
Elle est ce qui marque le sceau de l'union en l'acte. Elle se tient en maître du verbe de l'Amour. Ce Faire, elle l'englobe sans lui toucher.
La volupté c'est la folie des âmes qui se frottent et s'émeuvent en silence.
Es-ce alors à l'écrivain de saisir ces moments au vol, de les coucher sur papier aux yeux de tous ? Il doit plutôt les revêtir des nombreux voiles qui leur permettent d'être tout juste assez invisibles pour briller.

Dîner en tête –

Rédiger un poème d'amour
Seul dans sa cuisine
Sans musique, pour ne pas fantasmer ta voix,
C'est pathétique, comme moi, mettant le couvert pour deux
Dans mon 1 et demi.

«Tu prends du vin mon cœur ?»
L'absence sur la chaise ne me répond pas.

Ton nom est Nostalgie

Ton nom est Nostalgie
Donne-moi à boire
Donne-moi à boire
Et couve-moi
Comme si tu m'avais donné le sein
Et ce fut le cas
Deuxième mise au monde
À travers le vagissement plaintif de ma conscience de la solitude
Nourriture de pluie et odeur de terre

Sont mes «Pater Noster» quotidiens
Défense de penser au questionnement de Camus
Sisyphe a sa réponse
Toute trop simple
Et il ne vit que par lâcheté
Tout comme toi Nostalgie
Toi qui trouvais trop dur d'être ici avec moi et en moi
Pour des kilomètres et des kilomètres – Tabernacle
Toi Nostalgie qui sortais dehors sous la pluie, méprisant l'aisance
Et les bons sentiments protecteurs
M'embrassant à la française, à la dure
Tu prenais sans offre, ni compromis
Sans pudeur, sans rire, sans regarder,
Ni douter de toi qui devenais un sexe clapotant sur l'air
Tu portes ce nom Nostalgie, car tu n'es plus que brume de toi
Et souvenir de goût acre du bout des lèvres
Contentant toutes celles qui un jour ou l'autre
Me ramèneront à ma normale de mammifère sexué errant
Sur la Terre Mère Infertile que je veux quand même tenter
J'ai fais des rêves de poissons barboteux qui me murmurent de me noyer
Des souvenirs narcotiques que je supplie d'arrêter
De me gaver de toi Nostalgie
De me sevrer d'avoir à m'oublier en m'étouffant
Sous tes draps qui ont connu plus d'un rituel
Le contrôle c'est l'essentiel, mais je suis fou braque et j'ai l'haleine à chaud
Attache-moi au fond de l'abysse, je veux écouter les poissons
Et chanter la chanson du saule qui craque sous le crachat des éléments
Toi, Nostalgie, tu rampes au sol en agrippant chaque lieu-souvenir
Par la racine de ce qui fut un jour bonheur connement acquis
Connement savouré, connement désiré, un bonheur éminemment con
Par le con et pour le con
À en oublier de marcher dans la rue pour se questionner de la pertinence
Du prochain pas, vers toi, Nostalgie
Je t'ai caressé bien trop de fois
J'aurais du minimiser les dégâts
Et sabler ma joie, sabler mon sourire plus près du serrement des dents
Pour te posséder, Nostalgie
Mais ce n'est rien
J'ai des aiguilles plein les yeux et je ne t'attends plus pour la fête

Je suis trop vieux, par ta faute.

Photo by Logan Pelletier

Photo by Logan Pelletier

9/11, South Park, and the Political Imagination

Ulysses Fiorito

How much of our imagination determines how we perceive and experience reality? This question will serve as the main guide through my brief study of the effects of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the treatment of terrorism and imagination in *South Park*'s "Imaginationland" trilogy. In an attempt to answer the question, I will consider imagination as experienced by both children and adults and highlight in an intuitive fashion their differences and parallels. I will then present and engage with the ideas of various auctors on the role of the imagination. Finally, I intend to apply my interpretation of "Imginationland" to gain an understanding of what exactly changed in the western world following the events of 9/11. What 9/11 brought was a change in our imaginations. I posit that media coverage and rhetoric of the attack established a fiction-like portrayal of the event which played a crucial role in ushering in this change. I will ultimately argue that our imagination has a significant role in politics and is at the core of how we experience and perceive reality.

I love Mickey Mouse more than any woman I have ever known

-Walt Disney

My imaginative faculties played a significant role in shaping my childhood experiences, and I expect the same can be said for most children. How I spent my leisure time was through the use of my imagination, whether it was playing out stories with my action figures or imagining myself as a Jedi, or a Tolkien character on a quest to destroy the One Ring. I would give imaginative purposes to tedious activities so as to turn the harsh realities of visiting the doctor or cleaning my room into experiences of some greater purpose. I even chose to enroll in the high school I attended because it had a house-system similar to that of the Harry Potter world. I knew I wasn't actually going to attend Hogwarts but the fact that my high school mimicked an aspect of a magical world drove me to want to attend that particular school. Reality and imagination were in constant overlap, as though reality on its own was simply not good enough. As a practising musician and songwriter, I continue to consciously engage with my imagination and impose it onto reality. I have no shame in saying that I have a greater affinity to the products of my imagination than to most tangible beings.

Having said this, I find it easy to understand why people often ascribe imagination to either children or artists. However, imagination can also take on a political role. Concepts like *justice*, *freedom*, *liberty*, the *state*, the *people*, *democracy*, *fascism*, etc., are not in and of themselves "real"–at least not physically so. They are all non-tangible figments of our collective imagination set up to bring deeper meaning and structure into reality, similar to how Luke Skywalker or Gandalf bring meaning and structure into the realities of children, or how music and painting do so for the artistically inclined. They are real in so far as they are important to us as a society and as individuals.

These political concepts, along with political beliefs, make up our political imagination, an important aspect to politics because it allows us to re-imagine the world and envision and plan for a future based on our memory of the past and experience of the present. Commenting on Hume's ideas on imagination, Austrian philosopher Gerhard Streminger asserts that "while memory allows us to recall past experiences, we can make use

of the imagination to produce new ideas by imposing a new order on past impressions".[1] The political imagination incites the desire for new ideas and political and social change. But sometimes, change comes about in an unwarranted fashion.

Terrorism, especially when coupled with the proper rhetoric, has the ability to drastically alter our political imagination, and it does so by metaphorically attacking it. This is made most evident through the sublimity of the 9/11 attacks and the rhetoric that followed suite. An example of such rhetoric would be Bush's "War on Terror" declared after the attacks - a war on an intangible concept. The "War on Terror" is an essentially imaginary war, vivid enough to be experienced as real by those whose imaginations have been successfully overrun by fear. *South Park*'s "Imaginationland" deals with this concept, albeit in an unconventional fashion. Before I venture further into what *South Park* has to offer to this discussion, I will briefly outline David Hume's account of role of the imagination so as to tangent from my personal musings to more auctorial positions and get a better understanding of the philosophical implications of imagination.

> Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of the imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers.
>
> -David Hume

It was a trend in seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy to comment on or criticize the imagination on the grounds that it got in the way of reason and obstructed one's capacity to understand and connect with the immediate present. Hobbes calls imagination "nothing but decaying sense".[2] For Pascal, it had a persuasive power over even "the wisest men".[3] David Hume, likewise, attributes to imagination a great propensity to overpower reason, for the mind has an "authority over all its ideas" which makes it "able to believe whatever it pleases; contrary to what we find by daily experience".[4] He also recognizes its limitations, and relies on these limitations so as to assume that reasoning through sense is ultimately the best way to understand and know the world. According to Hume, the imagination is most limited in its "vivacity" compared to the intensity of "memories and experiences".[5]

For Hume, as well as Hobbes and Pascal, imagination has a certain power over sense, even though sense is its primary cause. He sees certain limitations to imagination when compared to sense yet still reckons it as dangerous enough to overtake reason. This potential danger comes when our "imaginations start running wild" as is suggested in "Imaginationland". This occurs when we lose the practical function of imagination to a mental ambush of fear – a fear initiated by terrorism but further propagated by media and rhetoric.

All of this was brought upon us in a single day – and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

–George W. Bush

1 Streminger 94
2 Hobbes 88
3 Pascal 9
4 Hume 31
5 Streminger 96

9/11 marks a paradigm shift in the western world, but what was it that changed western reality (or experience/perception of reality) after 9/11? In his book *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*, philosopher Slavoj Žižek compares 9/11 to *The Matrix*. He argues that for the American people, 9/11 served as the awakening and thrust into "real reality" that Neo experiences in *The Matrix* after taking the red pill offered to him by Morpheus.[6] Although this idea is compelling, I am inclined to disagree with it because it underscores the role that the imagination played in ushering in the paradigm shift that 9/11 lead to. What I argue is that 9/11 did not thrust us back into "real reality" but rather shifted the focus of our political imagination so that we then experienced reality differently. What lead me to this assertion was not a political commentator or terrorism expert, nor was it an academic paper – not even a world leader. Surely enough it was a cartoon show, a product of someone's imagination, that sparked my interest in this topic and that lead me to this politically relevant claim.

– Art Spiegelman (Maus)

South Park's "Imaginationland" offers insightful commentary that can be applied in this reflection on the imagination and its relation to politics. In the 3 part mini-series, the children of South Park find themselves in Imaginationland, a magical town where all the imaginary and fictional characters reside. While they are there the town gets attacked by Islamic terrorists which causes the imagination to "[run] wild".[7] This attack on the imagination, as it is put in the show, causes an imprudent response by the U.S. government. They decide to nuke the imagination "so the terrorists can't ever use it against us again" .[8] Having escaped Imaginationland, Kyle attempts to convince the U.S. government that imaginary characters are real, so as to dissuade the government from nuking the imagination and killing off every beloved fictional character. In his speech, Kyle equates the "real" to what is important to him, to things that have significantly impacted the way he acts and how he thinks. This mirrors my experiences with my imagination described at the beginning of this piece, and I argue that it mirrors our experiences with our political imagination as well. If liberty and justice are important to us, then that makes those concepts "real". By the same token, the constant paranoia of a potential terrorist attack turns a conceptual fear into a fear so real that the U.S. actually waged a war against it.

Juxtaposed to the political narrative in "Imaginationland" is the narrative that drives the plot forward, a bet that Kyle lost to Cartman that now obliges him to suck Cartman's balls. This part of the narrative is important not in its content but in its purpose. It ensures that the casual viewers of *South Park* (those who watch it purely for its comedy) will not get turned off by its political discussions. Conversely, those who don't usually enjoy cartoons or the type of comedy South Park employs will find something of interest through its political themes. This is an idea expressed by Spiegelman in *Maus* and McCloud in *Understanding Comics*.

In *Maus*, Vladek is interested in Artie's comic even though he doesn't "read ever such comics".[9] The content alone is not what draws the attention of readers, as Mala suggests

6 Žižek 15
7 Parker and Stone, "Imaginationland I"
8 Parker and Stone, "Imaginationland III"
9 Spiegelman 133

when she says: "It's an important book. People who don't usually read [Holocaust survival] stories will be interested".[10] The medium by itself is also not sufficient, as Vladek suggests when he states: "I don't read ever such comics".[11] It is the combination of the content and the medium that best draws one's interest and retains one's attention. This is true for cartoons like *South Park* just as much as it is for comics.

McCloud "realized that comic books were usually crude, poorly-drawn, semiliterate, cheap, disposable kiddie faire -but- they don't have to be".[12] *South Park* began as a "crude, poorly-drawn, semiliterate, cheap, disposable kiddie faire" but as the creators quickly realized, "[it didn't] have to be".[13] What I have come to realize through my interpretation of "Imaginationland" along with the arguments of Spiegelman and McCloud is the attraction that we have to a fictional visual representation of an idea or event and the power it has in tapping into our imaginative faculties, whether it be through a comic book, a cartoon, or a live action movie. This leads me to suggest that the televised portrayal of 9/11 was projected and received as a fictional representation of an otherwise unintelligible reality.

It's funny how the colours
of the real world
only seem r e a l l y
r e a l when you
viddy them on the screen

-Alex DeLarge

Before one's reality is altered, one's imagination must be changed or attacked. The sublimity of 9/11 attacked the imagination of viewers watching it unfold on the television over and over again, and the commentary that proceeded helped keep the imagination under siege, thus altering one's perception and experience of reality. I argue furthermore that this happened because of the medium through which the event of 9/11 met the eyes and ears of the majority of the public. The fascination with 9/11 came from the fact that it was televised and could have been viewed from the comfort of one's living room. As Marshall McLuhan's saying, "the medium is the only message", suggests in *Understanding Media*, messages will have a different impact depending on the medium through which they are expressed.[14] The fictional-like characteristics of 9/11 as a televised event (the explosions, the smoke, the massive collapse of the Twin Towers) has left it engraved in our imagination. Reality became perceived and experienced as a fiction, and as a fiction it affected us more strongly. This makes 9/11 hyper-real because its effects transcend the immediate event itself and remain part of the West's political imagination, leading to an irrational state of paranoia and animosity against the Muslim people. The hijackers became representatives of a generalized Middle Eastern threat, and the victims of a generalized American innocence.

Of course these feelings of hate toward one particular group of people were not felt or expressed by everyone. There was a lot of opposition to Bush's invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and to the tightened state security and surveillance; yet, in this instance the imagination triumphed over reason and "daily experience" as Hume would put it, because the invasion still legally went through and surveillance and security was still radically

10 Spiegelman 133
11 Spiegelman 133
12 McCloud 3
13 McCloud 3
14 McLuhan 25

increased. "Daily experience" tells us that the chances of a terrorist attack occurring are slim to none, but our imagination tells us otherwise. Imagination bleeds onto the world of politics because of the significance and impact it has on our perception of reality.

> They've changed my life - changed the way I act on the earth.
> Doesn't that make them kind of real? They might be imaginary but,
> but they're more important than most of us here.
>
> -Kyle Broflovski

Our imagination is at the core of how we perceive and experience reality, and it is our imagination that was ultimately changed with the advent of 9/11. This event had such lasting effects due to its fiction-like and spectacular characteristics portrayed through media and rhetoric. If we are affected by our imagination more significantly than by reason or facts as I believe South Park's "Imaginationland" suggests, then we can understand that 9/11 did not confront us with "real reality" as Zizek posits, but rather it set our imaginations on a new trajectory from which western reality only became perceived as different and more dangerous. We are raised and grow up with our imaginations as key players in our realities and this phenomenon is not parted with as we get older, it simply becomes political.

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Art by Elise Timm-Bottos

Blackness and Nothingness, Splendor and Misery: It's clipping— it's cutting— it's mu—

Charles Gonsalves

First God
Weary is my spirit of all there is.
I would not move a hand to create a world
Nor to erase one.

I would not live could I but die,
For the weight of aeons is upon me,
And the ceaseless moan of the seas exhausts my sleep.

Could I but lose the primal aim
And vanish like a wasted sun;
Could I but strip my divinity of its purpose
And breathe my immortality into space,

And be no more;
Could I but be consumed and pass from time's memory
Into the emptiness of nowhere!

Third God
Listen my brothers, my ancient brothers. A youth in yonder vale
Is singing his heart to the night. His lyre is gold and ebony.
His voice is silver and gold.

–"The Earth Gods", Kahlil Gibran

Can we say, with any certainty, *where* sleep takes place? Hannah Arendt, in *The Life of the Mind,* wrote that the question of thought was not *what it is* but *where it goes*.[1] And so, as with thought, the land or water of sleep—which can be thought of as thought in an extreme, what for its total disrespect for space, time, and identity—is similarly unmapped, perhaps unmappable. Sleep is an *inter*space: one in which we are *interred*, lowered, and rise from every morning; in which we enter into degrees of *inter*subjectivity—between, among, and mutual with the many iterations of the selves and others we keep in our depths. Fred Moten's essay, "Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)", says much about these depths—depths of flesh, body, mind, heart, soul, place, and history that I do not, cannot, and will not claim to know or understand; my comments on his essay, and the parts of it I will bring to bear on my own, will be made and borrowed with the utmost humility, sincerity, and hope—in the interest of "[t]he promise of another world, or of the end of this one, [which] is given in the general critique of world".[2] I will attempt to demonstrate what I have learned, upon a reading that demanded nearly all I could summon, from his essay, what I hope to learn upon subsequent readings, and what or how it, when read alongside clipping.'s *Splendor and Misery,* (de)generated. I will be foregoing the usual imperative of the essay—that of advancing an original argument—in favor of acquiescing to Moten's request and *amplifying* what I have heard in his work. He writes: "I really want you to hear what

1 Robertson 13
2 Moten 752

we've been working on, this under-riff we've been trying to play, to study, to improvise, to compose..."[3] And as a tonal guide for this essay, its interpretations, and associations:

> Is it possible to desire the something other than transcendental subjectivity that is called nothing? What if blackness is the name that has been given to the social field and social life of an illicit alternative capacity to desire? Basically, that is precisely what I think blackness is. I want it to be my constant study. I listen for it everywhere[4].

clipping. are an experimental rap group that consists of Daveed Diggs, William Hutson, and Jonathan Snipes. Hutson and Snipes experiment with power electronics and musique-concrete to make (amazingly) at times conventional or generic yet consistently interesting beats out of broken glass, beer cans, ball bearings, alarm clocks, gunfire, and much else; Diggs, the voice and lyricist of the group, flexes, on numerous occasions, his ability to rap relentlessly without sacrificing, and actually generating, melody and nuance—seemingly without needing to breathe. *midcity* and *CLPPNG,* their debut EP and LP respectively, while wildly inventive and, at times, anticipatory of themes the group will be preoccupied with later, are obviously in pursuit of different ends.

Splendor and Misery[5] is clipping.'s most obviously cohesive and directed effort: it is committed to telling a tight, haunting, explosive story. Unlike the two albums mentioned above, it demonstrates extreme attention to and rigor in world building: Diggs, Snipes, and Hutson create "the inhabitation of an architecture and its acoustic, an inhabitation given as if in an approach from outside".[6] When we listen to "Long Way Away (Intro)", which is really the album's core spiritual refrain—what Moten might describe as "the undercommons' (an) originary refrain"[7]—we are listening *from outside*. No matter how viscerally the insides of the ship are rendered for us, as evidenced everywhere on the record but in particularly amazing movements such as 0:40-0:56 on "The Breach" or the pounding beat of "Wake Up" that is both heartbeat and cold machinery, we are still listening from outside. This orientation is a crucial detail to bear in mind when Moten's account of Frank B. Wilderson III's notion of the fantasy in the hold and all that is created therein.[8] We must remember our *outsideness*—and, beyond just that, understand it not as an imaginative or critical exclusion imposed *on us* but as horribly representative of our history of *imposing* and *confining.* So listen:

> I'll follow the stars when the sun goes to bed / Till everything
> I've ever known is long dead / I can't go back home 'cause I
> want to be free / Someone tell the others what's become of me
> ("Long Way Away" [Intro])

The singer of this verse is not an identifiable character—or aspect of a character—of the album, and the journey of his disembodied voice is by night. This would be important to Moten, who writes: "Paralyric sociality has no place in the sun. The night holds fantasy, not

3 Moten 778
4 Moten 778
5 Splendor & Misery is an Afrofuturist, dystopian concept album that follows the sole survivor of a slave uprising on an interstellar cargo ship, and the onboard computer that falls in love with him. Thinking he is alone and lost in space, the character discovers music in the ship's shuddering hull and chirping instrument panels. William and Jonathan's tracks draw an imaginary sonic map of the ship's decks, hallways, and quarters, while Daveed's lyrics ride the rhythms produced by its engines and machinery. In a reversal of H.P. Lovecraft's concept of cosmic insignificance, the character finds relief in learning that humanity is of no consequence to the vast, uncaring universe. It turns out, pulling the rug out from under anthropocentrism is only horrifying to those who thought they were the center of everything to begin with. Ultimately, the character decides to pilot his ship into the unknown—and possibly into oblivion—instead of continuing on to worlds whose systems of governance and economy have violently oppressed him. Link: clppng.bandcamp.com/album/splendor-misery. The entire album has been embedded at the end of this essay for your listening pleasure. -ed.
6 Moten 746
7 Moten 746
8 Moten 743

identity".[9] The night that is travelled in *Splendor and Misery* is not, however, just *a* night; it is *the* constant, absolute, boundless cage of darkness in which there is only the suggestion of light, light that is always elsewhere, light that can only express itself through an atmosphere. This night, no matter how full of stars, is never *itself illuminated*: cosmic antagonism. The fantasy that is *held* by this night is essential to Moten's essay as it is the very essence of that space in which he "begin[s] to explore not just the absence but the refusal of standpoint [...] what Bryan Wagner[10] calls 'existence without standing'"[11]. Fantasy is therefore both the means of conveyance for criticism & creation *and* the thing itself—"as thingliness, even as (absolute) nothingness, even as imprisonment in passage on the most open road of all".[12] The open road is the ocean, obviously, but drawing the parallel between ocean and outer space does not require much of a leap[13]: both are traversed by ships—ships with the potential and purpose to carry, contain, and confine—and both are *nowhere* spaces. Moten writes: "It's terrible to have come from nothing but the sea, which is nowhere, navigable only in its constant autodislocation".[14]

Such is the state of the singer of the intro and Diggs, who raps, for much of the album, from the position of "Cargo 2331"—an intergalactic slave described, not unlike the subjects of M. NourbeSe's *Zong!*[15], as mere goods. As *outside inhabitants* of this album we are (limited) omniscient listeners: we are privy to, in addition to 2331's, the thoughts and speech of the AI systems responsible for and co-operative in, at first, his bondage and then, after, his escape. That escape happens on "The Breach", a 0:56 long song that is the album's first example of "the compression and dispersion, the condensation and displacement, of caged duration".[16] The first description given to 2331 on the album is: "a small anomaly [that] has become evident"; as the AI tries to alert the ship to his escape, it says something that, upon first listen/reading, is ambiguous, but if sat with—and with the aid of Moten—might appear analogous to *mu.*[17] The AI: "But the readings that are coming through / While not negating wholly the hypothesis / Seem to be unable to suggest it". The readings are of 2331 waking up, and rising up; yet something about the data produced is unintelligible: the event, the man, *is,* but also appears to inherently tend towards negation. On *mu,* Moten writes:

> I am concerned with the mu in 'Mutron' [...] what might be called a birth into death, or an entrance into bare life or raw life, but which I will insist, not despite but precisely because of its being the blood-stain'd gate through which the radically nonanalagous enters, is the impure immanence of the under-commons' (an)originary refrain.[18]

9 Moten 760, The 'para-' of 'paralyric' means besideness, 'lyrics' meaning a poetic expression of the Self. 'Paralyric' here signifieth a poetic expression from outside subjectivity, as evidenced in the block quotation above. Hence this paragraph's theme of the absence of identity / standpoint. -ed.

10 Wagner 2009:1

11 Moten 738

12 Moten 742f

13 Here and throughout, the ocean / space / cosmic night is evoked as something of a neutral space out of which blackness is created. The Ocean, as well as the Ship, is taken for granted by the author as an indispensable symbol of blackness: recall the transatlantic slave trade. -ed.

14 Moten 761

15 Anti-narrative account of the 1781 Zong incident, wherein the captain of the slave ship of that same name ordered that some 150 Africans be murdered by drowning so that the ship's owners could collect insurance monies. -ed.

16 Moten, 746

17 Fred Moten refers to *mu* (*wú* in Chinese), the Zen Buddhist notion of negativity or nothingness. Moten's account of *mu* is here coloured by a pair of 1969 recordings seminal to the nascent world fusion genre by jazz trumpeter Don Cherry, called "'mu' first part' and '"mu" second part'. Moten, via Wilderson, also quotes the poet Nathaniel Mackey: 'Where we were [which wasn't there] was what we meant by "mu"'. The gist of *mu* is that Moten reads it as a void of black subjectivity.

18 Moten 745f, 'Mutron' is a 1982 recording by the aforementioned trumpeter Don Cherry and the drummer Ed Blackwell (who was also features in the 'mu' recordings). Moten, if I read correctly, calls this recording an 'extended meditation on nothingness'. 'Mutron' refers presumably at once to Cherry's aforementioned dual albums and

As this essay itself has reached a refrain, as it were, the significance of the refrain that introduces *Splendor and Misery* should be more apparent by way of Moten's guidance. 2331, by breaking free of the hold, enters into the death of bare or raw life—the life that will be rendered over the rest of the album—and becomes the refrain (and question) enfleshed.[19] The question is actually many questions: where does he go now, in search of what, and believing in what? and Moten's:

> Can this sharing of a life in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused and consent, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which to know, a place out of which emerges neither self- consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question?[20]

Splendor and Misery could be described as an attempt to answer the latter by explaining the former. Between the speech of 2331 and the AI, subjectivity that was "never chose[n] nor [...] [chose]" is interrogated, improvised, and "keeps [...] pushing through nothing" towards ("A Better Place"). "All Black", the song that follows "The Breach", is sung if not totally from the perspective of the onboard AI, then virtually so. The ambiguous exception being of no less importance, though, if not more: it is the song's refrain, which describes, or dares not describe, the "All black everything / All black everything / All black everything / All black". Throughout the song the refrain bleeds into the verses, as if challenging whatever is not black to speak back. The AI does, indeed, continue, and she sets the stage for 2331 and herself: "No landing, [...] nowhere to arrive to". At the end of the verse she reflects that 2331's "gift of freedom [is] wrapped in / days of rapping to himself / until his vocal chords collapse"; this is another example of the (suggested) self- negating/destroying nature of his actions. As the song continues, however, the AI begins to sympathize, and eventually falls in love, with 2331 who, according to the AI, "babbles beautifully of Babylon" and "quotes Kendrick's 'Control' verse and spews his vitriol / into the echoes of the bowels of this floating metal hull". The anontic antics, if you will, of 2331 compel the AI to not only regard him as beautiful and "deserv[ing] [of] more than [he's] getting" but to regard herself— her body, as it were, as a mere, perhaps wretched, vessel. This is, in a sense, what Moten byway of Peter Linebaugh, depicts:

> a combination of, first, nautical English; second, the "sabir" of the Mediterranean; third, the hermetic-like cant talk of the "underworld"; and fourth, West African grammatical construction, produced the "pidgin English" that became in the tumultuous years of the slave trade the language of the African coast[21]

Or,

> this nonsense, the extrasensorial assertion, which must have emerged in the ship's hold, which was a language lab, a zone of experimental, audiovisual intonation but also [...] a scene, an erotic vestibule, a prison house of violent pleasure[22]

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to the Musitronics Corporation, producer of electronic musical effects pedals and often shortened to "Mu-Tron". -ed.

19 Moten 773

20 Moten 756

21 Moten 757, citing Linebaugh

22 Moten 773, Moten's own words

The song that follows, "Interlude 01 (Freestyle)", is not merely what its title might suggest. It is our first direct exposure to 2331 and this only deepens its significance as a song situated, etymologically at least, *under* and *inbetween* but also *in play,* and, explicitly, as *free*. Moten asks, and does not answer, whether or not "self-analysis, which is the name Cecil Taylor gives to improvisation, [can] liberate us from the self, or [if] it only further secure[s] [one's] incarceration"[23] (The AI will later, on "Baby Don't Sleep", suggest that being "delusional is easier than self- examination"). 2331 is actually, here, on this freestyle, at his most explicitly aggressive as he brags about having escaped, reflects confidently about his prospects in space, and challenges anyone to come after him: "Fuck a whole ship, fuck it's a glory sight / La la la la la la la...". Near the end of the song, just before he becomes impossible to hear: "Call me good boy no I'm God boy / quietly did our jobs for yuh / and talk code in our...". Regarding code or language creation, I think of Moten's questions: "What is pidgin? Who makes it? What pressure does it place on the very idea of the standard? Isn't such pressure, in fact, the making of the standard?"[24]

Language creation—the wheres and whats and hows of it, and its many affective valences—draws to my mind the titular poem from Dionne Brand's *No Language is Neutral*. Brand, hailing from Guayaguayare, Trinidad & Tobago, begins the poem: "No language is neutral. I used to haunt the beach at / Guaya [...]"[25] Brand, in this poem and throughout the book that houses it, meditates on language and origin and displacement with vignettes, memories, direct addresses, and whatever there is inbetween. "[H]ere", she writes, "language [...] was strict / description and teeth edging truth. Here was beauty / and here was nowhere".[26] What does it mean to be edging truth? Does edging mean *beside* or *approaching?* does it imply *excess*—both in the sense of overflowing or overcoming? And what of beauty and nowhere—are they opposites, apposites, or (impossibly) (necessarily) indistinguishable? To be in a position of questioning rather than one of knowing or asserting is a position I think one manner of edging truth, but also, in relation to this subject, I think for myself the most appropriate. Assertion itself is identified by Moten as the space in which "the difference [...] of the relative nothingness of blackness and black people in the face"[27] is given. And on *approach* or *approaching,* another of Moten's reflections on *mu* is useful: "Indeed, the content that is approached is approach, itself, and for the absolute beginner, who is at once pilgrim and penitent, *mu* signals [...] 'consent not to be a single being'"— or place or thing, with respect to black earth or black truth, which, Moten might say, is to say earth or truth[28]. Perhaps to be edging truth is "*Mu* [...] a practice of mysticism in the flesh".[29]

Brand's pilgrims, penitents, women, men, parents, and unfamiliars are creators of "new sound" and it is, at times, an evidently violent exteriorizing process, as the "syllables [...] [push] toward lips made to bubble blood".[30] Their regard for the ocean, that place of nothing, of constant autodislocation, is on key: the ocean, a / way out and not anything of beauty"[31]. At other times, her poems are immersive, personal, interiorized songs: "I saw this woman once in another poem, sitting, / [...] Seeing her / no part of me was comfortable with itself".[32] The woman she sees *in* a poem, in a lyric, dials her regard for herself into an extreme, into an *it*. And a few lines down: "...In my nerves something there / unravelling, and she was a place to go".[33] In a likeness of her unravelling and language making, upon reading and rereading this line, which is huge, I found in her *nerves* this formula: *n*verse. Not only does saying *n*verse sound like saying *inverse*—as in *inversion* and to be *in verse*—but if the *n* is understood as a numerical variable, this is a formula for any number of verses. I mean to suggest here not only the obvious, that of the lyric verse, but of the universe or, further, an entire multiverse. In the *lysis* of Brand's speaker's nerves is the potential for lyric; and in

23 Moten 770
24 Moten 765
25 Brand 19
26 Brand 19
27 Moten 750
28 Moten 750
29 Moten 753
30 Brand 20
31 Brand 20
32 Brand 46
33 Brand 46

that lyric, that is any number of lyrics, the uni*verse*—*the* single lyric—among infinite others. Frantz Fanon and Moten's complete lyric *lysis* of the morbid body/universe[34] could not but invade my mind, and then I realized that in *verse* there is also *sever:* to cut. The universal body that Fanon and Moten want to break completely open is itself, then, the *uni-sever*—the single cut or opening. The what or the where (is it always already here?) that it opens out or into is precisely what's at stake. And this is the (de)generative, surgical, spiritual work that Brand's book does—at times, such as in this example, effortlessly. The title she gives the book focuses it in a way that can leave no doubt: "*No / language is neutral* seared in the spine's unravelling. / Here is history too".[35] Brand rejects a fictive nothingness (neutrality) by way of embracing and performing the *realism* of black nothingness, and punctuates the above line with two "choking aspirate[s]", as if her work were not breathtaking enough.

Regarding *here* and *history,* Moten writes: "I am in total agreement with the Afro-pessimistic understanding of blackness as exterior to civil society and, moreover, as unmappable within the cosmological grid of the transcendental subject"[36] but goes on to qualify civil society and transcendental subjectivity as "fundamentally and essentially antisocial [...] necropolitical imitation[s] of life".[37] In "Wake Up", 2331, faced with the fact that "the chance that he ever reaches any place / suitable to support life in his lifetime's pretty low", decides to "just go (let go)". This means hypersleep. And sleep, especially hypersleep, is a kind of oblivion that *goes somewhere* and anticipates, by way of inversion, 2331's eventual decision to commit to conscious exploration of nothingness rather than any proximate something. He promptly takes a "deep breath" and sets course for the promise of another world. The tension between *here* and *nowhere* becomes the focus of the chorus, which is preoccupied, specifically, with where exactly 2331 will be when he wakes up: "[You'll] [be] right here when you wake up [...] There'll be no here when you wake up".

The album's refrain closes the song and begins the next, in which it is lyrically and formally elaborated: "It's a long way away / It's a long way away / And I'm all alone / Along, along a long way" ("Long Way Away"). The words here are manipulated in a way Philip would, I think, approve of. And on "Break the Glass", which depicts 2331—who, after having woken up from hypersleep prematurely, finds and uses various psychoactives in and prolonging a state of much despair—begging the AI to engage him with words that feel lifted from Philip herself. She writes: "This is the axis on which the text of *Zong!* turns: censor and magician; the told and the untold; the telling and un-telling of what cannot, yet

must, be told".[38] 2331, after confessing that "[he] [is] so tired of bein' alone, / [...] so tired of goin' home", asks the AI: "what're you tellin' me by not tellin me / anything, anything? / I'd give anything if you'd say my name". This is a profound moment: 2331 is begging, demanding, to have his name spoken from *outside* himself. This is a playing out of the drama, or wretchedness, in what Fanon describes as "one element in [the] understanding [of] the black man's dimension of being-for-others, it being understood that to speak is to exist absolutely for the other".[39] 2331 has no others, as he reflects on the third interlude, where he pleads: "get at me my brothers, my sisters, get at me / where are you?"; his request for speech from the AI, the closest thing to a companion that he has, is, in essence, a plea for existence alongside what is, for most of the album, him speaking to no one: existing for *nothing*.

"Baby Don't Sleep" is, for my money, the hardest hitting song on the album and the richest for comparative study with Moten. The speaker of the song is, not insignificantly, *not* 2331; it is the AI, who has, apparently, become quite vex with him. She begins: "What

34 Moten 774
35 Brand 20, my emphasis
36 Moten 740
37 Moten 740
38 Philip 199
39 Moten 758

the fuck is you thinkin' / better yet where the fuck is you going? / Get back to no star mappin' / out here nobody knowin". 2331's choice of the (absolutely) unknown regions of space over the relatively known and more proximate constellations is, in a sense, or perhaps *the* most literal sense, pursuit of complete lyric *lysis*. On this Moten elaborates:

> beyond [...] in the hold, in the *basho* (the place of nothingness, that underground, undercommon recess), is the social life of black things, which passeth (the) understanding. In the hold, blackness and imagination, in and as consent not to be a single being, are (more and less than) one.[40]

And they are as such "like its nothing, nothing out / of nothing". The AI, sole remaining antagonist of 2331, ends the first verse by reducing him (& his beliefs) to a mere "beta boost inside a brain". She reminds him, in the first chorus, that he has "no home", that his "saviours are fiction", and that his "memories [will] [fade] like ghosts, ghosts". And yet, again in Philip-esque manner, the *gho* in ghosts is *severed* to become the imperative "go". 2331 is, indeed, going into the nothing and the AI asserts to herself, to 2331, or both, that "nothing is familiar". The more obvious meaning is likely meant—that the nothing he is entering is unfamiliar—but what, to 2331, could be more familiar than, ultimately, nothing? The song's chorus is another (not-so) coded imperative: "baby don't sleep / baby don't sleep too much": don't give into that nothing; explore, instead, "the hyperreal time of [y]our thinking".[41]

Recall now, please, the "illicit alternative capacity to desire" that Moten identifies with blackness, and consider this, now, with the idea of the universe as the cut in mind:

> There is an ethics of the cut [...] that I have tried to honor and illuminate because it instantiates and articulates another way of living in the world, a black way of living together in the other world [...] in the alternative planetarity [...] of blackness".[42]

The cut made visible is difference and deferral; it opens out or into an undercommon; it is lyrical; and it is our cosmos. For 2331, who I wish I could refer to by name, the facts of space-time may have changed, but for our purposes, the limits of this universe can only possibly be known from the outside. It, therefore, can only be cut from the outside, and nothing can exit it. We are the morbid multitude, the vicious viscera, of this verse; there is no better place to be somebody else. We have only the one option: make that place out of here.

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40 Moten 752
41 Moten 774
42 Moten 778f

Splendor & Misery **buy** **share** bc
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1.	Long Way Away (Intro)	01:05
2.	The Breach	00:56
3.	All Black	06:15
4.	Interlude 01 (Freestyle)	01:35
5.	Wake Up	02:05
6.	Long Way Away	01:30
7.	Interlude 02 (Numbers)	01:04
8.	True Believer	03:44
9.	Long Way Away (Instrumental)	00:51
10.	Air 'Em Out	03:50
11.	Interlude 03 (Freestyle)	01:09
12.	Break the Glass	02:21
13.	Story 5	03:04
14.	**Baby Don't Sleep**	03:07
15.	A Better Place	04:25

Our Land (New Mexico)

Elise Timm-Bottos

Our land was forty acres of wild desert an hour from Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Our land had rolling red earth and a blue sky so wide
it could wrap twice around the horizon.
It had hidden secret caves that smelled like clay,
with message walls filled with paper notes of past memories.
It had one great grandmother tree, the survivor of every draught,
spreading her expansive branches as far as the sun.

Our land had millions of cow patties.
They littered the ground like broken plates,
cracking like the dry earth,
lines forming geometric shapes on a summer's day.
Our land had majestic watermelon mountains,
turning a magical bright pink as the sun went down,
only to reveal an infinite starry sky.

Our land had one tin motor home,
filled with books and comfy worn down pillows.
It laid empty until we came for holidays,
my sister and I filling those metal walls with shrieks of childish laughter.
Our land was safe until that day.

That day that hooligans who still thought they lived in the wild wild west,
shot down the length of our home,
bullet holes like a connect-the-dots picture,
breaking our windows and ripping those books to shreds.
Our land became a place not safe for children.

When we returned our tin house was found empty,
left as free pickings for looters and rats.
We camped in our car that night.
Our land still holds the remains of our tin home,
though I've forgotten what it looks like,
a crumpled shell resting on a vast red desert of endless sand.

Photo by Hailey Oldfield

Photo by Hailey Oldfield

Why is he Ugly?
A Kantian Aesthetic Approach to Frankenstein

Elizabeth Robinson

In his *Critique of Judgment* (1790), Kant is concerned with aesthetic judgments, and how they arise in the mind of the subject. He focuses on the aesthetic judgment of beauty – a pure judgment of taste – and how this judgment does not involve any intrinsic beauty as a characteristic of the judged object. Rather, the beauty is in the subject's contemplation of the object. Kant explains that when a subject judges that an object is beautiful, this contemplation of the object is based in the feeling of pleasure.[1] He distinguishes judgments about the beautiful from judgments of the good and the agreeable: although the two latter judgments also involve a feeling of pleasure in the subject, they differ from a judgment of beauty because they are not *disinterested*. In other words, for a judgment of beauty (i.e. a *pure* judgment of taste) to occur, the subject must have no desire for the continued existence of the object: she must be totally *disinterested* in its existence.[2] Moreover, a judgment of beauty is disinterested and pure insofar as it does not rest on a conceptual framework: the faculty of reason plays no part in a subject's judgment of beauty.[3] The subject cannot use concepts to explain why she finds an object beautiful: she just does.

I will argue that it appears as though the creature in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818) inspires an inverse judgment of beauty in the characters who encounter him. Indeed, every character who encounters the creature is so immediately disgusted by his physical appearance, that they may be said to experience a pure judgment of taste. However, in this case it would be the diametrical opposite of a judgment of beauty: a judgment of ugliness. Although Kant rarely discusses negative aesthetic judgments, it is possible to imagine what he would have said about them by considering the antitheses of the positive judgments he *is* concerned with. In other words, by applying a dialectical approach (à la Hegel) to Kant's *Critique of Judgment,* one may derive judgments of the ugly, the disagreeable, and the bad (as opposed to the beautiful, the agreeable, and the good, respectively). Such negative versions of Kantian judgments may be applied to *Frankenstein*: is the characters' collective immediate disgust for the creature's appearance a judgment of the ugly (and thus, a *pure* and *disinterested* judgment of taste), or is it more akin to a judgment of the disagreeable, or the bad? In what follows, I will compare and contrast these dialectical opposites of Kantian judgments, and discern what kind of judgment the characters in *Frankenstein* make about the creature. Ultimately, the answer will be somewhat synthetic: the characters disgusted by the creature (indeed, every human who encounters him) make a judgment that falls somewhere between a judgment of ugliness and a judgment of the bad. Nonetheless, it falls closer to a judgment of the bad: I will show why the judgment of the creature's appearance is more distant from

1 Kant 44
2 Kant 46
3 Kant 51

judgments of the ugly and the disagreeable.

Nonetheless, because the characters in *Frankenstein* are so *immediately* disgusted and frightened by the creature, their judgments of his appearance seem to resemble a pure judgment of taste, and henceforth the opposite of a judgment on beauty. Victor describes the creature's ugliness as "unearthly" and "almost too horrible for human eyes"[4]. Furthermore, many who encounter the creature reflexively cover their eyes, because his ugliness is too much to bear: Walton "[shuts his] eyes involuntarily".[5] Moreover, when the creature comes to life, Victor runs out of the room, for he is "unable to endure the aspect of the being [he] had created […]"[6] In sum, every character's encounter with the creature results in a reaction to his appearance that is so immediate, it seems unlikely that they had time to use reason and consider concepts, in order to make the judgment. This would support the disgust for the creature being a judgment of ugliness (and hence, a pure judgment of taste, as the inverse of a judgment of beauty), for Kant explains that,

> [a judgment of taste] considers the character of the object only by holding it up to our feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Nor is this contemplation, as such, directed to concepts, for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment […] and hence is neither *based* on concepts, nor directed to them as *purposes*.[7]

In other words, if a character has to pause and use their faculty of reason to bring the creature's appearance under a conceptual framework, then they are not making a pure judgment of taste, as it involves cognition. It seems as though the characters in *Frankenstein* react too quickly to undergo this cognitive reasoning in their disgust for the monster. For this reason, the judgment appears to be one of ugliness, in the sense that it is the opposite of an aesthetic judgment of the beautiful.

One may also argue that the collective immediate disgust for the monster is a negative pure judgment of taste because it always involves negative *feelings*: For Kant, a judgment of beauty results in, but is not predicated upon a feeling of pleasure:

> […] it must be the universal communicability of the mental state[8], in the given presentation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence.[9]

If the feeling of pleasure came before the judgment of beauty, then this would just be an experience of the agreeable: it would be akin to tasting a delicious food, and would be purely subjective – for the agreeable is merely "what the senses like in sensation".[10] In other words, the subject would not experience that subjective universality wherein she expects others to agree with her judgment of the object.

In this way, the characters' disgust for the creature appears to be a pure judgment of taste. The encounter with the creature always instantiates intense displeasure in the character who judges him as ugly: whether it is fear, disgust, or both. After the creature comes to life, Victor suffers a mental breakdown: the initial disgust for the creature created so much displeasure for him that for a while, he could not experience joy. He relates that "[The creature] on whom I had bestowed existence was forever before my eyes […]"[11] Fortunately, his loving friend Clerval helps him: "I remember the first time I became capable of observing outward objects with any kind of pleasure […] It was a divine spring; and the season contributed greatly to my convalescence".[12] The creature's disgusting appearance had so marked Victor, that it is branded on his mind. Slowly, Victor becomes capable of experiencing pleasure, as he contemplates the beauty of nature. The fact that Victor's pleasure in the experience of beauty acts as an antidote to his overwhelming displeasure

4 Shelley 68
5 Kant 163
6 Kant 35
7 Kant 51, original italics
8 Kant means the mental state of the subject experiencing the beautiful: their mental state is that of a free-play between the imagination and the understanding (62).
9 Kant 61
10 Kant 47
11 Shelley 39
12 Shelley 39

for the creature's appearance supports the claim that his disgust for the creature is a pure judgment of taste. In other words, the displeasure he experiences due to the initial pure judgment (if it is one) can only be countered by the pleasure of an equally pure judgment, by that of its diametrical opposite: a judgment of beauty.

All of this supports the initial claim that the characters who encounter the creature in *Frankenstein* are making pure judgments of taste in judging his ugliness. However, there are several overwhelming reasons why the judgment of the creature cannot be pure, and henceforth cannot be the inverse of a Kantian judgment of beauty. Despite the visceral immediacy with which characters are disgusted by the creature, they do not make a pure judgment of taste because their judgment of him is predicated on their preconceived notions of what the human form *should* look like. The only reason why the characters' reactions and judgments are so immediate, is because they have presuppose, what Kant calls, the standard idea of the human form, *prior* to any engagement with the creature. Thus, the subject forms most of the judgment before even meeting the creature, simply by being exposed to congruent sensory data, which seem to confirm how a human ought to look. Our standard idea of the human physical form derives from what Kant explains as "[…] the imagination [projecting] […] one image onto another, and from the congruence of most images of the same kind [arriving] at an average that serves as the common standard for all of them".[13] The judgment of the creature is completed upon encountering him: he deviates (to a *strong* degree, otherwise he would just be a regular 'unattractive person') from the standard idea of the human form.

This could not be a pure aesthetic judgment because the subject uses reason, and considers external concepts: it is thus a partially cognitive/logical judgment. The judgment of the creature is what Kant would call an aesthetic judgment that is based on a logical judgment – because it is about the creature's appearance, yet is based on the subject's logical conclusion of how a human should look, given the congruent sensory data. Although Kant does not discuss aesthetic judgments that are based on logical judgments, he writes about their inverse: logical judgments based on aesthetic judgments:

> […] I may look at a rose and make a judgment of taste declaring it to be beautiful. But if I compare many singular roses and so arrive at the judgment, Roses in general are beautiful, then my judgment is no longer merely aesthetic, but is a logical judgment based on an aesthetic one.[14]

Simply stated, judgments of taste are singular. It is not a pure aesthetic judgment if one concludes that roses are beautiful in general, based on the premise that one has encountered many particular beautiful roses in experience: this judgment includes logic, and is thus no longer merely aesthetic.

The judgment of the creature's appearance is similar to this, in that it is an impure aesthetic judgment because it is based on a logical judgment (whereas Kant's rose example was the inverse). The logical judgment involved in the aesthetic judgment of the creature is the conclusion that the subject derives about the standard idea of the human form. *Every* character who encounters the creature feels disgust for him immediately: this does not result from the aesthetic universality of judgments of taste, but rather from the judgment's logical universality. In sum, because every character has *lived* and been exposed to the same kind of human form, they all logically derive a standard idea for the human form. Because the creature is *de*formed, every character makes an aesthetic judgment about him, which is based on this logical conclusion that they *all* made.

Indeed, Shelley plays with the words "form" and "deformity" to accentuate that the creature is judged and feared for not fitting the standard conception of the human form. It is also significant that the creature deviates from the standard human form, because he is a messy assemblage of bits and pieces taken from different deceased human corpses. Although Victor claims that overall, the creature's body is proportionate and that he chose what he believed to be beautiful features, the fact that the creature is *formed* from different body parts creates an overall disharmony, and is the source of his ugliness:

13 Kant 82
14 Kant 59

> His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes […][15]

The luxuriances (his lustrous hair and white teeth) contrast horrifically with the rest of his features, which make him appear undead: his yellow skin, his watery "dull yellow" eyes, his "shriveled complexion and straight black lips".[16] The creature's "dead features" and their overall disharmony in the assembly of his body are the root of his deformity – the root of his deviance from the standard human form. The creature only becomes unbearably disgusting to Victor when he comes to life: Victor exclaims that "I had gazed on him while unfinished; he was ugly then; but when those muscles and joints were rendered capable of motion, it became such a thing as even Dante could not have conceived".[17] This is because, prior to his animation, the creature was not *meant* to resemble a living human being. It did not matter that the creature did not fit the standard of human form: all he was then was an inanimate medley of dead flesh from different corpses – his form was not yet striving to place itself in the realm of humanity.

The creature's humanoid form emphasizes his deformity: the fact that he is supposed to resemble a human (and yet is merely the assembly of different deceased and re-animated body parts) adds to peoples' disgust for him. The creature himself is aware of this, as is made evident as he laments his situation to Victor:

> Why did you form a monster so hideous that even *you* turned from me in disgust? God, in pity, made man beautiful and alluring, after his own image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even from the resemblance.[18]

The creature's form is made more horrid because of its resemblance to the human form; because it "is a filthy type" of it. Most of the characters who encounter the creature base their judgment and disgust for the creature on his deformity. For instance, when Victor spots the creature during a flash of lightning, he describes his shape in terms of its deformity, which is "more hideous than belongs to humanity […]"[19] In contrast, when Victor talks about Clerval near the end of the novel (when the two are travelling together, and Clerval is being his wonderful self by supporting Victor and making him feel better), he claims that Clerval's form is "divinely wrought, and beaming with beauty […]"[20] The creature also gushes over beautiful human form: "I had admired the perfect form of my cottagers – their grace, beauty, and delicate complexions […]"[21] Although these are aesthetic judgments, they are not pure judgments of taste because the subjects (Victor, and the creature respectively) are not impartial: Victor loves Clerval, and the creature loves the cottagers. As Kant explains, "[…] if a judgment about beauty is mingled with the least interest then it is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste".[22] Nonetheless, Clerval and the cottagers pertain to the standard (and thus *desired*) human form.

Kant actually discusses pure judgments of taste, and their relation to the human form. He explains that the beauty of a human "presupposes the concept of the purpose that determines what the thing is [meant] to be, and hence a concept of its perfection, and so it is merely adherent beauty […]"[23] (as opposed to free beauty, which is a pure judgment and would not include a concept of the object's perfection). In this case, the beauty of a person is predicated on the concept of human perfection: it *adheres* to it. By applying this to the judgment of the creature's appearance in *Frankenstein*, one can discover that the creature's ugliness is adherent to the standard idea of the human form, just as human beauty is adherent to the concept of perfection of the human form. Kant refers to this type

15 Shelley 35
16 Shelley 35
17 Shelley 36
18 Shelley 93
19 Shelley 50
20 Shelley 114
21 Shelley 80
22 Kant 46
23 Kant 77

of aesthetic judgment as "an applied judgment of taste"[24], as opposed to a *pure* judgment of taste.

In sum, when characters judge the form of the creature to be disgusting and ugly, they are making an applied judgment of taste: their notion of ugliness draws on the standard idea of the human form, and since the creature deviates from this norm, he is deemed ugly. Their conception of ugliness is adherent/accessory, and is thus not a pure judgment because it draws on external concepts. This applied judgment of taste about adherent beauty is similar to Kant's judgment of the good: "In order to consider something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is meant to be, i.e., I must have a determinate concept of it".[25] This is similar to an applied judgment of taste because in both cases, the subject's judgment relies on a determinate concept of what the object is meant to be, or look like. It follows that the judgment of the creature in *Frankenstein* is either a judgment of adherent ugliness (an applied judgment of taste) or the inverse of a judgment of the good – a judgment of the bad. It is difficult to discern which one applies more to *Frankenstein*: in both cases, the judgment rests on a conception of what the human form should look like. However, while the judgment of adherent ugliness rests on an abstract concept of *perfection* of the human form, a judgment of the bad rests upon the standard idea of the human form (as a logical conclusion derived from the conformity of human forms experienced by the subject in reality). The former is a transcendent and ideal human form[26]; the latter is nothing more than the calculated average of experienced human forms.

In conclusion, the characters in *Frankenstein* who judge the creature's ugliness make a judgment of the bad. He is not disgusting to them because he fails to fulfill a transcendent ideal of the human form: *nobody*, not even Elizabeth or Safie could come close to this ideal. No: the creature disgusts because he is deformed. He is humanoid, yet not quite human. He is alive, yet not quite living. He is far from human: he is a mass of assembled, decomposed chunks of flesh, animated to the point that he can use advanced reason and rhetoric. The creature's ugliness rests upon the deformity of his features: dead mixed with living features, whose disharmony is created by their very proportionate and meticulous assembly.

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24 Kant 78
25 Kant 49
26 Perhaps manifested as God?

Gloriae Cupiditas: The Fall of the Roman Empire in the Eyes of Saint Augustine

Ophélie Proulx-Giraldeau

While the great Roman republic tragically started collapsing, Cicero wrote his treatise *De Officiis* (On Obligation) to recall the glory of his lost *patria*. Published the very year of his assassination, his work bears witness to the end of what has been one of the most successful and powerful political regimes of all time. Centuries later, Saint Augustine, witness to the beginning of the fall of the Western Roman Empire, publishes *City of God*, one of his masterpieces, almost half a century before the deposition of Augustus Romulus by Odoacer. Defending that Christianity is not the cause of the fall, Saint Augustine describes how the Romans led themselves towards destruction. Indeed, he claims that even though the empire rose on its honourable virtues, it was vulnerable to its own pride, and fell from its own standards. Saint Augustine comments on Cicero's ethics, using the stories of the legendary Regulus and Lucretia to illustrate the collapse of reason, honour and faith and the inconsistencies in Cicero's notion of virtue. The analysis of Cicero's definition of the virtuous individual and the stories of Regulus and Lucretia in Saint Augustine's eyes will define the meaning of true honour: detached of earthly matters and aiming towards the ultimate pursuit of true felicity.

In *De Officiis*, Cicero makes an account of what it takes to lead a virtuous life. He "teaches his fellow Romans [that] their primary duty is to preserve Rome in gratitude and filial piety".[1] To do so, the author emphasises the importance of honour as the greatest good. In the Ancient world, honour is a virtue that takes a disproportionate perspective compared to our own western cultural understanding of the concept today. In fact, people would rather be killed than be seen as deplorable by others. Therefore, he writes that "the philosopher who claims that the highest good has no connection with virtue and measures it by his own interests rather than by what is honourable, cannot cultivate friendship, justice, or generosity."[2] In other words, he explains that honour is at the centre of what makes a good Roman citizen. However, he carefully nuances his purpose by clarifying that the search of honour and glory cannot drive an individual throughout his life. In fact, the lust for glory is far from being considered as a virtuous motivation to live a just life. Therefore, he believes that the desire for glory or, *gloriae cupiditas*, makes one "no longer free, but compelled to do whatever it takes to win it".[3] Because glorious, powerful and costly lifestyles are appealing, honour can be seen as an utilitarian way to fulfill an evil lust. However, it should be understood in the opposite way: honour brings benefits, benefits do not bring honour. Consequently, honour can only truly be achieved through the accomplishment of virtuous acts for the good of the *patria*, or community.

For Cicero, the concept of "society" or "*communitas*" is the key to understanding the true role of the honourable citizen. He believes that it is part of our nature to consider each and every one of us as a whole and to always see our acts as necessarily having an impact on society. Thus, the harmony between personal good and common good is undeniable. In fact, the resonance of an individual's act on his community justifies not only the importance of honour, but above all, its utility. Indeed, with a lack of honour comes a lack of patriotism which, inevitably, harms the strength of the state.

However, interpreting an act as being honourable is a complex subtle affair and

1 Roberts 114
2 Cicero 4
3 Roberts 116

can easily be misunderstood. Thereby, there exist two great threats to the stability of the state, of which Cicero is fully aware, when relying on honour. Honour can either lead to the evil lust of power and personal interest, or, when uncontrolled, become irrational. To illustrate the first threat, Cicero uses the example of Gaius Caesar who "undermined all laws, divine and human, in order to establish that dominance which his erroneous belief had targeted for himself".[4] As mentioned before, this insatiable hunger for power, glory, and its benefits can only reflect the soul of a vicious individual. Because it goes against the only concern of doing "nothing which is unsightly or degenerate, […] or to contemplate nothing capricious in all our actions and beliefs"[5], this behaviour is proven to be everything but honourable. The second threat, concerning the irrational treatment of honour, could be seen as even more dangerous than the first, threatening the integrity of humans. As a unique gift given to humanity, reason enables us "to visualize consequences, and to detect the cause of things".[6] The correct use of our reason becomes one of our prime duties as human beings; the search of wisdom and nobility of spirit should constantly be at the centre of honourable acts. Consequently, actions unreasonably committed in the name of honour do not simply harm the reliability of oneself, but of the entire community.

In sum, in *De Officiis,* Cicero is not only illustrating what he considers as being the "ideal individual". He also prevents the reader from misinterpreting what is truly honourable. Bearing witness of the fall of the Republic, the author knows perfectly how easily individuals can be corrupted. Even though he tried to depict what seemed to be the most efficient way of preventing the collapse of the Roman republic, centuries later, Saint Augustine finds a way to identify the main inconsistencies of Cicero's philosophy.

In the *City of God*, Saint Augustine uses great care to disavow what was considered as being so virtuous about contemporary Roman values. In order to show that Christianity is not responsible for the fall of the Empire, Augustine establishes, from the beginning of his work, a very clear distinction between what he considers as being virtuous, and the actual Roman values of his time. By taking the example of the stage plays performed to honour the pagan gods, he perfectly demonstrates how moderation, reason and nobility of spirit, all highly praised by Cicero, are completely lost. Indeed, Saint Augustine emphasises the absurdity of the importance given to grotesque embodiment of the gods in Roman culture. Promoting immoral and indecent actions, comedians of the time were dressed obscenely on stage claiming to be making religious service. Instead of showing respect to their divinities through noble acts of honour or courage, the Romans kept filling irresponsibly and blindly the theatres. As for what Cicero claims in *De Officiis*: "to everyday activities we shall maintain decency and decorum"[7], nothing seems less "decent" than these examples of daily entertainment. For Saint Augustine, pagan divinities become nothing less than "unworthy and no proper protectors of the morals of the people"[8] if they truly command such grotesque plays. Even though this example illustrates clearly the lack of virtue in Roman values, Saint Augustine goes even further by criticizing emblematic figures of the culture. Still known today for being great acts of courage and virtue, the stories of Regulus and Lucretia are, however, interpreted by the author as complex and fundamental key concepts to understand the fall of the empire.

Marcus Aurelius Regulus was a Roman general captured by Carthage during the Punic wars. In order to ask for the liberation of their own men, the Carthaginians let Regulus go back to Rome to convey their proposition, but only after making him swear to return to Carthage. Therefore, Regulus swore and went back to Rome, but told them not to release any of their Carthaginian prisoners. He probably could have escaped had he never returned to Carthage, but because he had made a promise, he went back and was tortured to death. Whether seen by Cicero or by the entire Roman community, this act was ultimately courageous, noble and honourable because it fulfilled a patriotic duty and

4 Cicero 11
5 Cicero 7
6 Cicero 6
7 Cicero 8
8 Augustine 35

promoted a virtuous message throughout the whole society.

However, Saint Augustine's reading of the event differs completely from the common interpretation of his time. Far from being honourable, he claims that this event demonstrates how Roman values were unreasonably pushed to the extreme. Firstly, Saint Augustine argues that the glorious will to protect a city over oneself is justified by the quest for an afterlife or by a rescue from the gods, that "Rome unfairly binds its citizens to itself offering them political glory as shadowy counterfeit of their true end."[9] He strongly criticizes this "search for reward"; it should never be targeted as the "true end" of a heroic act. For him, these quests are the reflection of earthly pleasures that are far from being "truly good". In fact, he argues that felicity, as the ultimate pursuit, is "the full possession of all that the heart can long for"[10] and that Rome will never be able to grant such finality. To be completely disconnected from earthly matters and to aim towards the essence of heavenly delights is the only path leading to true felicity. Secondly, he insists on the importance given to the matter that divinities will not save human beings, even the most pious, honourable, and heroic ones. In the Hebrew Bible, the moral of the story of Job illustrates perfectly the matter; it tells us that no one should expect, by any chance, to be saved by any divinity. Again, it is not rewards but pursuit of true felicity as heavenly matter that it the only possible way to achieve noble ends. Consequently, in Regulus' story, the hero sacrifices his existence for nothing more than misdirected honour in attempt to achieve earthly glory in the eyes of men. As Saint Augustine claims: "even love of praise is a vice"[11], and there is no better example than the story of Lucretia to explore this thought in depth.

Lucretia was said to be a Roman figure well known for her chastity, nobility and beauty around the year 500 before common era. After being raped by the youngest son of the King Tarquin, she would have committed suicide in order to maintain her chastity intact and not being accused by others for committing adultery. This legendary event was identified as being a turning point of the Roman political history, weakening the Monarchy and eventually giving way to the Republic. Furthermore, because this sacrifice was made in the name of honour, it was believed to be one of the most virtuous and courageous acts of all time. Especially, throughout art history, countless artists, inspired by the legend, depicted the rape of Lucretia as being a fundamental element of the classical culture. However, Saint Augustine's interpretation of the story contrasts drastically from the common reading of his time. Indeed, he first argues that the only thing Lucretia was guilty of doing was committing suicide in the name of honour and glory. Because she got involved into an act, to which she truly never gave consent, she could not possibly have been guilty of committing adultery. In fact, not only did she not commit adultery, but was a victim of it to the same extent as her husband. Saint Augustine maintains firmly that "not only the [soul] (…) but also the [body], [remains] holy"[12] when violated. He adds that: "[being] a Roman with a passion for praise, she was afraid that, if she lived, men might think she did willingly what she had endured by violence".[13] In other words, this love for praise, or nonsense, becomes an absolute dangerous folly that threatens the integrity of humans; encouraging suicide over life. Moreover, in contrast to the story of Regulus, the sacrifice of Lucretia was not even made for the common good or for her *patria*. It was an unreasonable outsized act of self-protection against shame. But, what is more important than life itself, and what is to be protected when nothing remains? In *De Officiis*, Cicero's concept of "empty pride" defined by the "nature as motivated by a sense of vainglory, [appearing] to do out of kindness many things which seemingly arise out of exhibitionism rather than goodwill"[14] seems perfectly suited to Lucretia. Thus, not only does she become guilty of committing suicide, but she can be considered as anything but truly honourable.

In this example, the idea that human beings have the natural capacity to love what is good, studied by Saint Augustine, becomes fundamentally relevant. Indeed, he claims that:

9 Roberts 120
10 Augustine 67
11 Augustine 5-12
12 Augustine 16
13 Augustine 18
14 Cicero 17

"we do not call a man good because he knows what is good, but because he loves it." In this case, the true love of good is the only thing that can define a good individual. In her story, Lucretia thought that she knew what was good; following Roman values to the extreme. But, in reality, her love was not directed towards the ultimate good. Her soul was perverted and led her to make a fatal decision. Because her love was misdirected towards praise, glory, honour and chastity, the importance of love for itself was lost and, consequently, fatal. Transcending reason, this matter suggests that every individual possesses the ability to do true good. Although strongly influenced by the values promoted by his community, he must fight against the perversion of his soul and devote himself entirely to the good and the just.

By stating that Christianity was not the instigator of the fall of the Western Roman Empire, Saint Augustine establishes a strong relationship between the survival of the state and the values it promotes. He demonstrates that, even by trying to follow as closely as possible what was established as being honourable by Cicero, the Roman society was already condemned to collapse. Paradoxically promoting excessive pride and patriotism on one side, and moderation and self-control on the other, Cicero does not prove that either the great Regulus or the legendary Lucretia could truly reflect honourable individuals.

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

Art by Elise Timm-Bottos

The Problem of Desire in Dante's Inferno

Callum Boog

The fourteenth-century medieval Christian world view is not often recognized for its tolerant views on homosexuality, and with good reason. The popularity of scholasticism in medieval universities, made possible largely through the theological and philosophical work of Thomas Aquinas, was largely responsible for the conception of homosexuality as an unnatural and egregious sin. Nevertheless, despite its strong ties to Thomism, Dante Alighieri's *Commedia,* completed in 1320, offers a great deal of commentary on medieval homosexual practice among men. References to sodomy appear twice in the *Commedia:* in cantos XV and XVI of *Inferno,* and later in canto XXVI of *Purgatorio.* Not only does Dante explicitly reference male-male homosexuality in his depictions of the sodomites in the *Commedia*, but, relative to his 14th century context, he further demonstrates an unusually sympathetic take on homoeroticism. Dante's lenient attitude towards homosexuality suggests that he is altogether less troubled by the particulars of misguided passions, such as sodomy, and more concerned with the Augustinian principle of directing all desire properly to focus on God.

The setting of the third ring of the seventh circle of hell, as described in canto XIV of *Inferno*, suggests that Dante conceived of the sodomites' sin as sexual in nature and directly related to male homosexuality. In the Middle Ages, the term "sodomy" did not always denote anal intercourse between two men. Instead, sodomy often signified a variety of sexual practices, all of which were thought to be "against nature" to some degree.[1] Dante is likely drawing upon the ideas outlined by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica.* Aquinas' aversion to homosexuality was teleological in nature and rooted in the issue of reproduction: all proper sexual conduct had the potential for generation; homosexuality was therefore unnatural and against nature.[2] When Dante writes that he and Virgil "had come upon an open plain / that banishes all green things from its bed"[3] he draws attention to the apparent infertility of the sandy landscape. He also describes a wooded area that encircles the flat expanse of sand, highlighting the sodomites' exclusion from "natural" and fertile sexual practices. Indeed, Joseph Peguigney writes that the references to sand suggest barrenness, and "carr[y] the implication that the sodomites would have deliberately chosen to forgo the fructifying purpose of the sexuality conformable to nature".[4] The sodomites thus spend eternity in a sterile natural environment as a persistent reminder of their contrarian behavior.

Dante also uses setting to make biblical reference to the sodomites' behavior. He describes that the sodomites exist on a plain of sand above which "distended flakes / of fire showered down".[5] This is surely a reference to the city of Sodom and Gomorrah, the two cities destroyed in fire by God for their sinful corruption in Genesis 19:12. There is much debate about whether Dante conceives of the sin in the Genesis story as relating specifically to homosexuality. Dante never uses the word "sodomy" or "sodomite", and instead refers to the sin by the name of the city of Sodom: "And so the smallest ring stamps with its seal / both Sodom and Cahors".[6] The nature of the sin of the biblical inhabitants of Sodom is ambiguous. Some scholars argue that God destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah for the sins of

1 Pequigney 22
2 Pequigney 23
3 *Inferno* XIV.8-9
4 Pequigney 25
5 *Inferno* XIV.28-29
6 *Inferno* XI.49-50

pride and poor hospitality, while still others hold that the residents were clearly corrupt homosexuals and punished as such.[7] However, John Boswell argues in his article *Dante and the Sodomites* that civic law and learned circles during the High Middle Ages did in fact mean to indicate homosexuality by the term "sodomite" or any reference to the city of Sodom, and that Dante certainly uses it in reference to male homosexuality.[8]

In *Purgatorio,* Dante again encounters a group of lustful sinners on the seventh terrace whose situation mirrors closely that of the sodomites in *Inferno*, and illustrates Dante's strikingly egalitarian treatment of homosexuality and heterosexuality. The first shade he speaks to, Guido Guinizelli, describes to Dante the two groups of lustful sinners found on the seventh terrace of purgatory, and describes his own sin as "by contrast […] hermaphrodite".[9] If the term "hermaphrodite" in this context means "heterosexual", as Pequigney suggests, then the use of the expression "by contrast" surely indicates that the other sinners on the seventh terrace are homosexual.[10] Grouping the heterosexual and homosexual sinners together on the highest level of Purgatory is remarkable, especially considering that the sodomites were five circles below the lustful heterosexuals in *Inferno*.[11]

These sinners also directly allude to the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, and are again subject to punishment in flames. However, the sodomites share the space on the seventh terrace with lustful sinners whose sins are not homosexual in nature. The non-segregation of the homosexual men in Purgatorio further demonstrates Dante's tolerance of homoeroticism[12] and also associates the fiery imagery as suggestive of passion and desire regardless of sexual orientation. All the sinners are at once purified by "blazing bolts of flame. / And round the edge there breathed an upward wind / that bent these flames back, keeping them at bay".[13] Within the flames, Dante watches newly arrived shades—all men—embrace and kiss each other. As they separate, some "cry 'Sodom! Gomorrah!"[14] This effectively identifies many—but not all—of the men as homosexual. Dante groups the curious mix of heterosexual and homosexual sinners together not under the umbrella of orientation, but instead because of the "unnatural" nature of their desirous passions. One of the shades on the terrace, Guido Guinizzelli, says that sinners "did not follow human law / but ran behind our appetites like beasts".[15] Again, the broader problem of appetite is more pertinent than the specifics of how the desire finally manifests itself. The presence of these unnatural sinners in *Purgatorio* further demonstrates that desire is inherently problematic, but also perhaps shows that it is difficult to be rid of altogether. The persistence and ubiquity of desire for most human beings, then, necessarily create a space in Purgatory in which there is also room for repentance and atonement so that desire might be better channeled elsewhere.

The presence of the sodomites in canto XXVI of *Purgatorio* suggests that Dante is lenient about their desirous inclinations because he recognizes that they can atone for their passion, regardless of its nature. Once he understands the nature of the sin at hand, Dante also sees that the shades have "twice been made / aware of their desire".[16] It is important to highlight that Dante sees their desire as something that the shades themselves must recognize in *Purgatorio,* because it implies that there it is something intrinsically wrong with the nature of it. However, soon after Dante exclaims, "But, so may your greatest longing / soon to be satisfied and the heaven take you in / that is so full of love and holds the widest space".[17] This is perhaps the ultimate sympathetic reaction. For Dante to create space in paradise—where desire should focus on God and love of a heavenly nature—for sinners whose actions and appetites are not only problematic in terms of desire, but in what is "unnatural" in the medieval worldview context, demonstrates that he is sees redemptive opportunities for all incorrect forms of desire, homoerotic or otherwise.

7 Boswell 34
8 Boswell 66
9 XXVI.141
10 Pequigney 32
11 Pequigney 32
12 Boswell 69
13 *Purgatorio* XXV.121-125
14 *Purgatorio* XXVI.40
15 *Purgatorio* XXVI.83-84
16 *Purgatorio* XXVI.52
17 *Purgatorio* XXVI.61-63

The simile that Dante uses to describe the sodomites in *Inferno* is of a homoerotic nature as well. As the Florentine sodomites wheel towards Dante and Virgil, Dante describes them as "champions, naked, oiled"[18]. The attention given to male nudity and bodily contact, implicit in the mention of oiled wrestling champions and induced by the human wheel of sodomites, reads as deliberate. Joseph Pequigney closely examines this simile and writes that "the naked athletes […] have the kind of bodies that would have attracted the sodomites, and the images of those robust and glistening youths offer a contrast to the exposed flesh of the sinners themselves".[19] This also calls attention to the burning punishment the sinners must endure. This is further seen in Heather Webb's reading of *Inferno,* in which she writes that medieval texts often emphasize a connection between bodily violence, sports, and sodomy. As Dante describes the wrestlers, he mentions the "blows and wounds" that befall them.[20] Dante's reference to the overt violence of competitive wrestling when describing the sodomites then suggests the not only the act of sodomy in a male homosexual context, but the danger of it as well.[21]

The allusions to homosexuality in *Inferno* make Dante's interactions with the Florentine sodomites in canto XVI particularly striking. Upon seeing the extensive burns on the sodomites, Dante empathetically grieves that "it pains [him] still as [he] remember[s] it".[22] Not only does Dante feel badly on account of their suffering, he also declares that had he been kept safe from the flames, he "should have thrown [him]self down there among them" and that he is "impatient to embrace them",[23] Considering that Dante wrote *Inferno* at a time when persons convicted of sodomy were deemed monstrous, dehumanized, and were often killed, these passages that deliberately stress the physicality of Dante's desire to be among the sodomites are all the more unusual.[24] In fact, Bruce Holsinger goes as far as to read Dante's desire in this instance as evidence that he readily identifies with the sodomites and nearly "abandon[s] his visionary quest for Beatrice in favor of the company of the sodomites".[25] If so, then Dante's acknowledgement that "his teacher would have let him"[26] join the sodomites is also striking. However, historically speaking, these three sodomites—Guido Guerra, Tegghiaio Aldobrandi, and Jacopo Rusticucci—were Florentine noblemen who tried to dissuade other Florentines from fighting at the Battle of Montaperti in 1260.[27] Dante's admiration of these men, and indeed Virgil's assumed permission for Dante to join them, is likely rooted in the respect for their contribution to Florence and their honourable service—both of which may have trumped any associations with sodomy or homoeroticism and did not diminish their standings as well-respected citizens, even in hell. Associations with homoeroticism do not carry as pejorative of a connotation in Dante's text as they might have elsewhere in the fourteenth century, likely in light of other external personal factors that Dante took into consideration.

In his study of desire in the *Commedia,* William Burgwinkle acknowledges that the homoerotic encounters Dante has in canto XV of *Inferno* -- amongst the sodomites -- retroactively color his interaction with Brunetto Latini in the previous canto as both homoerotic and positive.[28] When Dante recognizes his old friend and revered teacher, he defers to Latini and treats him with utmost respect—possibly more so than any other figure in *Inferno*.[29] For example, as Dante and Latini walk alongside each other, Dante describes that he walks "as does a man who goes in reverence".[30] When Latini leaves, Dante describes that "he turned and seemed like one of those / who race across the fields to win the green /

18 *Inferno* XVI.22
19 28
20 *Inferno* XVI.24
21 Webb 66
22 *Inferno* XVI.12
23 *Inferno* XVI 47-51
24 Pequigney 26
25 252
26 *Inferno* XVI.48
27 Mason 222
28 Burgwinkle 571
29 Crompton 210
30 *Inferno* XV.45

cloth at Verona".[31] For readers in the Middle Ages, the description of the famous foot race at Verona would have likely conjured images of nude male runners[32], which fits accordingly with Heather Webb's theory. According to Webb, Dante uses sports metaphors to allude to homosexual behavior.

When Dante inquires about Latini's companions in hell, he refers to them as "comrades of repute and excellence".[33] Latini identifies two such companions as Priscian, a Latin grammarian of the sixth century, and Francesco d'Accorso, a professor of law at Bologna and Oxford. In his historical study of homosexuality, Louis Crompton suggests that Latini intentionally identifies scholars like himself because of the common association of homosexuality and intellectuals and teachers in the fourteenth century.[34] Given that Latini further elaborates that he and his scholarly companions "were stained by one same sin upon the earth"[35] Crompton believes there is little doubt that the sin Latini refers to is sodomy. Here Crompton acknowledges that *Inferno* appears to assume the traditional theological condemnation of homosexuality, as demonstrated by Dante's Thomistic conception of the sin of sodomy, and yet unexpectedly treats the sodomites— who, like Latini, were upstanding and revered men in their own right—with a great deal of respect.[36] This is most puzzling in that during Latini's lifetime, he was never publicly accused of sodomy or homosexuality and no evidence exists as such. Scholar Richard Kay dismisses the homosexual overtones in canto XV on the grounds that "neither Brunetto nor his companions have any reputation for homosexuality except in the poem and its commentators".[37] Kay might also acknowledged that Dante did not claim *Inferno* as an accurate historical account of any of persons featured in the poem. Indeed, John Boswell offers a compelling rebuttal to Kay's argument in that the famous story of Paolo and Francesca's romance in canto V of *Inferno* also lacks external corroborating evidence, and yet Kay does not offer criticism of their romantic or sexual inclinations.[38] But the fact remains that Latini had a family and was well-respected public servant and literary figure in Florence; the sudden accusations of sodomy thus present as somewhat dubious. That Dante locates such a revered and recognizable figure in such a perilous place in hell, despite lack of historical evidence, might suggest that Latini's sin is not meant to be understood as sexual in nature. For example, Kay suggests that Latini might be in hell for being "opposed to the empire"[39] and that Dante is condemning Latini for Guelph idolatry. Nevertheless, historicity aside, it is remarkable that Dante does not seem overtly concerned with tarnishing Latini's reputation with accusations of sodomy or homosexuality—whether that is due to his tolerant understanding of sodomy, or because Latini sinned in a different way is left uncertain.

Much of the analysis of Dante's attitudes towards male homosexuality comes from cantos in the *Divine Comedy* which refer explicitly to sodomy. However, another passage of *Purgatorio* also serves to legitimize what many scholars conceive of as Dante's lenient take on homosexuality. In canto IX of *Purgatorio,* the pilgrim has a dream that evokes the ancient Greek myth of Ganymede. This myth is often recognized for its homoerotic overtone—in fact, the term *ganymede* sometimes indicates a homosexual person—

31 *Inferno* XV.121-123
32 Pequigney 28
33 *Inferno* XV.101
34 Crompton 208
35 *Inferno* XV.108
36 Crompton 209
37 Kay 20
38 Boswell 67
39 Kay 65

and Dante makes impartial use of the story to narrate his eventual journey to the gate of Purgatory.[40] Dante describes his dream:

> I saw an eagle in the sky, with plumes of gold, / its wings wide spread, its purpose soon to swoop. / And I, it seemed to me, was where the kin / of Ganymede, when he was seized, swept up / towards the highest court, remained abandoned[41]

Here Dante readily and rather surprisingly identifies himself with a traditionally homosexual mythic figure.[42] But the dream sequence need not necessarily read as any indication of homosexual inclination on behalf of Dante himself. Rather, Bruce Holsinger describes Dante's bold move as a prime example of the "enduring presence of classical homoerotics as an integral part of medieval religious experience".[43] Many readers and scholars often overlook such instances in Dante's work, which is indicative of the pervasive power of medieval scholasticism—the same power which Dante both subverts and affirms in the *Inferno* and *Purgatorio,* insofar as his recurring descriptions of the sodomites and their plight are in fact blatant references to male homosexuality and meant to be read as such. Dante's concerns about homosexuality, though obvious in most cases, tend to focus more closely on the larger issue of passion and misguided desire, and the same can be said of heterosexual behavior in the poem.

Although Dante remains consistent in his description of the sinners and their surrounding fiery, sterile environments in both *Inferno* and *Purgatorio,* he differs significantly in his categorization of the nature of their sins. This distinction might account for the sudden change in placement between the sinners in *Inferno* and *Purgatorio*. As he describes the various circles of hell, Virgil says of the sodomites, "one can be violent against the Godhead, / one's heart denying and blaspheming Him / and scorning nature and the good in her".[44] In *Inferno,* Dante classifies the sodomites' sin as violence against God, and gives specific attention to acts which contradict what is natural. That sodomy does its violence to God by means of "scorning nature" reveals Dante's Thomistic influences: The *Summa Theologica* conceptualizes sodomy in much the same way.[45] Meanwhile, in *Purgatorio,* the sodomites are punished—alongside heterosexual sinners—due to the sin of excessive love. What, then, might account for Dante's sudden change in positionality of the sodomites? Joseph Peguigney theorizes that the teleological schema of sexual conduct implicit in *Inferno* is replaced in *Purgatorio* with the "schema of deadly sins, in which lust is the least offensive of the seven, combined with a schema of moderation whereby excess becomes the determinant of sexual guilt".[46] However, examining sin as a function of choice, rather than as a question of excess, might prove a simpler explanation. William Burgwinkle underlines the interplay between the will and the body in the canto XXVI of *Purgatorio,* focussing especially on Dante's interaction with Guido Guinzelli. As the two speak to each other, Guido remarks that he and the other sinners around him "no longer have the power to sin"[47] implying that he previously had the ability to exercise his will towards sinful behavior or not. Tellingly, Guido, a poet, also criticizes those who "arrive at their opinions / without the use of skill or reason".[48] There is a marked emphasis on the use of reason and exercise of will throughout the canto in *Purgatorio* that suggests Dante affords sinners (both heterosexual and homosexual) a degree of clemency once they recognize the error of their misguided will or previous lack of reason.

Recognizing the effects and complicated relationships between will, desire, and reason reveal Augustinian influence throughout the *Commedia*. In canto II of *Inferno,* Dante describes a concept of will that sounds similar to St Augustine's notion of the divided will: "And as one who unwills what he has willed / changing his intent on second thought".[49]

40 Pequigney 36
41 *Purgatorio* IX.35-39
42 Pequigney 37
43 254
44 *Inferno* XI.46-48
45 Pequigney 24
46 Pequigney 36
47 *Purgatorio* XXVI.132
48 *Purgatorio* XXVI.122-123
49 *Inferno* II.37-38

Dante, like Augustine, imagines that the most difficult things to properly converge are desire and will, and both are ultimately concerned with the proper way to channel desire towards God. For example, it is not until canto XXVII when Dante realizes that God is the final end, or ultimate goal, of all desire. Virgil explains, "That sweet fruit which mortals seek / and strive to find on so many boughs / today shall satisfy your cravings".[50] On the threshold of Paradise, Dante understands that which awaits him is not tied to erotic love embodied in Beatrice as he might have previously imagined (or in what other sinners in the *Commedia* might imagine as sodomy, lust, and other physical passions) but rather spiritual love exemplified in the presence of God. His will and his desire finally converge: "Desire upon desire so seized me to ascend".[51] Once these two forces join, the presence of reason becomes unnecessary. The fact that Virgil—a great and highly revered poem in Dante's mind, but still a pagan figure—disappears from the narrative the moment Dante experiences will and desire simultaneously confirms that his guide represented "the quintessence of human reason untransformed by Christian grace".[52] Once desire is properly directed towards God, and the will aligns itself accordingly, there is no longer a need to exercise reason.

Reason complicates the matter of desire several times in the *Commedia*. In the second circle of hell, Dante encounters Francesca da Rimini. He describes the sinners he encounters as those "damned because they sinned with the flesh, / subjecting reason to the rule of lust".[53] Here Dante is critical of the impassioned sinners, both for their misguided desire and for their demotion of reason in favor of carnal desire. Yet Francesca's sin of lust places her in the circle that is farthest away from Satan, which demonstrates that Dante believed it to be the least problematic of all the possible sins in hell. Furthermore, after hearing Francesca's tragic story of her brief love affair with Paolo, Dante remarks "alas / how many gentle thoughts, how deep a longing / had led them to the agonizing pass".[54] Notably, the Italian "disio" in line 113—rendered as "longing" in the Mandelbaum text—is often translated instead as "desire".[55] Despite his earlier recognition of their desire wrongfully taking over their faculties of reason, Dante is in fact sympathetic and compassionate towards their plight. These carnal afflictions, he mourns, "mov[e] [him] to tears of sorrow and pity".[56] Dante's compassion is reasonable and impartial, most significantly in that he is equally critical of heterosexual desire as he is of homosexual desire. Any manifestation thereof—whether in the form of sodomy, or adulterous embraces—is problematic in the *Commedia.* But desire is clearly also a powerful force with which to reckon for many souls, and so it is a struggle still worthy of Dante's pity and compassion.

There is no escaping passion or desire in the *Commedia* until Dante reaches paradise. As Dante recognizes the different forms of desire, as depicted by various sinners throughout the poem, there is a simultaneous recognition of the necessity and pervasive nature of love. To love and to feel passion is to be human, but to properly harness the power of desire and direct it solely towards God is the only correct way to love, and simultaneously align both will and desire. The *Commedia* in fact culminates with Dante "near[ing] the end of all desire"[57] as he moves closer to the light of God. In the final canto of the *Commedia*, Dante writes:

> He who beholds that light is so enthralled / that he would never
> willingly consent / to turn it away from it for any other sight
> / because the good that is the object of the will / is held and
> gathered in perfection there[58]

Dante's final encounter with God in Paradise confirms that the issue of desire and passion throughout the poem is not centred in specific behaviors, orientations, or appearances, but rather with an alignment of the Augustinian principles of reason, will, and desire.

50 *Purgatorio* XXVII.115-117
51 *Purgatorio* XXVII.121
52 Goodheart 161
53 *Inferno* V.37-38
54 *Inferno* V.112-114
55 Hollander 53
56 V.117
57 *Paradiso* XXXIII.46
58 *Paradiso* XXXIII.100-104

Homosexual or heterosexual, lustful adulterer or sodomite—the only proper way to cease all misguided passion in Dante's Christian epic the *Commedia* is to direct one's will and desire to centre on God.

Dante wrote the *Commedia* operating under Thomistic and Augustinian influences at a time where views on sodomy and homosexuality in general were almost universally condemnatory. Scholars can only speculate on Dante's unusually permissive attitude towards both issues throughout the poem, but focussing on the overarching concerns with human physical passion, and the struggle with will and reason, prove helpful in conceptualizing Dante's relationship with desire and God. In the *Commedia*, there is only one divinely acceptable way to channel human desire, and thus it follows that Dante would not need to concern himself with the specificities of sexual or lustful action. As a final thought, if homophobic attitudes have no place in Dante's hell, purgatory, or paradise, perhaps we might re-evaluate their place in other literary and mortal realms.

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Art by Nick Nestorowich

'The Queen of Monthlies': Reformism Beyond the Times.

Julia Sutera Sardo

Understanding the radical nature of the *Godey's Lady's Book* magazine launch in the early nineteenth century is pivotal to addressing the evolution of the feminist identity and movement in North America. Reformist, far-reaching, and absolutely necessary, the creation a monthly written exclusively for women, by some women alongside their male counterparts was a major societal development. This event heavily shaped societal perceptions toward the cause of female rights as human rights and brought equity to the front lines of the press far beyond the times. To address this, the political context in which the monthly debuted will be outlined; strategies employed by journalists and editors to educate women while pressuring the state in issues of the magazine, despite male resistance, will be considered (i.e. the fashion illustrations began including shorter skirts and pants); and the impact of feminist publications like this one will be explored, as it relates to the concepts of social change and activism.

Political Context

The struggle for gender equality, particularly in the fields of journalism and literature, has consistently been depicted throughout American history.[1] While prejudice toward females was deemed an acceptable social norm, it only deepened the experience of cultural oppression and social marginalization for women.[2] In the Victorian era, the law essentially dehumanized females by socially conditioning them to feel apprehensive about the world outside of their households; this was a legal attempt at strengthening traditional gender structures within society, for it reinforced the idea that women should maintain their homes as their husbands labored "the world of commerce".[3] Emphasis was placed on a woman's leisure while the importance of having a function in society was left ambiguous, as a mean to undermine liberty rights and reinforce patriarchal configurations.[4]

As a response to amplified gender issues, women and other minority groups turned to publishing in an effort to overcome their "victimization".[5] This led to a rise in progressive action toward creating a more radical 'mainstream' during the nineteenth century. Social activism enabled women to self-define "in relation to [values carried by] white, Protestant" males, whose standards of living were significantly better than theirs.[6] In fact, the use of journalism presented a pragmatic approach for women to develop their cultural identity on their own terms, despite the concessions they had to make to eventually reach that point.[7]

While lobbying for change had not yet become popularized as a concept during antebellum America, the seeds for the feminist movement were dropped. As women became

1 Bradley ix
2 Rose 132
3 Rose 133; Bradley xi
4 Douglas 63
5 Douglas 63; Bradley xviii
6 Rose 133, 148f, 158
7 Rose 133

more informed about the existence of pressure tactics, they began to strategize and construct effective means to exert their influence in society.[8] Their success in doing so through writing in the press was a significant political advancement considering the fact that women were socially marginalized, and did not have exhaustive access to higher education– unlike their male counterparts who were "accustomed to voicing and writing down" their viewpoints, in addition to being heard.[9] A change in the position of women in society–from housewives to militants–could only be explained by an economic shift toward consumerism, which took place in the 1830s.[10] The emergence of product placement as an advertising technique in business prompted the inclusion of women in the mass media market, as they could yield a 'women's angle' for the purpose of appealing to female readers; thus, increasing press sales and interest in the latest goods.[11]

Strategies and Tactics for the Advancement of Feminism

The commercial media became an important tool in the struggle for equality rights; more than simple employment, it fostered a space for women to collectively defy gender norms in a domain that diminished their work as women. Becoming novelists, journalists and writers, women used duplicity to succeed in conveying their political opinions under the pretense of affirming and publicizing cultural party line.[12] They advised women in their domestic customs while hinting at social issues and critiquing them in manners that men were inadvertent to.[13] Nonetheless, nineteenth-century women still had to "walk a delicate balance" at work, weighing the maintenance of their employment with responsible journalism–ultimately accommodating their views to the conditions of their work environment.[14]

Despite being owned by a man seeking profitable business, *Godey's Lady's Book* provided women with a means of self-expression that enabled them to make their social presence noticed.[15] It was so notable in fact that the paper achieved a circulation of 150,000 in its first year, reaching a significant amount of women every issue.[16] Sarah Josepha Hale was mainly responsible for the paper's success over the fifty years in which she acted as its editor, building a reputation for herself and the paper as an influential "arbiter of feminine opinion" in Philadelphia.[17]

Hale envisioned *Godey's Lady's Book* as an important platform for reformist ideology and women's education; she proposed the use of colloquial writing and recruited all female employees to achieve that. Just the practice of deploying written language had a concrete societal impact on female writers who labored for the purpose of social justice, as literacy rates for subordinate groups were low in antebellum America due to discriminatory policies enacted by chauvinistic men.[18] While female writers could have followed an orientation toward sensationalism, or scandal to draw in a large audience, they opted not to. *'The Queen of Monthlies'* widened the scope of its women's sections, tackling important issues while also addressing ordinary 'women's questions' in its advice column. Alongside articles on home décor, domestic work, religious practices, and shopping were mentions of public affairs and "material progress [that were] tangible to life's true meaning".[19]

Women's magazines challenged stereotypical, sexist domestic standards for women and used fashion to encourage women to "free themselves of restrictive [social principles and] clothing".[20] Illustrating slightly shorter skirts that showed off the ankles, and

8 Douglas 56
9 Douglas 56
10 Rose 156
11 Douglas 59; Bradley xix
12 Bradley x
13 Rose 159
14 Bradley xvii
15 Rose 140; Bradley 27
16 Bradley 27
17 Piepmeier 270
18 Rose 132
19 Rose 160
20 Douglas 52

tops that drew attention to the collarbone in fashion pages served as a way to establish female culture, as well as ambition, within a systemically patriarchal social order. It gave force to increased–yet cautious–feminist organizing through resistance to matriarchal values, too. For women journalists, fashion became a "form of reprisal" against inequitable economic practices.[21] In its editorial section, *Godey's Lady's Book* published stories that placed housewives at the center of socio-economic issues, which had been disguised as fiction but were actually fact-based.[22] Other sections included cooking and poetry.

Sarah Josepha Hale structured the paper in a way that convinced men that this periodical would allow for "more loving, because less bored, wives and daughters".[23] *Godey's Lady's Book* journalists produced a controversial body of social criticism that "explicitly and implicitly criticized the priorities of men," and denounced gender revisionism through the lens of informed, working women.[24]

Impact of Feminist Publications

Authorship and literacy together illustrate the "circular influence" of intellectual activity on the feminization of culture and the workplace in the United States[25]. This demonstrates the impact of language for minority groups that deemed institutions to be untrustworthy and unfair. Writing was an "instrument of social advancement," a bridge for women in the newsroom who levied their freedom through progressive social activism "in a world dominated by a sex essentially hostile to it".[26]

Power inequalities within social communities are channels for capitalism to triumph, whereas stability in the form of power equity can lead to deeper instances of collective action to improve the conditions of society as a whole by valuing everyone's experiences and backgrounds. Women in journalism such as Sarah Josepha Hale were united in a joint "struggle for identity and esteem" that was "real and complex" because it involved self-consciousness and tenacity in the face of the Protestant ministry.[27] They raised questions pertaining to social dynamics on the basis of mainstream identity, and seized the power they were accorded in the publishing industry to display agency in their fight against categorization, stereotyping, and oppression.[28]

Conclusion

The establishment of *'The Queen of Monthlies'* was essential to the advancement of women's rights in the 1800s-onwards; and the difficulties that female writers and editors faced while trying to advocate for themselves through passive means, like fashion illustrations, are important considerations that contributed greatly to the resilience of women. The normalization of feminist identity began with concessions, but ended in victories because females were creative and determined in their advocacy tactics.

21 Douglas 71
22 Douglas 85
23 Piepmeier 280
24 Bradley 32f
25 Oberholtzer 19
26 Douglas 55
27 Oberholtzer 72
28 Piepmeier 275

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

Art by Elise Timm-Bottos

Don Quixote and the Mirth of Metafiction

Elizabeth Robinson

In the canon of the modern novel, the origin of the ostensibly modern literary device of metafiction is attributed to Cervantes' novel, *Don Quixote* (Part I: 1605, Part II: 1615). Cervantes' use of metafiction is genre specific: he uses it to highlight the satirical and comic nature of *Don Quixote*. Indeed, his application of literary metafiction in the text enhances its comedic effect, on multiple interrelated levels. The most apparent level of Cervantes' application of metafiction to comedy is his explicit parody of the type of metafiction that is proper to chivalric romances. Cervantes' appropriation of the metafictional tropes found in chivalric romances goes beyond basic parody: several episodes are made absurdly ironic due to the presence of metafiction. Furthermore, the revelation in part I, chapter VIII of the metafictional presence of Don Quixote's chronicler, Cide Hamete Benengeli, provides Cervantes with more comic opportunities. Last, he uses metafiction in Part II to further his humorous ridicule of Avellaneda's spurious sequel to Cervante's first part of *Don Quixote*.

Don Quixote is, first and foremost, a satire of the medieval chivalric romance. Traditionally, these romances themselves are metafictional because their authors make explicit claims to convince the reader that the stories are true – the fantastical narratives are purported *histories*, not stories. Such a convention is metafictional because the narrator's intrusion within the text draws the reader's attention to the literariness of the work. Paradoxically, the author's claim that the events of the book are *real* reminds the reader that it is a work of fiction. It is the romance author's way of playfully enticing the reader into the evidently imaginary world he has written, with its gallant knights, princesses, and giants. Caroll B. Johnson summarizes the metafictional tradition of the chivalric romance:

> Virtually all the books of chivalry recount the story of their own origins and how they came to be in the hands of the reader. The Castilian romances all purport to be the work of a trustworthy historian who has found a pre-existing manuscript written in a foreign language, which contains the fiction itself, which he then either translates himself or causes to be translated, and then presents to the reader in the reader's language.[1]

Cervantes mocks this trope by imitating it, and presenting the ridiculous and hilarious consequences that follow from this chivalric metafictional formula – consequences which were presumably absent from the primarily non-comedic romances that used the trope. The second historian of *Don Quixote* is Cide Hamete Benengeli, first alluded to at a most inopportune moment in Part I, Chapter VIII. The suspenseful moment when Don Quixote is about to "split [the Basque] in half" with his sword, has all the bystanders "terrified and wondering what was going to be the outcome of the prodigious blows with which the two men were threatening each other".[2] The reader is also left on a cliff-hanger: is this harmless (up until now) buffoon of a madman about to murder an innocent civilian, and change the tone of the novel entirely? The narrator apologetically interrupts the dramatic climax of this moment, inducing laughter because of the burlesque irony of his ill-timed intrusion:

> But the trouble is that at this very point, the author of this history leaves the battle unfinished, excusing himself on the ground that he hasn't found anything more written about these

1 Johnson 1
2 Cervantes 70

exploits of Don Quixote than what he has narrated.[3]

This metafictional interruption is humorous on several levels – the most straightforward of which is Cervantes' parody of the chivalric romance's use of the historicizing device. Jean Starobinski writes that authors of chivalric romances claim that the events of their stories actually happened, in order to endow their work with prestige.[4] Cervantes mocks this literary device by using it in a situation that strips it of its ability to grant prestige to the work, because of the absurd irony of the narrator's inopportune interruption. Moreover, the humour of Cervantes' ironic attempt to bamboozle the reader is physically manifested in the fact that the reader is holding the hefty weight of the remaining 912 pages of Don Quixote's story. Here, Cervantes' implication that Don Quixote and his adventures are based in reality represents a comic subversion of the same metafictional device used seriously in chivalric romances. Through the use of irony and absurdity, Cervantes mocks the genre by applying its traditional device to a situation that renders it comic. Bandera confirms that *Don Quixote's* profound awareness of its fictional nature "becomes throughout the course of the novel the basis for a devastating parody of the nonfictional pretensions of books of chivalry, that is, their feigned historical character".[5]

Cervantes also exploits the metafiction of chivalric romances for the comedic effect produced by satire. The narrator of chapter VIII onward sets out to find the remaining history of *Don Quixote de la Mancha*. He knows that in the chivalric tradition, every knight-errant "had one or two sages, made to measure for him, who not only recorded his exploits, but also depicted his least thoughts and trivial actions […]".[6] Despite the narrator's jab at chivalric authors' inclusion of trifling matters, most serious chivalric romance authors exalted their knight-errants (and the text itself) by only including their honourable deeds, leaving out the natural but disgusting human affairs, such as defecation and urination. Mikhail Bakhtin supports this claim in his essay "Discourse in the Novel": "The chivalric romance opposes to all this [vulgar discourse] its own discourse, linked only with the highest and noblest associations, filled with references to lofty contexts (historical, literary, scholarly)".[7] Cervantes satirizes this elevated nature of chivalric sages in several instances. After the introduction of Cide Hamete Benengeli, the second intrafictional historian of Don Quixote's exploits, Cervantes sarcastically praises him "for his meticulousness in telling us about all [the history's] most minute particulars […]".[8] Indeed, Cide is *overly* meticulous: Cervantes undermines the chivalric sage tradition by having him relate the most vulgar, anti-chivalric anecdotes which include the "minute particulars" of human life. Take the detailed story of Sancho's laborious act of defecation, for instance. He "thrust two ample buttocks into the night air" and "began to grit his teeth and hunch his shoulders […]".[9] Aside from being a comedic, slap-stick episode centered on a funny and lovable character, this is an example of Cervantes' reversal of the chivalric sage's unrealistic, purely noble portrayal of human knights and squires. The humour of the parody is inherent to the irony embedded in it: the archetypically noble and loyal squire of chivalric romances is attempting to relieve himself without his master noticing. Although this is not an inherently metafictional moment, the parody here refers to the chivalric romances' metafictional tradition of having a sage relate an allegedly true history. Cervantes mocks the romances' metafictional pretension of reality: if these lofty knights and squires are real people, and their sages record everything they do, why do they not defecate?

As for directly metafictional instances in the novel, Cervantes' insertion of Cide Hamete Benengeli provides him with much metafictional material to enhance the comedy of *Don Quixote*. Whenever Cervantes mocks Cide, he necessarily uses metafiction to parody metafiction – that is, the metafiction of chivalric romances. The romance authors who claimed that their texts were based on real historical manuscripts only did so because of

3 Cervantes 70
4 Starobinski 91-2
5 Bandera 37
6 Cervantes 73
7 Bakhtin 384
8 Cervantes 750
9 Cervantes 160

the prestige that the truth value granted their work. As Starobinski says, it "is intended to make a plea for the authority of real life"[10], thus granting the authority of real life to the text itself. Since this was the case, no romance author would explicitly doubt the honesty of their metafictional historian within the text itself – to do so would undermine their attempt to elevate their work as a true history. Cervantes parodies the romances by doing exactly this, through his ridicule of Cide. The pretension of reality allows Cervantes to exploit metafiction to achieve comedic effect. He satirizes chivalric metafiction through his metafictional mockery of the author of Don Quixote's adventure – Cide.

Cide and his credibility as a historian are a running joke in the text, and his narrative presence is emphasized in part II. In fact, Howard Mancing argues that "The main role of Cide Hamete Benengeli, […] in part II is to replace – or at least rival – Don Quixote as an object of laughter".[11] Many of the jokes at Cide's expense are racist, as Cervantes relies on Islamophobic stereotypes. Thus, while progressive modern readers may understand the jokes, the humour is lost on them because they are aware of the stereotypes' harmful nature. Nonetheless, Cervantes' pandering to "Moorish stereotypes" was intended to be – and presumably was – humorous for Spanish readers at the time of *Don Quixote*'s publication, due to the widespread Spanish intolerance for Muslim immigrants. For this reason, it is important to address how Cervantes used metafiction to generate his reader's laughter at the expense of Cide Hamete Benengeli.

The jokes begin as soon as the narrator finds Cide's manuscripts. The narrator makes a racist joke, metafictional in nature, targeted not at Cide but the Muslim translator of part II. Nonetheless, as a metafictional joke that targets another Muslim involved in the chronicling of Don Quixote's adventures, it sets the tone for the upcoming mockery of Cide. The narrator encounters a "Spanish-speaking Moor," who is reading Cide's account of part II in Arabic. He laughs, and explains his laughter to the narrator: he states that it is written in the margin that "This woman Dulcinea del Toboso, so often mentioned in this book, is said to have been a dabber hand at salting pork than any other woman in La Mancha".[12] Luce Lopez-Baralt deciphers this joke: apparently, Toboso (where Dulcinea lives) was mainly inhabited by Spanish Muslims during Cervantes' lifetime. Thus, Dulcinea del Toboso translates to: "Dulcinea of the Moorish town".[13]

> And, to top it all off, Dulcinea salts pork, desperately taking on that Christian employment no doubt in order to hide her (scorned) Moorish origins. Thus it is that the Moorish translator of *Quixote* […] laughs so heartily (and probably at the same time bitterly): he must have seen his own situation reflected in Dulcinea's dissimulations, and it hardly takes any stretch of the imagination to conclude that he is also laughing at himself and his society.[14]

However, the joke can be interpreted in many ways. At first glance, it appears to be a pun on Dulcinea's name, which derives from the Spanish word for sweet: "dulce." The humorous irony of the pun is that Dulcinea strays from the sweet nature of her name, being renowned for her use of salt on pork. Moreover, the line "dabber hand at salting pork than any other woman" may be a sexual euphemism. Ironically, Don Quixote's sweet maiden may not be so chaste after all: his pork is not the only one she is salting.

Despite the many possible interpretations of this joke, the Islamophobic meaning, however subtle, is present. This follows from the fact that there are many racist jokes throughout the novel. This is merely the beginning of the explicit metafictional jokes at the expense of the "Moors" who helped record and translate Don Quixote's exploits. Cide's own name is, in itself, a racist joke that mocks Spanish Muslims. According to Rutherford's endnote, Cide Hamete Benengeli translates to something akin to "Lord Hamed Aubergine-eater" – it was stereotypical of Muslims from Toledo to eat a lot of eggplant.[15] Cervantes'

10 Starobinski 91f
11 Mancing 81
12 Cervantes 75
13 Lopez-Baralt 37
14 Lopez-Baralt 37
15 Cervantes 75, note 4

Spanish readers at the time would have immediately understood Cide's name and laughed at it. Cervantes further exploits the eggplant stereotype in a highly metafictional moment, when Sancho and Don Quixote first hear about the publication of their adventures from Part I.[16] Sancho mistakenly refers to Cide Hamete Benengeli as "Cide Hamete Brinjalcurry" – an Indian dish containing eggplant (brinjal). Cervantes' mocking of Cide is metafictionally profound: even the characters themselves are making fun of him.

Moreover, the narrator divulges himself of the responsibility for the "truthfulness" of part II, stating that if any objection is made against it, "it can only be that its author was an Arab, and it's a well-known feature of Arabs that they're all liars […]".[17] This statement is an explicit beginning to the metafictional running joke throughout the novel: Cide's credibility and Cervantes' constant ridicule of it. Moreover, the Arabic sage is a direct parody of the chivalric romances' own sages, and their authors' pretension of reality. Indeed, Cide is a humorous "*reductio ad absurdum* of chroniclers".[18] Presberg discusses the comedic consequences of having multiple narrative voices in the text:

> The resulting proliferation of voices and fragmentary versions that suppress, embed, contradict, or claim to contradict other voices and versions combines with an endless swirl of hearsay about the protagonist to create the central joke of the text: the text itself as "true history," or Cervantes' fiction transparently masquerading as history.[19]

Thus, the unnamed narrator and Cide share the task of narrating *Don Quixote*. However, in Part II, "the story is wriggling out of the hands of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, into those of Cide Hamete Benengeli".[20] The humorous quality of Cide's presence is essentially metafictional, and would not be achieved if Cide were a character in the same vein as Don Quixote and Sancho. He needs to be an author in the text for his credibility and truth to be potentially doubted – and thus mocked – at all.

Cervantes directs the reader's laughter at Cide's credibility as a historian on several occasions. He always does so by undermining him. Even when Cide appears to redeem himself to the Catholic Spanish readers at the beginning of Part II chapter XXVII, by claiming to be Christian, Cervantes turns it into mockery:

> Cide Hamete, the chronicler of this great history, begins this chapter with the words: 'I swear as a Christian and as a Catholic…'; to which the translator adds that when Cide Hamete swore as a Christian and a Catholic, being a Moor, as he most certainly was, he only meant to say that just as when the Christian or Catholic swears something, he swears, or should swear, the truth, and he swears to tell the truth in everything he says, so Cide Hamete was also telling the truth, as if he were swearing as a Christian and a Catholic, in everything he wrote about Don Quixote […][21]

This long chapter introduction begins as a "redemption" of Cide to the Islamophobic Spanish readers because it appears he has converted to Catholicism, meaning that *now* he can be trusted. However, it is immediately undercut by the translator's interruption – the same translator who laughed at the racist joke about Dulcinea. The translator's explanation that Cide's oath is nothing more than an "Moor's" attempt to convince readers of his reliability necessarily advances the stereotype that all Arabs are liars. Unfunny to the liberal-minded modern reader, Cervantes' Islamophobic Spanish contemporaries would have adored this joke. Moreover, Mancing speculates that Cervantes intended for Cide's oath to be a declaration *against* the truth:

> […] such a tacit admission of the superiority of Christianity over the historian's own Moslem beliefs is incongruous. An

16 Cervantes 501
17 Cervantes 76
18 Parr 31
19 Presberg 265
20 Rutherford x
21 Cervantes 671

> equally —or more— plausible interpretation of these words is that the Moor is consciously facetious in employing them; after all, for Moslems, Christians are lying dogs, and to swear like a Christian is to invalidate the oath. But no matter what the oath "means," the passage is both comic and absurd.[22]

Both Mancing's and my own interpretation demonstrate that the layers of metafictional interruptions here (first Cide, then the translator through Cervantes' narrative voice) are meant solely to mock Cide and encourage the readers to laugh at him. The passage's comedy and absurdity are enhanced by the strange syntactical nature of this sentence. The repetition and parallelism of multiple variations of "Christian and Catholic" and "swear to tell the truth" strengthens the association between being a Christian and being honest. This emphasizes the Muslim translator's strong urge to convince the reader of his high opinion of Christianity. This follows from Lopez-Baralt's interpretation of the translator's bitter laughter at his own Muslim origins. One might also conclude that Cervantes is attributing the ineptitude of the redundant sentence structure to the Arabic narrator, as it was he who wrote the comment in the margin. Perhaps Cervantes is both ridiculing Cide as a lying Arab, and mocking the translator as an Arab who cannot write. It is difficult to say, but it is possible, considering Cervantes' readers were mostly intolerant of Arabic immigrants – he pandered to their cruel sense of humour.

On one occasion, the metafictional mocking of Cide turns around, to be directed at Don Quixote instead. After hearing about the publication and proliferation of Part I, Don Quixote worries about how the history has portrayed him so far. After consoling himself, he "lost heart again when he remembered that the name Cide suggested that the author was a Moor, and not a word of truth was to be expected from any of those […]"[23] He worries that Cide misrepresents his deeds, and fails to narrate them as they are: that is, as he *believes* they are: "grandiloquent, lofty, illustrious, magnificent and true".[24] This segment is a prime example of Cervantes' metafictional, absurd, and comic irony. The readers who have just finished Part I know that Don Quixote's adventures are the opposite of grandiloquent and lofty: he is a delusional clown of a madman who attacks windmills after mistaking them for giants.[25] The deep irony is that Cide's account of Part I (he picks it up from chapter IX) is, as far as Cervantes and the reader can tell, truthful. This follows from the fact that Cide's Don Quixote is the same – just as insane as, and equally lacking in grandiloquence or loftiness – as the first unnamed historian's Don Quixote. The dramatic irony is embedded in Don Quixote's anxiety that Cide will lie and distort the loftiness of his deeds, which Cide's honest portrayal shows to be completely bereft of grandiloquence and loftiness. More sensitive readers may find this irony cruel and feel pity for Don Quixote. However, as a satire of real knight-errants, who are truly portrayed as honourable and lofty, Cervantes intended this play on metafiction to be ironic and humorous.

Even though Cide's portrayal of Don Quixote is largely truthful, thus relinquishing the narrator's initial worries about Cide being a stereotypically dishonest Arab[26], Cervantes must maintain that his abilities as a historian are questionable, for him to continue to be an object of laughter. He uses every available opportunity to ridicule Cide. For instance, Cervantes directs readers to laugh at Cide for his lengthy digressions. When Sansón informs Don Quixote of the recently published Part I, he brings up some of Cide's tangents in which Don Quixote and Sancho are entirely absent:

> One of the faults that have been found in this history […] is that the author included a tale called *Inappropriate Curiosity*; not that it's a bad one or badly told, but it's out of place and has nothing to do with the history of the great Don Quixote.[27]

Don Quixote replies, and makes a statement about Cide that demonstrates Cervantes' and

22 Mancing 77
23 Cervantes 502
24 Cervantes 502
25 Cervantes 64
26 Cervantes 76
27 Cervantes 506

the reader's own attitude toward Cide: "[…] the author of my history is no sage but some ignorant prattler, who started writing it in a haphazard and unplanned way […]"[28] At first glance, this is yet another example of Cervantes' running joke about Cide's credibility, both mocking the Muslim historian and acting as a parody of the metafiction of chivalric romances. However, it is also a paradoxically exalting denigration of Cervantes himself. The readers know that the outrageous story of Don Quixote is an invention of Cervantes, meaning that its posited chronicler, Cide Hamete, is also a product of the author's imagination. Henceforth, this passage acts also as a dignified self-mockery. The metafictional joke for the pleasure of his readers is thus at his own expense. Cervantes knows that he can be tangential in his writing, and here he shows the reader that he is confident enough to laugh at himself.

Cervantes also uses metafiction in a comedic way to ridicule the spurious sequel to *Don Quixote* Part I, published by the author who goes by the pseudonym Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda. By humorously mocking Avellaneda throughout Part II, Cervantes reinstates his authority as the one true author of *Don Quixote*. He uses metafiction in reminding the reader of his authorial presence and persona, as he humorously draws the reader's attention to the literariness and fictionality of the text. Cervantes ridicules Avellaneda directly in the prologue to Part II by comparing his poor attempt to produce a false sequel to an absurd anecdote about a madman who inflates dogs by shoving tubes up their anuses. The madman addresses the bewildered onlookers: "Do you think it's an easy task to inflate a dog?".[29] Cervantes then challenges Avellaneda by immediately adding a mocking parallel: "Do you think it's an easy task to write a book?".[30] The absurdity of this mockery is profound, and makes the extra-textual jab at Avellaneda all the more humorous. To compare a failed attempt at writing a novel to a literal madman who inflates dogs for no apparent reason – other than his own lunacy – is quite a stretch.

Cervantes' ridicule of Avellaneda's sequel is intensified by stronger metafiction later in the novel, when Don Quixote and Sancho encounter characters who have read it and were disappointed by it. One of them, Don Jeronimo, calls the sequel "nonsense," and adds that "Nobody who has read the first part of the history of Don Quixote de la Mancha can possibly derive any pleasure from reading this second part".[31] The seventeenth century readers who knew of Avellaneda's version would have found this passage humorous, because of the irony of the metafiction. Don Jeronimo's comment causes an unexpected merging of Cervantes' (and the reader's) reality, Don Quixote's reality – because Avellaneda's book is said to exist in both. Moreover, avid fans of the original *Don Quixote* would have laughed at Don Jeronimo's comment because of their disdain for Avellaneda – a disdain produced by their loyalty to the original author of their favourite book.

In Chapter LXX, Cervantes criticizes Avellaneda metafictionally, in an even more humorous episode: Don Quixote encounters a woman named Altisidora, who tells the knight about her journey to the gates of Hell. She has witnessed a group of devils "playing pelota" with "rackets of fire," but "instead of balls, they were serving books".[32] One of the books was discovered to be "the second part of the history of Don Quixote de la Mancha, not written by Cide Hamete, but by some Aragonese person who says he comes from Tordesillas".[33] Another devil is familiar with Avellaneda's version, and their conversation turns into an absurd, comedic metafictional mockery of Avellaneda's book:

> "Remove it," replied the other devil, "and consign it to the depths of hell; I never want to see it again.
> "Is it as bad as all that?" the other one asked.
> "It's so bad," replied the first devil, "that if I'd tried my very hardest to write a worse one the task would have been beyond me".[34]

28 Cervantes 506
29 Cervantes 484
30 Cervantes 484
31 Cervantes 887
32 Cervantes 957
33 Cervantes 958
34 Cervantes 958

Even *devils* loathe Avellaneda's *Don Quixote* and want it to burn in the depths of hell. The absurd hyperbolic nature of this metafictional anecdote is what makes it so funny. Even the creatures of hell who are responsible for all the misery and sin in the world would be incapable of producing such a god-awful novel, according to Cervantes. He is equating Avellaneda with the Antichrist, or rather, something *worse* than Satan himself. Thus, by exploiting metafictional opportunities – having characters in the text show disdain for Avellaneda – for comedy, Cervantes ridicules his rival and reinstates his own authority as the creator of *Don Quixote*.

By the end of the novel, Cervantes has successfully demonstrated the relation between metafiction and comedy. Rutherford confirms that Cervantes "made fiction itself a central theme of this work of fiction, because of the comic possibilities with which this provided him".[35] His implication that *Don Quixote* is a true history, through his insertion of the historian Cide Hamete Benengeli, provides him with many opportunities to mock the chivalric romances' own pretension of reality. The humour of this parody extends to Cervantes' framing of Cide as an inept author, relentlessly directing the reader's laughter at him. Cervantes' satire of chivalric metafiction provides him with much comedic material based in the ironic absurdity of the characters' knowledge of their own stories being published. Sometimes, these metafictional running jokes catch readers off guard, before making them laugh at the sheer absurdity of the situation. For instance, when Sancho meets the Duchess of Part II chapter XXX, he ensures that he is the same Sancho from Cervantes' Part I, "unless they did a swop when I was in my cradle, *by which I mean the printing press*".[36] The metafictional absurdity of Sancho's unreflective (almost subconscious) awareness that he is a fictional character is humorous. If the printing press were his cradle, then Cervantes is the one who gave birth to him and placed him in the cradle.

Finally, Cervantes uses metafiction to frame his comedic ridicule of his authorial rival, Avellaneda. His last metafictional ridicule of Avellaneda is given by Cide Hamete, after Don Quixote's death. Through Cide, Cervantes warns Avellaneda to refrain from producing any more sequels. Cide tells the readers "[…] you can warn [Avellaneda], if you do happen to meet him, to leave Don Quixote's weary mouldering bones at rest in his tomb […]"[37] Cervantes uses every opportunity he had to enhance comedic effect with metafiction. He humorously re-appropriated chivalric romance metafiction to such an extent that it could never be taken seriously again. In fact, Cervantes killed it with the legacy of his satirical metafiction. Anyone who picks up a chivalric romance after reading *Don Quixote* will be reminded of Cervantes' parody. Never again will a romance author grant prestige to their work through a pretension of reality – Cervantes makes sure of it.

35 Rutherford xiii
36 Cervantes 689, my italics
37 Cervantes 981

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NO EXIT

Logotype by Thalia Stefaniuk

The Liberal Arts College Theatre Society mounted an ambitious production of Jean-Paul Sartres' *NO EXIT*, in keeping with its tradition of working with texts found within the Western canon, if not our program's reading list. Thalia Stefaniuk's poster and set design brought a dimension of German expressionism with little more than gaffer tape and paint. Ophélie Proulx-Giraldeau contrasted this stark and striking set with vivid primary colours in midcentury silhouettes. A tantalizing teaser was shot and produced by SOPHIA Concordia alumni Oliver Ocinhiero. Throughout the show, Cedric Lowe's classic and tasteful sound design cued the audience to the many twists in tone taken in this play. The cast, Bryan Lee, Chelsea Pietracupa, Elise Timm-Bottos and Joseph Calnan each brought remarkable talent and personal attributes to their characters that clashed like titans upon the stage of Théâtre Sainte-Catherine. Director Darragh Mondoux can be proud of another year directing and producing the society's show.

Phtoto by Peter Ryaux-Larsen

Special thanks to Concordia collegiates Alienor Dufetel, Kristiana Alcancia-Shaw, and acting Liberal Arts Society general coordinator Hayley Currier for answering the call to arts, and to the Concordia Student Union for complementary funding.

Cover Concept:
Elise Timm-Bottos

Photo Editor:
Pierre-Yves Montpetit

The cover is inspired by the opening section of Rainer Maria Rilke's poem, "Orpheus. Eurydice. Hermes":

> *Here was the wondrous mine of souls.*
> *Like silent silver ore they moved*
> *in veins through its darkness. Among roots*
> *the blood welled up that flows to the humans,*
> *seeming as heavy as porphyry in the dark.*
> *Nothing else was red.*

(trans. Galway Kinnell and Hannah Liebmann)

The image blends the bounds between the individual and external world. Though it is a satellite image of the earth's rivers bleeding out into the ocean, it also looks like veins pumping blood in the human body. Like our new journal title of *Corpus*, the image is representational of us as individuals, as groups and as an all-encompassing Earth. As this section of Rilke's poem describes land in terms of both red blood and red rock (porphyry), the image is an excellent metaphorical representation.