CORPUS

2020-2021



FOREW

UNIVERSITÉ Concordia UNIVERSITY

STUDENT SERVICES

Concordia Council on Student Life

To the Students of the Liberal Arts College,

It has been an absolute pleasure for the team and I to work on this year's issue of the CORPUS Journal. First, we would like to thank everyone that submitted their work to the journal this year. This was a special year for us because we received the most submissions we ever had, and, considering the high quality of all the submissions, it was one of the most difficult when it came down to decisions of what to include. We would like to thank everyone that sent in their work to the journal, everyone who submitted contributed to another successful issue of the journal's publication despite the tumultuous year we have had.

It has been wonderful working alongside all our authors and creators this year, whose work published in this journal is a testament to the great and diverse student body we have at the Liberal Arts College. As in past years, this year's issue includes a display of awe-inspiring creative and academic work covering a vastitude of different topics and works. We would like to thank all our creators for the work they put into their submissions this year, and for seeing it through to the final products published here.

I would also, personally, like to thank the team of editors behind the journal this year. As Editor-in-Chief, it was an honor to work alongside a group of capable and committed students who believe whole-heartedly in the philosophy of our journal. Each member brought new ideas and overwhelming enthusiasm to the project and working with all of you has made my year significantly better than it would have been otherwise. We work as a team to collectively celebrate our colleagues and give them a platform to show off their talents. Each member of our 2020-21 team was dedicated to seeing this philosophy through, and the results are astounding.

Finally, I would like to thank Maria Chabelnik as this year's journal designer. Maria is the reason for the outstanding design of this year's issue, and without her, none of what we achieved this year would have been possible.

The CORPUS team hopes that you enjoy all the work and love that was put into this year's journal, and you feel the same amount of pride looking through your peers' work as we did the first time we received it.

Thank you,

REBECCA
AND THE CORPUS EDITORS

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A Class of One's Own: An Exploration of Marx and Engels' Treatment of The Working-Class Woman

BY MAUD BELAIR

Often considered the fathers of communism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels searched to find a cause for the alienation of labour in the *proletariat*, i.e.: working-class. Since the 1980's, Marxist-Feminists have criticized the two philosophers' conclusions, by arguing that Marx and Engels maintained and enforced an excessive gendering of labour rather than a sweeping analysis of the multitudes of ways people work to live. Defining Marx and Engels' views on the nature of female labour, this survey will answer questions such as what is 'female" labour?; Is it natural or social?; and, Is it considered productive within a capitalist system?. In this attempt to establish where women reside in the realm of Marx and Engels' criticism of capitalism, we can infer where they reside in their esteem, as well as understand why Marxist-feminists criticized these opinions. While their theories regarding the condition of the working- class are an essential component in a communist society, these concepts must be applied to all labourers, regardless of the nature of their work.

Marx's exploration of the body in relation to labour is an interesting starting point when assessing the place of female labour in his work. In *Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* on Estranged Labour, Marx establishes that

> The universality of man is in practice precisely in the universality which makes his *inorganic* body —both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life and (2) the material, the object and the instrument of his life-activity. Nature is man's *inorganic body* —nature, that is, in so far as it is not itself the human body. Man *lives* on nature — means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.[1]

This division of *organic* and *inorganic* bodies, outlined by Marx, is an incredibly interesting place to begin the analysis of where traditionally female labour blurs this allegedly marked separation. All aspects that Marx considered to be natural; derived from nature; and, given to man as a natural part of his *inorganic* body, all require labour. Labour is what makes them *palatable* and *digestible*, hence

> Just as plants, animals, stones, the air, light, etc., constitute a part of human consciousness in the realm of theory, partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art —[man's] spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make it palatable and digestible — so too in the realm of practice they constitute a part of human life and human activity. Physically man lives only on these products of nature, whether they appear in the form of food, heating, clothes, a dwelling, or whatever it may be.[2]

The ways in which we have evolved to improve our quality of life, complicating it with transformative undertakings. The food we eat, the clothes we wear, the homes we live in, are undeniable products of labour, thus marrying the concepts of organic and inorganic matter. In the coexistence of these transformations of our basic natural needs beyond those explicitly dictated by our natural urges and the desire to satisfy mankind's taste for something flavourful, something beautiful and something *better* than what nature in and of itself has to give.

With the knowledge that work is the root of all material wealth, working-class families attempt to capitalize as much as they can to ensure their survival. Marx speaks of this increasing need for labour to be divided as "a major driving force in the production of wealth as soon as *labour* was recognized as *the essence of private property* — i.e., about *the estranged and alienated form of human activity as an activity of the species* [...]."[3] Gender roles, enduring through the specialization of labour and the development of an artisan class, have attributed the task of catering to the family's organic body by transforming inorganic matter and making it readily available to those she cares for. A woman's labour, in maintaining her family through domestic work, is owned by every person who consumes it. All these domestic tasks, while being executed by working-class wives, can always be purchased as goods in the public capitalist sphere; just as she can make bread, so can the baker. In the same way that the labourer does not own means of production yet manufactures products, a working-class wife does not own the food with which she cooks nor the house she keeps, yet there is no reward for her work. At the mercy of her husband, the wife is likened to the labourer at the mercy of the bourgeoisie. While bourgeois households outsourced domestic tasks to artisans, the working- class wife executed the same work without pay. The domestic labour women in the late nineteenth century did, to maintain their families in the capitalist context only proves that

> Private property has made us so stupid and so one-sided that an object is only *ours* when we have it—when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited,

> etc.,—in short, when it is *used* by us. Although private property itself again conceives all these direct realizations of possession as *means of life*, and the life which they serve as means is the *life of private property*—labour and conversion into capital.[4]

Because of the nature of domestic work, working-class women are required to make more than what they will personally *use*, yet their lack of compensation for such efforts of production is an exploitation of her means of labour. Marx's disregard for the union of the *organic* and *inorganic* body in women's uncompensated labour within a marriage, proves that women's work belongs to her husband, the owner of the family's means of production. In working without compensation and incapable of being independent from her husband, the wife is the worker's worker.

Friedrich Engels, Marx's frequent collaborator and co-author of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, focuses on another aspect of working-class wives' existence in his 1945 book *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. Contrary to Marx, Engels pays great attention to the growing need for cheaper labour in factories and its effect on families. The steady improvement of machinery which no longer required the same level of physical strength to be operated induced a mass exodus of men from industries. Still needing workers, these industries hired an increasing amount of women and children to work in their place.[5] With wages as low as half of the mens' for similar (if not identical) labour, the exploitation of women began to extend its realities beyond the realm of purely domestic labour. Working in conditions just as awful and just as exploitative for less means, the duties of caring for the family nonetheless fell on wives. These women, Engels explains, were often the sole breadwinners in addition to being the primary familial caretakers. They often supported their families for years at a time while their husbands found themselves unemployed.[6] While wives and mothers were expected to still provide and care for their families, they often found themselves at just as much of a loss as their husbands:

> It is self-evident that a girl who has worked in a mill from her ninth year is in no position to understand domestic work, whence it follows that female operatives prove wholly inexperienced and unfit as housekeepers. They cannot knit or sew, cook or wash, are unacquainted with the most ordinary duties of a housekeeper, and when they have young children to take care of, have not the vaguest idea how to set about it.[7]

Working-class women do not have the necessary tools nor the proper understanding of what domestic work entails; they have lived too much of a sheltered life working

as the sole breadwinner of the family for them to act as caregivers. While Engels acknowledges a working- class wife was made to "[spend] more than twelve hours away from her child daily; the baby is cared for by a young girl or an old woman, to whom it is given to nurse,"[8] he offered no reflection regarding how inhumane the task required of women in a capitalist system proved to be other than "[wishing] and [hoping] that a time may come in which married women will be shut out of the factories."[9] Engels' call for removal of women from factories expresses his wish for society's return to its natural order. Rather than strive for fair pay, restricted hours and the prohibition of child labour to protect the general working population; Engels' opinion that women had no place in industries demonstrates the inherent sexism of the era, and the communist cause.

Though the condition of the "fairer sex" has an undeniably physical component such as the carrying and birthing of children in addition to generally weaker physiques, caretaking does not necessarily need to be executed solely by women. Men at this time, however, who were generally out of work and with little prospects in sight, offered little relief to their wives and their workloads due to their own inability to sew, knit, cook and wash yet, leaving her to be the one who "goes away Monday morning at five o'clock, and comes back Saturday evening; has so much to do for the children then that she cannot get to bed before three o'clock in the morning; often wet through to the skin, and obliged to work in that state."[10] If it were desirable for women to return home as Engels expressed, it demonstrates that his interest in the labourer's working conditions only applies to the male gender, given that women's work belongs to the family, and not as a contributing member of public society.

Beyond examining Marx and Engels' domestic and socio-economic concerns, one must also determine how their synthesized opinion responds to women's position in society, be it capitalist or communist. Though the text calls for the dissolution of private property, Marx and Engels' idea of an egalitarian state is limited to the man's condition. Though Marx describes at length the destructive and possessive qualities that often come when owning private property, he fails to mention how one comes about owning said property. Marx also fails to consider that "property" extends past those acquired through an exchange of goods. Marriage, in many ways, is a form of property since one party has dominion over the other.[11] While the conditions regarding a marriage differ from traditional property agreements, a man's dominion over another remains the same. Their societal role as caretakers, pre-existing the capitalist system, is demonstrative that in its persistence, women have merely adapted to the capitalist system and the pressures it placed on the family, selflessly and without compensation. Rather than praising the woman for her efforts in maintaining and extending the household's income, Marx objectifies

her as he believes that she is "giving" herself to her husband. One can mistakenly equate this issue to the movement of counterposing universal private property to private property, to which one finds

> expression in the bestial form of counterposing to *marriage* (certainly a form of *exclusive private property*) the *community of women* gives away the *secret* of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism. Just as the woman passes from marriage to general prostitution, so the entire world of wealth (that is, from man's objective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community.[12]

This comparison between the equal distribution of private property across all men of a given communist society to the equal distribution of access to a group of women, to which he refers to as the *community of women*, shows how little regard he has for women and the possibility they may have free will. While marriage in our society is commonly for love, in the late 19th century, many are for economic reasons yet, there undeniably exists familial bonds beyond those of money, such as the care and production of kin. Marx's counterargument to the critique of communism is a clear demonstration of how misinformed he truly is about both the dynamic and true purpose behind the nuclear family. Many consider the wife to be the property of her husband; however, they are gravely mistaken. The reality is that the woman cannot belong to the man— in the capitalist sense— because the husband never participated in an economic exchange to "acquire" her.

Sustained objectification of women throughout Marx and Engels' writing asserts how little they care about the condition of the working-class woman, even in their idealized communist utopia. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx and Engels write (in near exact contradiction to Marx's previous statements),

> But you Communists would introduce community of women, scream the whole bourgeoisie in chorus.
>
> The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and naturally, can come to no other conclusion than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.
>
> He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.[13]

Despite Marx's previous statement about the abolition of private property and its repercussions on women as objects of private property, this passage overstates its egregiousness. Aside from trying to hurt the image of the bourgeoisie, it does nothing to further the cause of the proletariat, which arguably exploits women in more ways than the bourgeoisie does, yet only within the domestic realm. While the manifesto aims to eliminate the idea of women being mere "instruments of production", it fails to describe how a woman's labour under communist rule will differ from labour under bourgeois society. In both contexts, meaning communism and bourgeois society, women are bound to complete domestic-related work.

As detailed earlier in this essay, Engels recognizes an alteration in gender roles in 1845. His criticism of the female presence in industries brings about some serious interrogations about what cements the union of the family, pushing him to question the role of women in the household. In his questioning, Engels highlights the shifting of power dynamics that occurs within the family household once the woman becomes the provider and the husband, the receiver

> If the reign of the wife over the husband, as inevitably brought about by the factory system, is inhuman, the pristine rule of the husband over the wife must have been inhuman too. If the wife can now base her supremacy upon the fact that she supplies the greater part, nay, the whole of the common possession, the necessary inference is that this community of possession is no true and rational one, since one member of the family boasts offensively of contributing the greater share. If the family of our present society is being thus dissolved, this dissolution merely shows that, at bottom, the binding tie of this family was not family affection, but private interest lurking under the cloak of a pretended community of possessions.[14]

This statement focuses on the male ego and its emasculation in the process of being financially supported by the wife. However, Engels fails to acknowledge the reality of the union of husband and wife. Many seek marriage for the financial benefits it can potentially bring to both parties; however, it was once considered a crucial element for an individual's survival. While it is true that the capitalist system allows for a reality where women *could* leave their husbands and provide for themselves, they may only do so as second-rate citizens, facing hardship every step of the way and significantly complicating their lives. The dissolution of private property and labour to achieve it is not what threatens the institution of marriage or the tradition of union of two individuals, but the concept of tangible power differentials within such arrangements. If women, who have systematically been regarded as private

property rather than independent individuals for thousands of years, had not suddenly been forced to enter the job market as a last resort to provide for their families, emasculating their jobless husbands in the process, the family as Engels believes it do be, would not be at what he deems to be at such a risk.

Similar to the issue encountered with Marx above, Engels seemingly contradicts himself in their collaborative text, in which he accuses the bourgeois of all the things he previously attributed to changes in the proletariat's lifestyle. While asking "what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based?"[15] and asserting it is built

> On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in he practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution. The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.[16]

We are forced to question which class is truly at the mercy of these economic strains on the family; indubitably, the bourgeois will suffer most. With its lack of independence from the proletariat, the bourgeois family, who will have to learn how to fend for itself in the domestic realm is that which would be most altered by the advent of a communist revolution. The discrepancy between both Marx and Engels texts preceding the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* wholly indicates the use of arguments concerning women and the family are only invoked out of selfish interest for their cause rather than protecting all individuals if the rules of communism were to establish the new world order.

Since the publication of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, the condition of women has changed beyond recognition. While capitalist systems are still in place in most regions of the globe and continue to exploit women and their labour, this trend no longer gouges them to the point of meriting their class categorization. The preceding is unlike the realities which stunted women during Marx and Engel's lifetimes. A hundred-fifty years after authoring their foundational communist texts, revered and criticized by the masses, American Marxist- feminists of the 1980s began to address Marxism's failure to acknowledge the exploitation of women in both the domestic and public spheres. In her book *Marx on Gender and the Family*, Heather A. Brown explains how fellow Marxist-feminist scholar Christine Di Stefano "criticizes Marx for what she sees as his masculinist understanding of work and his inability to incorporate women's work into his idea of productive labour.[17] She holds that Marx dealt only with labour traditionally done by men and did not discuss work

commonly done by women. Therefore, she argues that Marx had a distorted view of human labour.[18] This criticism is shared by many Marxist-feminists who continue to observe the lasting effect capitalism has on women, zeroing in on Marx's failure to consider how the organic and inorganic bodies of man are united on an everyday basis by women:

> Thus, according to Di Stefano, Marx resolves all contradiction and conflict by privileging one side of the dualisms without actually reconciling them; instead, a new, but still hierarchically-ordered, series of dualisms remains. While Marx claims that a socialist revolution would create the conditions for overcoming conflict between the individual and society, all that he is able to do is create another false universal, the male proletariat.[19]

The realities of capitalism have made Engels' wish to see women out of the industries and back into the home— impossible. As time went on, capitalism became acute in the ways to exploit the unpaid labour of the average working-class wife. In the addendum to Martha E. Gimenez's chapter on "The Feminisation of Poverty: Myth or Reality?" of her book *Marx, Women and Capitalist Social Reproduction*, she writes of a marked improvement in the conditions leading to female impoverishment from the early 2000's data onwards. These ameliorations are a result of an even distribution of poverty across genders (even skewing away from women toward men, due to the higher rate of female college graduates after the year 2000), no longer allowing the realities of women in the capitalist economy to reduce them to an inferior, isolated class.[20] In the following chapter, "The Dialectics of Waged and Unwaged Work", Gimenez identifies all the ways capitalism exploits domestic labour to cut costs, ultimately monetizing on the willingness of the proletariat to work for free to obtain goods and services outside of their price range. These realities, which disproportionately target and exploit women, demonstrate early communism's failure to recognize domestic labour as actual labour. Domestic labour is indeed capable of affecting the proletariat and benefitting the bourgeois as it maintains a

> Total dependence on a wage or salary to survive means that employment and wage/ salary levels condition the ability of households to engage in some or all the forms of unwaged labour [...]
>
> A) domestic labour engaged in the production of use-values for household consumption (i.e., labour that enters the process of physical and social reproduction at the daily and generational levels).
>
> B) Domestic labour engaged in consumption work (shopping, self-

service, and transportation of purchases).

C) domestic labour engaged in the production of use-values for home maintenance and improvements (i.e labour that reproduces households' infrastructure') and,

D) domestic labour engaged in the production of goods and/or services for the market (e.g., Cottage industries' of all kinds, word processing, child- care).[21]

Comparable to the proletariat of Marx and Engels' time, today, the status of a family's wealth dictates the number of resources available to them. Capitalism has become more strategic in its extraction of money from the masses; catering to the desire of the working class to feel as though wealth may be accessible. This false belief has become an integral part of the American dream, in which the narrative of working hard to achieve a certain standard of living marketed to "improve" the masses' lives only exists to sell manufactured goods. The realms in which Marx and Engels failed to account for exploitation, due to their nature of feminine labour, were considered and capitalized upon by the bourgeoisie, the class Marx and Engels were working towards challenging. With Marx and Engels' refusal to look at the oppression of women, it is hard not to question whether the inclusion and absorption of the feminine cause to that of the communist would have changed the course of history. Though it is undeniable the works of Marx and Engels are among the most notable in the realm of socio-economic philosophy, the authors have their share of flaws. For Marx, it is his failure to define labour in its holistic nature, i.e. to include work done outside of the public economy which receives no payment whereas Engels' flaw lies within his view that women should be banned from industry work rather than advocating for equal and improved working conditions. The pair's assessments are equally faulty in their collective objectification of women as private property in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. The discrepancies within the two's theories lead many contemporary Marxist-Feminists to be sceptical of wholly ascribing to communist ideals prescribed by Marx and Engels. This omission of inclusion outside of the capitalist sphere leads me to posit another source of alienation aside from money: the sense of obligation. While money may be the objectification of this obligation to work, the proletariat in the late nineteenth century find themselves obligated to work to financially support their families; just as proletarian women have no other option than physically sustaining them. The sense of responsibility, accountability, and obligation ultimately lead to alienation as the inability to find another source of income leaves the proletariat with a sense of hopelessness.

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[1] Marx, 75.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid, 101.
[4] Ibid, 87.
[5] Engels.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Marx, 82. 12 Ibid.
[13] Engels and Marx, 488.
[14] Engels.
[15] Engels and Marx, 487.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Brown, 14.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid, 13.
[20] Gimenez, 227-233. 21 Ibid, 243.

DAYDREAMS OF A SEDENTARY NOMAD

BY WARSAME ISSE



Call from the Horn of Africa

Nomad into No Man's Land

Cosmic Collision



Galactic Gaze



Cobalt Comb (Sapphire Shanlo)

A Postmodern Analysis of Fragmented Identity in *Blade Runner*

BY DIEGO CARUANA

In the latter half of Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* one of the film's fugitive androids, known as Replicants, named Pris alludes to the French philosopher René Descartes when she says "I think, Sebastian... therefore, I am."[1] The irony is in that though Pris' identity is put into question throughout the movie, she still calls upon Descartes' central, unified, and distinct sense of self to define her own. Rather, the identities of Pris and her companions, known in the film as 'Replicants,' align more to the sort of understanding of selfhood present in the Postmodern tradition. Instead of adhering to a cohesive Cartesian model of the self, the identities of the Replicants appear decentralized, in that they are not oriented within a particular self. The Replicants' disunified personal identities are a result of their relationships to the humans who created them, in that the Replicant identity rests in the Replicant body as well that body's creator. The appearance, character, occupation, and death of the Replicants is always necessarily determined by their creators. This determination manifested in the Replicants' implanted memories, manufactured body parts, and social-economic function as slaves in an off-world colony. Each of these aspects are evidently pre-determined by and contingent upon those who manage and are responsible for the existence of the Replicants. One can easily tie this to a Postmodern understanding of selfhood, rooted specifically in the writing of a philosopher like Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). Derrida, in response to the Cartesian tradition, proposed an account of the self which derives its meaning and primacy in the other. The self only exists as an appropriation of those things which lie outside of the self, and as such is not unified but divided between "myself" and "other." When applied to the Replicants in *Blade Runner*, their identities are mediated by their relation to manufacturers like Eldon Tyrell, who serve as their preeminent creator-others.

As intimated, the identities of the Replicants are not confined within themselves; they are appropriated by and derived from their creator. While Replicants Roy and Leon are interrogating Chew, a Replicant eyeball designer, Chew refers to their eyes as "my eyes,"[2] to which Roy responds, "if only you could see what I've seen with your eyes."[3] Despite the eyes now belonging to the two Replicants as parts of their own physical bodies, Chew still maintains a degree of ownership over them. Roy's response to Chew, as well as Chew's initial remark about the eyes being

his, complicates the idea of physicality belonging to the individual and implies a necessarily shared sense of identity between creator and created. The eyes do not only physically belong to Roy, but also to Chew insofar as the eyes are a product of his craft. Consequently, whatever sense of self that would have traditionally been associated with one's own physical body no longer exists in *Blade Runner*. Selfhood instead exists beyond a unified and individual dimension. The grounds for the Replicants biological sense of self, e.g. their eyes, can only have their origin in the existence of their creators. Therefore, the Replicant is thus disallowed from echoing a human tendency to define the self as associated with their body, as their physicality is considered not their own but an appropriation from the other. The source of physical organs and body parts that constitute the Replicants' physical selfhood does not evoke a sense of individuality, but rather of plurality and division. This fragmentation of the Replicant self is further expounded when reflecting upon the representation of Replicant consciousness.

Just as it was with the Replicant's biological identity, the Replicant's psychological identity is also decentred and based in the external creator. Throughout *Blade Runner*, the film suggests that since Tyrell designed the Replicant brain, some of Tyrell's own identity is imparted into the minds of the Replicants. If this were the case, the apparent Cartesian selfhood of the Replicants would be a mere matter of appearance. Though it may seem that Roy, the leader of the film's rebellious Replicants, has solidified his own agency in his pursuit of an extended lifespan, since his mind has been artificially created, Roy's psychological qualities are doubtless appropriated from those of the creator insofar as the creator necessarily pours themselves into their craft. Roy's mind was created by Tyrell, and so a large part of Roy's psychological identity is thus Tyrell's. The development of Roy's selfhood is inevitably contaminated with what it inherits from the personality of its creator, which is external to it. This is the origin of the Derridean deconstruction of the Cartesian self in *Bladerunner*—the Modern conceptualization of the 'whole' identity now finds itself somewhere between self and other. One way this is represented in the film is when Roy symbolically replaces Tyrell in a chess match against Sebastian.[4] Roy can successfully substitute for Tyrell because his identity, to some degree, is a product of Tyrell himself. Through evidence of his cognitive capabilities, Roy mirrors the sort of intellectual prowess Tyrell exhibits. It is thus evident that Roy's intellect stems from outside of himself. It originates from Tyrell's own mind.

At the climax of Roy and Tyrell's meeting, when Roy finally realizes he cannot prolong his life, he kills Tyrell, effectively committing a sort of psychological suicide. Since the film suggests the creators' self is embedded within the self of the Replicant, when Roy kills his creator, he destroys the cause of his own selfhood, as well as

that of the rest of the Replicants. From this point onward, we see the beginning of the dilapidation of the remaining Replicants Roy and Pris. In the last act of the film, when Deckard is in his final pursuit, Pris is shown displaying feral behaviour as if the death of Tyrell and consequent damage received upon her mind has reduced her to a mere animal.[5] When Pris is killed by Deckard, Roy follows Pris' behaviour by howling, panting, and hissing while pursuing Deckard like a predatory beast.[6] Roy and Pris, having destroyed the source of their psychological identities, are left only mere carnal and animalistic bodily identities. Roy is only able to overcome this, and claim a unified sense of self, after severing all existential ties he had to his creators, not just that of the mind. The birth of Roy's complete self only occurs after he eradicates his fragmented selfhood in both mind and body: first in killing Tyrell, and then in physical death. The death of the divided self and the birth of the complete self is symbolized by the dove that flies from Roy's dead body into the sky.[7]

Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner*, through its Replicant characters, presents a conceptualization of selfhood as disunified and divided. Replicants exist in a world that outlaws and enslaves them, and which does not grant them their own individual identities. The Replicants consequently exist in a fragmented state; their bodies and minds do not belong to them wholly, but rather also to those who have created them. Replicant body parts paradoxically belong to both themselves and their designers, and the Replicant mind is merely an appropriation of its creator's identity. To this extent, *Blade Runner* clearly presents a portrayal of the self that is outwardly Postmodern in the Derridean, decentred sense, but which nonetheless struggles with trying to achieve a unified and complete selfhood, such as that conceived by Descartes.

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

LIGHTHOUSE

SONIA LAMBROULIAS

It is easy to be consumed by darkness,
the mind parts from optimism
it radiates such light
its beam is too bright
you cannot be too close to see it

in and out of orbit
everything in its right place
...
a momentary lapse of guidance
to inner calm and peace



POMEGRANATE
BY JOELLE GUEDON

Destroy and Preserve: Nostalgia and Determinism in Shelley and Wordsworth

BY DANIEL BELSHAW

William Wordsworth and Percy Shelley present different ways of solving the problem of nostalgia inherent within romanticism. Specifically, the problem is the following: how may a romantic sensibility avoid the trap of fruitlessly longing after a highly specific set of circumstances that engendered the desire to write poetry? Is it possible to write poetry in changed circumstances? In my view, these poets address the Romantic problem of contingency through different solutions. for Wordsworth, reason is the overriding counterforce to the dangers of nostalgia, and for Shelley, self-sacrifice plays an equivalent role. For both, the problematic quality of nostalgia must be sub- dued by a quiet performance of determinism, where the protagonists learn to conceive of the terms of their isolation from power as beauty.

The speaker of "Tintern Abbey" knows what can befall other people who cannot leave Tintern Abbey behind: After the first experience of their equivalents to Tintern Abbey has ended, they try to re-enter the experience some way, somehow. Wordsworth writes, "Not for this / Faint I, nor mourn nor murmur."[1] Three distinct forms of consciousness are represented in the kinds of resistance Wordsworth indicates: there is involuntary loss ("faint"), painful retention ("mourn"), and obsession ("murmur"). In Wordsworth's estimation, these alternate figures suffer from an at- tachment to their previous selves. The speaker notes the key reason that he changes from his "boy- ish days"[2]: which is that he now reasons, unlike "in the hour / Of thoughtless youth."[3] As lyrical as the speaker's conceptions are, he has a thinking relationship to Tintern Abbey. The Abbey's effect is palpable when understood as "the joy / Of elevated thoughts"[4] and "A motion, and a spirit, that impels / All thinking things, all objects of thought."[5] The abbey can now only be understood in connection with the speaker's rationality. It is not that the speaker cannot revel in the details of the pastoral in and of themselves, but that a shadow of realism attends the whole poem. The speaker is grown and must not merely see things for what they are but construct them for what they are. He must find a source, an authority, for his reported feeling in the heart and in the blood.

For Wordsworth's speaker, revisitation reveals the disappearance of youthful illusions, replaced with the comfortable partialness of thought. The speaker explains his tolerance for a private shift from emotional obliviousness to reason: Nature "had

no need of a remoter charm / By thought supplied."[6] Earlier, the speaker says how "beauteous forms"[7] of nature, after manifesting as sen- sations, "[pass] even into my purer mind, / With tranquil restoration."[8] The speaker indicates how reason is the necessary, welcome converter of adolescence, an acknowledgement of how the adult mind completes poetry. Although youth is presented as a discrete period of cognitive failure, wherein sensations rule, the speaker implies the degree to which the mind, however superior, first requires the presence of unsophisticated feelings, thereby fusing with them. Reason is a capstone rather than a cornerstone: it is the state reached after the owner of a particular mind registers the arrival of the forms in the less sanctified reaches of the body before they travel onwards to purifi- cation. "[Remote]"[9] may bring on delight and so is a neutral rather than negative word for the speaker. Adulthood's reason is not an alien imposition on childhood, it is the careful appropriation of childhood's sensory information.

The speaker is no longer unable to discern the environment he once lived in, which means the speaker sees how power worked on him in the past as it does in the present. Picturing his young self as a "roe,"[10] Wordsworth describes the shift in power he discerns in connection to nature. As metaphorical "roe," the speaker moved "wherever nature led: more like a man / Flying from some- thing that he dreads, than one / Who sought the thing that he loved."[11] The young speaker loves his own "glad animal movements"[12] because they offer him a natural escape from whatever stasis he "dreads."[13] He writes, "I cannot paint / What then I was."[14] In Wordsworth's telling, the young self escapes from a superstructure that is "all in all," where no particular threat or quality is de- fined.[15] When the speaker is young, he anticipates nature and the world with dread and senses a threat, without knowing exactly from where it comes. The speaker's youthful self did not neces- sarily need to run with the hurry of fear rather than love, naiveté blunting the chance of a more purposeful, love-driven movement. Dread makes in childhood for a totalized ambience. The youth does not think critically about what fear means for them, nor what love means, and they conse- quently blur for the child. The situation of childhood freedom suggests the youth in his 'gladness' should manifest an image of love, and yet they are indistinguishable from fear. The moment of childlike incomprehensibility, where the stakes of fear and love are not thoroughly deduced and separated by the boy, is incapable of being later portrayed. The speaker's new adult sense of reason prevents him from mentally inhabiting a personality that ignored such basic distinctions. The speaker sees his youth from the outside looking in, discovering the cost of viewing nature's dis- coveries in the monolithic fashion of his youth. He once moved through nature without differenti- ating nature, and now he has aged to a point that he may observe nature in a clear way. Solace is born from determinism,

in the sense that the irrevocability of maturation leads to a discourse that accepts nature at an intellectual level.

Artistic pleasure in the life of the adult speaker comes in tempered and knowing form. Wordsworth describes his new state of mind as "The still, sad music of humanity, / Nor harsh nor grating, though of ample power / To chasten and subdue."[16] "Tintern Abbey" is a chastened, subdued poem, disenchanted with what can be gained not only from materiality, but also from its artistic representation. Wordsworth tries to convey the limited power of humanity in these lines. It is only until the adult speaker returns that he may list specific forces from which he cannot escape. Social cruelty, "evil tongues, Rash judgments, [or] the sneers of selfish men," are the inflictions which the sober, older poet can philosophize away.[17] Although he undercuts the realm of music in the doing: music, even the "still, sad" variety can offer a more intense experience of the moment than quotidian life can. Music allows us briefly to scramble our limits without removing them, a defiance of our greater emotional reticence in everyday life. Wordsworth's choice of adjectives emphasizes music's power to restrain as much as to liberate. For the speaker, music is not an example of a material force that shatters the divide between nature and the "mansion" of his mind, but another source of determination that limits rather than expands[18]. It is clear who has the power and who does not and that the speaker has relinquished his claim to ignorance.

None of the speaker's aforesaid emotional sobriety is to imply that "Tintern Abbey" has a bitter message or tone. "Tintern" reflects a distinct need on the part of the speaker to escape his former unworldly self, even as he loses the sensations that allow him to speak poetically. "Tintern" is mystical to the degree that the attribution of holiness to nature is always mystical, but it is ultimately guided by clear-sightedness. Wordsworth wants to observe the sources of his solace precisely and does not want to mystify them. In the furtherance of this goal, he uses banal religious language: "all which we behold / Is full of blessings,"[19] "With far deeper zeal / Of holier love."[20] Such near-placeholder language puts the focus back on nature and the mind in and of themselves. Wordsworth cares about this emphasis because it defeats the wrong kind of nostalgia where ignorance, rather than beauty or "aching joys," is the lost paradise [21]. Others "faint" or "mourn" or "murmur" at the intrusion of knowledge; Wordsworth wishes to thrive, albeit with the pain of a knowing powerlessness.[22] For him, the successful conversion of emotions from a previous state is the entire goal.

Wordsworth fuses his quiet determinism with a final message of continuity. The last stanza of "Tintern Abbey" is advice about sublimity and sobriety, about how to sustain the call to life. His "sister" receives the advice after the speaker praises

her naturalness: “Nor, perchance, / If I were thus taught, should I the more / Suffer my genial spirits to decay.”[23] The speaker acknowledges that the ‘untaught ’may also inspire “genial spirits”; his sister’s vibrancy and “the shooting lights / Of [her] wild eyes” is enough to summon pleasure.[24] However, Wordsworth’s inclusion and presentation of the sister is ultimately couched in a language of preservation. The sister learns that she too should dissolve and sculpt the meaning and memory of nature as her brother has, and in part because doing so will preserve Wordsworth’s place in her memory: “With what healing thoughts / Of tender joy wilt thou remember me.”[25] The speaker indicates at poem’s end that an essential piece of his sister’s inner life depends on the same attitude towards nature contaminating her: “this green pastoral landscape, were to me / More dear, both for themselves and for thy sake!”[26] Although Wordsworth begins the ‘advice ’section of “Tintern” with an acknowledgement of his sister’s unrestrained nature, he affirms that her own well-being will also submit to nature, and that being remembered by the sister after death would be a personal solace. The speaker delivers his life-affirming advice paternalistically but not forcibly; to echo his own language, he is “gently leading [her] on.”[27] A need for the poetic feeling itself to replicate itself is at the heart of Wordsworth’s project, which indicates some grander design, and not merely an expression of emotion and sentimentality. It is important for the sake of those Wordsworth loves that they understand what Tintern Abbey may become for them when they leave the visceral physical details of the actual place behind.

In the case of Shelley, a different sensibility is at play, although the goal is the same as it is for Wordsworth. In Shelley’s hands, the proper response to change and the ensuing threat of nostalgia is, in a sense, a combination of Wordsworth’s unpreferred fainting and murmuring. In “Ode to the West Wind,” reason is employed to suggest a more thorough negation of the self than discovered in “Tintern.”

By rapturously describing the wind, Shelley fetishizes what seems to be nature’s most visceral and palpable instrument of change.[28] The wind has multiple identities in the beginning, for it plays the role of “Destroyer and preserver,”[29] an “enchanter,”[30] and an undertaker leading the “pestilence-stricken multitudes”[31] to their graves. The wind’s profile is so vast that Shelley himself does not quite know what it is, but on the other hand, it is clear that the wind’s function is to uproot: The enchanter uproots consciousness, the wild spirit uproots grand designs, and the undertaker uproots lives. through challenging these concepts, the wind becomes more than a facet of nature and reveals its direct link to human nature. The speaker has unnatural reverence for a force so clearly destructive, and the reason for the speaker’s devotion can only be explained by a benefit the wind figuratively provides him, something beyond the admiration of strength. In the story of the ode, the wind is an amorphous

riot of frightening identities, and yet they somehow lead to spring and the flowers rising again. Shelley reads into the wind identities that are suspect in the enclosure of the human world for the reason that these identities all lead to outcomes that are fundamentally opposed to life. The undertaker arranges the unrenewed body, the wild spirit lives for itself and not for a cohesive community, and "ghosts," already incorporeal, fear what the enchanter can further do.[32] People do not imagine these occupations and circumstances as generative, and fear an entity combining them. Shelley is comfortable with the existence of something that both kills and renews and unafraid of his metaphorical insights. He has a superior knowledge about the wind in the sense that he knows that the very forces that should only destroy somehow revive the realm in which they operate. The wind is a paradox that he understands and replicates for himself.

In section III, Shelley lays out how the wind is singularly responsible for the destruction of Paradise. We are introduced to a scene of both sentimentality and excess. The "blue Mediterranean"[33] is in the grip of "summer dreams"[34] and has a vague premonition of "old palaces and towers / Quivering within the wave's intenser day."[35] Summer is the season of blissful ignorance, of lushness under threat. It is also a time of decadence, with towns "overgrown with azure moss and flowers."[36] The Mediterranean image is a scene which subsequently someone may convert into a store of inner strength for private future sustenance, a scene of innocence introducing beauty to the young and uninitiated. By the end of the section, the plant life of the Mediterranean "[grows] gray with fear," and the picture of excess and sentimentality vanishes.[37] One cannot take comfort in a faded location, nor can the decadence of a place seem more than bittersweet after catastrophe. the stage has been set for the nostalgia problem within the Ode. A paradise has been ruined, or is about to be ruined, and it seems impossible to refashion the hard facts of destruction into beauty and renewal. The wind becomes poetically understandable to the reader as an unsolvable paradox. The identity, or several metaphorical identities, of the source of the destruction is inconceivable as a rectifying partner. The temptation to retreat to a toxic nostalgia of time-based essentialism, to yearn for one instantiation of the physical place, becomes real. Shelley's deeper understanding—the fact that, despite the greater load of 'knowledge 'he possesses about the cruel metaphorical identities of the wind, the wind renews—is the matured response to the loss of paradise.

Shelley expresses a profound desire to lose himself in response to this paradox. Because the adult Shelley understands that his paradise was lost through paradox, he does not try to overcome the threat of nostalgia with reason or to bridge the divide in a Wordsworthian fashion between innocence and maturation, refusing to condemn his childhood as irrational. Actual existing nature provides all the inner

sense of pleasure and identity that Shelley needs. Shelley is fascinated just as much by what is being manipulated by the wind as by the wind itself, and he submerges his own personality with the first:

> If I were a dead leaf thou mightest bear;
> If I were a swift cloud to fly with thee;
> A wave to pant beneath thy power, and share
> The impulse of thy strength, only less free
> Than thou, O uncontrollable![38]

The wind is not only something out of Shelley's control, but something into which he desires to merge, in however diminished a role, as such a union would allow him to marginally partake in effecting change. In Shelley's understanding of sublimity, the human is radically altered, and his assurances about dignity and continuity are secondary to the sheer majesty of force. His appeal to the wind is submissive as displayed by the wishes he expresses. Shelley claims to have once been a "comrade" of the wind and his separation from such youthful naiveté has preserved this simple relationship.[39] However, "comrade" is a childish boast; the power dynamic in the rest of the Ode undercuts the sincerity of the word. The adult Shelley comes to the wind "in prayer in my sore need."[40] Shelley's desired subsumption is not for a cheap thrill, but for a moral and aesthetic purpose. He comes to a life force that is capable of everything, both death and renewal. The problem and the solution lie together as a monolithic entity.

Within the framework of the spiritual monolith, the speaker can only grow by paradoxically sacrificing himself and being absorbed into a source of death. Shelley elevates and abjectifies himself in the same sections of the Ode. In the final section, he continues the rhetoric of being no better than the dead: "Drive my dead thoughts over the universe / Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth!"[41] Shelley speaks the language of one who can never recover the life that created those very thoughts and has the courage not to crave the return of that life. The problem of nostalgia is solved for Shelley: renewal codifies sacrifice of the whole of someone, not just part of them. It is not enough for the wind to take away Shelley's sense of joy or ecstasy in order to spread his romantic poetry, it is inevitable that Shelley become overwhelmed by his wind-possessor and be fragmented, a fallen leaf. When the speaker suggests that the wind may turn him into "a lyre, even as the forest is,"[42] it further emphasizes the absence of difference between the world outside and inside of Shelley's head. The relativizing of tonal instrument and atonal biology suggests a world of no distinction between nature and human consciousness. Nature performs its immemorial task, and the mind submits, because the way to join in any sort of

communion with the future is through death. It is a world that is holistically poetic, because it does not look for beauty in just the notes of the lyre or the ambience of the forest. The necessity of joining one's aesthetic sensibility to death is imperative to Shelley; only in a determined universe, where renewal follows destruction and spring follows winter, can a poet forget the concrete past and write romantic poetry.

It is striking that Wordsworth and Shelley speak, by the ends of their respective poems, in the language of prophecy. Wordsworth's promise to his "dear sister"[43] that nature will renew her thoughts is a conservative but no less potent version of prophecy: she *will* have such reserves of beauty as long as she maintains a triangulation of nature, filial remembrance, and reason that ensures "wild ecstasies shall be matured / Into a sober pleasure."[44] The experience of the wild, irrational boy who became a sober man will be the same formative experience of the girl with "shooting lights / Of [her] wild eyes" yet to grow older.[45] In Shelley's last moments, the wind satisfies his desire to overwhelm the past with reversal and to insinuate itself into Shelley's "spirit,"[46] however disagreeable the wind's previous aestheticized regime change of storm and death. They are final statements on the need to transcend the past and its problematic importance for a heightened sensibility. Although the past bequeathed the poetic impulse, its unchanging perpetuation would burden the imagination. The past tempts with sentimentality, that is, with an ignorance of what actually constituted the past. Despite the upheaval, the wind promises spring: therefore, it is not the hybrid monster responsible for ending all paradise, only certain fixed images of paradise. Moreover, by representing turnover of the seasons it is, unquestionable, determined. The fated path from unreason to reason cannot be made sweeter, and in any case, Wordsworth would not want such false comfort.

Clarifying Wordsworth and Shelley's solutions to the same problem of nostalgia addresses not only aesthetic questions but basic human needs. Each poet's response is their temperament, a signal for how to move with assurance through a changed world. The performance of renuncia- tion—Wordsworth's speaker's irrational past self, Shelley's speaker's human totality—induces the very pleasure that pure, constraining nostalgia threatened. "Tintern" and the Ode complicate the natural wish to remember and protect everything comfortable or familiar that may become lost. The contrasting approaches of Wordsworth and Shelley allow the reader to reflect on the stakes and nuances of nostalgia within English Romanticism elsewhere.

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MOVEMENT, BETWEEN TWO SEASONS

VALENTINA PUENTES ARDILA

Their feet rustle the leaves,
ochres, auburns, browns.
They litter the ground
beneath them.

The sameness of the city,
a wasteland of hidden crevices,
surrounds me in comfort.

A stretched out car drive
into a small town,
with a strange name;
another unknown,
a greater unknown

I am I, but who will I be?
frosted eyelids,
juniper fills the air,
Space swells into becoming.

Snow covers the ruins,
frost of the white and white of the snow.
My feet dig into silence,
silence swallowed by the
hissing of the street

When I move,
they will change directions

Dress to Impress: Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's Seductive Masquerade

BY KATIA STAPLETON

Lady Mary Montagu's correspondences in *The Turkish Embassy Letters* are used as a means for the author to document her travels in the Near East. The epistolary form allows Montagu to deliver social commentary and to reflect on her cultural experiences, while simultaneously allowing her to bypass the censorship imposed on traditional forms of women's writing. In addition to this, the letters feature as part of an edited collection that Montagu had prepared to publish posthumously. Therefore, it is safe to assume that she altered the letters with the intention of adapting them to a broader English audience and that in doing so, she imparted them with her personal agendas. This essay will decipher one of the many inhibited messages that Montagu delivers to her posthumous readership by considering her descriptions of clothing. I will argue that she uses clothing to perform a clandestine erotic masquerade that is specifically addressed to the English reader and that through her various descriptions of dress and undress, Montagu taunts the reader and makes herself the object of the gaze.

The descriptions of dress in *The Turkish Embassy Letters* have previously, and dare I say incessantly, been considered as an example of orientalism: a form of travel writing that patronizes Eastern cultures. In fact, Srinivas Aravamudan reads the carnivalesque elements of Montagu's letters as an effort to levantinize and whitewash Turkish culture. Koder Konuk also frames his argument in a similar manner and states that: "Montagu clearly enjoyed the aesthetic pleasure of ethnomasquerade and even had herself painted in Turkish dress,"[1] suggesting that Montagu mocks the culture for personal entertainment. Alison Winch argues the opposite and suggests that Montagu's letters *delevantinize* Turkish culture. Winch claims that Montagu uses dress in order to navigate Turkish classism and that her descriptions help portray Turkish women's freedoms as superior to those of English women. While these interpretations are accurate, they fail to notice how Montagu's *ethnomasquerade* transgresses nods to cultural difference. Her descriptions of exotic clothing both *levantinize* and *delevantinze* Turkish culture because they serve an ulterior motive: Montagu consistently uses them to perform an erotic performance addressed to English readers. Her texts are filled with descriptions of clothing and disguises that centre on considering the garment's ability to give women sexual agency. Montagus's description of her English "stays," her remarks on Viennese dress,

and her notes on the veil will be examined in order to explicate how attire is used as a vehicle for seduction.[2]

The description of her visit to the Turkish Baths in Sofia is a standout moment in her collection of letters because the author overtly addresses a meta-audience. In this letter, Montagu simultaneously addresses the Turkish women, the posthumous reader, and the letter's recipient - Lady Mar. Montagu's ability to address three audiences points to the meticulousness of her storytelling and supports the idea that she is intentional about minute details like the affective qualities of attire. Additionally, the description of her visit is extraordinary because the writer physically enters the *hamam*, a sacred space reserved for women and prohibited to male travel writers. Yet, Montagu quickly reclaims this excitement by making herself the "extraordinary"[3] figure in the scene. In fact, she prepares her entrance into the *hamam* in Sofia by "Designing to go incognito."[4] The act of "designing" her trip to the *hamam* makes it clear that she is concerned about every aspect of her outward appearance. The calculations that are implied in this "design" point to her fixation on her social status. She chooses to hide in her coach as she approaches the bath because she worries that bystanders and readers will think that she is partaking in nudist activities, as this would be perceived negatively. She is also meticulous about her attire inside the *hamam* when she later prepares the scandalised English reader by explaining that: "twas impossible to stay there with one's clothes on."[5] This sentence highlights Montagu's efforts to preserve a modest appearance, all the while setting up her desire to undress as a temptation that is "impossible" to resist. Montagu's actions - from her decision to go "incognito" to her comment about the impossibility of remaining dressed - build seductive tension that culminates in her interaction with the Turkish women.

During the latter part of her visit to the *hamam*, Lady Mary Montagu reverses the traditional English trope of orientalism by making herself the orientalised object of the gaze. Montagu uses clothing to dramatize the events during her interaction with the naked Turkish women and she describes herself as such: "I was in a travelling habit, which is a riding dress, and certainly appeared very extraordinary to them, yet there was not one of them that showed the least surprise or impertinent curiosity, but received me with all the obliging civility possible."[6] Montagu starts by stating that she "appears very extraordinary to them," in order to ensure that the readers' attention remains on her. However, she continues by commending the women for refraining from giving her "impertinent" or naughty looks. In doing so, she sensualises herself despite being the only clothed woman in the scene. Rather than admitting that she wants to join these ladies and undress herself, Montagu claims that she resists their coercive efforts and peer pressure, and successfully preserves her modest attire:

> [the lady] would fain have undressed me for the bath. I excused myself with some difficulty, they ebbing all so earnest in persuading me. I was at last forced to open my skirt and show them my stays, which satisfied them very well, for I saw they believed I was so locked up in that machine that it was not in my own power to open it, which contrivance they attributed to my husband.[7]

Montagu appears to be portraying herself as a victim of the limitations of the English patriarchy when she draws comparisons between her restrictive outfit and the restraints she suffers as a married woman. Although it is clear that Montagu uses clothing to focalise her feminist agenda and to criticize the English patriarchy, Winch argues that it has other implications: "Through troping stays with boxes owned by husbands, Montagu highlights her own lack of control in the heterosexual matrix of desire."[8] Montagu's preoccupation with power and control over the "matrix of desire" points to the letter's purpose as a space where she can exercise sexual agency. Montagu's intention is to perform for her English audience – the readers are the true vectors that ebb and persuade her to undress herself. By overemphasizing external pressure to undress herself, she can participate in covert, calculated seduction. Alison Winch adds to this reading when she argues:

> This 'Account' includes Montagu's playing with her reader's expectations as to whether she will undress herself. The focus on her dress and the sensuality of the scene demonstrate Montagu's depiction of herself as erotically appealing, strip-teasing for the reader, seductively flaunting herself as 'such a sight as you never saw' for the anonymous woman's gaze.[9]

Describing the event as a strip-tease is accurate even though Montagu is clothed, because Montagu taunts the Turkish women with her stays and notes that this "satisfies them."[10] Winch accurately highlights the erotic appeal that ensues when Montagu omits her own nakedness, but the critic fails to notice that the intended gaze is not limited to the letter's recipient. The erotic nature of the letter should instead be a clear indicator that the intended reader is any person willing to fall under the author's seductive spell.

Montagu's fixation on dress and undress is not an isolated event. In fact, her fondness for Turkish Dress is, according to Aravamudan, part of a perpetual masquerade to seduce the English onlookers. She is playing dress up as an act of seduction, all the while criticizing specific aspects of clothing. In another letter addressed to Lady Mar, Montagu describes Viennese stays: "Their dress I think extreme becoming.

This lady was in a gown of scarlet velvet, lined and faced with sables, made exactly to her shape and the skirt falling to her feet."[11] Montagu's remark about the Viennese women's form fitting dresses works in perfect contrast with her experience in the *hamam*, where she claims the Turkish women deem she is trapped and "locked up"[12] by her English stays. Montagu doubles her efforts at seducing her readership by surrounding herself with Viennese women in tight-fitting attire and naked Turkish women, and persistently portraying herself as the most desirable woman in these scenarios.

Montagu's descriptions of clothing intend to overwhelm and seduce the English reader with the extravagance of the Orient. The letters include particularly lengthy descriptions of attire in each new city that she visits, which demonstrates that Montagu considers clothing as a defining element of Eastern culture. Aravamudan explains the performative aspects of Montagu's writing by looking at what motivates these stage-direction-like descriptions of clothing: "Montagu drew her epistolary models of female experience from the performance- oriented context of the theatre rather than the newer bourgeois discourse of female domesticity legitimated by the novel."[13] By likening the epistolary form to the theatre, Montagu is able to simultaneously write, act, and direct the performance she delivers to her audience. The erotic aspects of dress-up therefore point to the meta-qualities of letters; they not only serve to keep addressees informed about the particularities of foreign clothing, but also function as a props in a calculated performance. Aravamudan continues by further explaining the meta-elements of Montagu's performance:

> Even as Montagu celebrates the performative nature of the act of writing, drawing attention to her authorial powers, there is a wry implication that female travel writing is itself not very different from the context of carnival, encouraging 'all sorts of diversions in perpetual practise.' It is from the viewpoint of her female identity that Montagu wittily dismisses the suspicions of English high society, suspicions that she invites only in order to rhetorically vanquish.[14]

Aravamudan's reading effectively highlights Montagu's agency and deliberateness in her erotic descriptions of clothing by explaining how she draws attention to herself and invites the reader to think critically about the function of clothing. The "diversions" that Montagu creates serve to entertain the recipients of her letters and her onlookers in the same way the design elements of a theatrical or carnivalesque performance would.

Lady Mary Montagu also exoticizes foreign clothing by portraying them as garish, hereby cementing the idea that physical appearance functions as part of her seductive act. In her ninth letter, Montagu expresses her opinion on the formal Viennese attires as such: "I cannot forbear in this place giving you some description of the fashions here, which are monstrous and contrary to all common sense and reason than 'tis possible for you to imagine."[15] Montagu uses fashion to denigrate these women and qualify them as inferior in "common sense and reason," which perpetuates the portrayal of English women as smarter than Viennese women in both appearance and intellect. Montagu extends her criticism of fashion to a more general reproach of Viennese attractiveness: "You may easily suppose how much this extraordinary dress sets off and improves the natural ugliness with which God Almighty has been pleased to endow them all generally."[16] Montagu emphasises the ugliness in both Viennese dress and the women's physical appearance to create a contrast with her own splendour. Although this juxtaposition is not explicit, it nevertheless contributes to her sexual performance. Aravamudan argues that Montagu's description of Viennese dress has broader implications:

> While she is impressed with the magnificence of the Imperial court culture, and critical of the drama, she is scandalized by the ridiculous court attire and the ugliness of the aristocratic women. These women's aesthetic infelicities are compounded by their libertinism.[17]

Aravamudan states that disagreeable aesthetics compound sexual restraint, a statement which confirms that Montagu's preoccupation with aesthetic appeal is directly linked to her fixation on sexual attraction. The juxtaposition between the women's aristocracy and their "ugliness" baffles Montagu because they negate each other. Her "scandalised" reaction to Viennese clothing is the strongest emotion conveyed in the letter, which shows that Montagu perceives female beauty as the most important means for women to control their fate.

Montagu demonstrates awareness of the artifice of gender and clothing, and how these forms of artifice are tied to eroticism. In fact, throughout her letters, she uses attire to dictate what makes foreign women feminine, and more importantly, attractive. Aravamudan questions the correlation between dress and gender, and uses the masquerade as a metaphor for the performance of femininity:

> Can the proscription of masquerade matter very much, especially when women are the chosen objects of a travel narrative written by a female author? Montagu's focus on the artifice of femininity suggests that antirealist practices can function quite freely whether or not masking has been banned.[18]

Aravamudan explains that Montagu's female "masquerade" functions outside of existent expectations because she writes about women from a female perspective. This attitude is one that points to her writing intentions – she actively tries to unshackle herself from the limits that have been imposed onto her by men. By reclaiming the definition of femininity, Montagu's authority as a female author is vindicated, and her self-sexualisation is validated. Winch explains how sex and gender are in a continual process of fabrication: "Montagu enjoys the liberatory potential of Turkish dress, dress which 'though entirely feminine, is also virtually identical to the items worn by men."[19] Montagu appreciates the way that Turkish dress blurs the lines of gender, hereby giving women the power to dress and act as men would. This attitude towards dress allows Montagu's womanliness to function as a mask.[20] Hence, through dress, she is able to slip in and out of femininity as she pleases and therefore is able to select the moments when she seduces the reader.

When Lady Mary Montagu initially describes the veil she says that "the face that peeps out in the midst of [the veil] looks as if it were pilloried."[21] Critics have yet to study this description because, rather than highlighting Montagu's description of the veil as a pillorying piece of dress, they tend to emphasize her descriptions of the veil as a liberating article of clothing. The critics consider this secondary explanation of the veil as reverse-orientalism because it breaks with the traditional English Orientalist argument that the veil constrains Muslim women. Instead, the veil allows women to retain their anonymity as they engage in adulterous behaviour. Winch adopts this school of thought: "Montagu describes the veil as a means to escape the imprisonment of the male gaze and marriage. Montagu writes that the veil provides a way for a woman to control how she is seen, as well as to transgress her status as a married woman."[22] For Montagu, the veil is a way to ensure that women preserve their reputation, all the while "transgressing" the limits of marriage, which implies that veils condone extramarital sex. The latter is the most crucial aspect of the veil because it vindicates the promiscuous behaviour that she participates in as a seductress of the English audience. She sees veils as dress-up and is clear in demonstrating how her masquerade isn't about assimilating the veil, but rather about momentarily escaping sexual constraints and partaking in a fleeting transgressive act. Konuk explains Montagu's empowerment as such: "her narrative authority derives from the perpetual performance of her Englishness against the threat of transgression of ethnic and sexual boundaries in an all-female Oriental world."[23] Montagu celebrates the veil as a tool that enables the promiscuity of Turkish women, while simultaneously perpetuating the idea that the Orient is tyrannical in its practices of unrestrained sex. Much like her interaction in the *hamam*, she teases the audience with the prospect that, should she choose to follow foreign customs, she too could partake in sexual recklessness. She would do so while retaining her

reservations as she continues to portray herself as a respectable aristocratic woman.

Overall, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu flirts with her audience through her various accounts of foreign clothing. In the *hamam*, she manages to seduce the reader while keeping her clothes on. During her visit to Vienna, she rambles about the horridness of their court dress to render herself the only attractive figure. When she describes the veil, she depicts it as a tool that enables extramarital sex as a means to arouse the reader with the prospect of possible adultery. When these elements are added together, her use of clothing as an ethnomasquerade can no longer be understood as an attempt to navigate the Orient by dressing like Oriental women. On the contrary, it is a narrative strategy used to "demonstrate control over the perceived seductive allure of the Orient."[24] This reading holds true when one considers that Montagu does not describe the fashions that she encounters within a cultural framework. She chooses them as a crutch that serves her desire to become the ultimate muse to her posthumous readership.

[1] Konuk, 394.
[2] Montagu, 103.
[3] Ibid., 101.
[4] Ibid., 100.
[5] Ibid., 101.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., 103.
[8] Winch, 56.
[9] Ibid., 57.
[10] Montagu, 103.
[11] Ibid., 93.
[12] Ibid., 103.
[13] Aravamudan, 70.
[14] Ibid., 77.
[15] Montagu, 60.
[16] Ibid., 61.
[17] Aravamudan, 75. 18 Ibid., 77.
[19] Winch, 55.
[20] Aravamudan, 71.
[21] Montagu, 63.
[22] Winch, 57.
[23] Konuk, 395.
[24] Ibid.

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The Day After Death

Nathalie Lemn

Shine your shoes
Wear your Sunday best
Adorn yourself in pearls
Powder your cheeks
Put your brave face on
But don't ever let them see you cry

You get one day to mourn
But only one;
Don't be greedy.

Life continues.
Your taxes still need paying
Your house sweeping
Your fridge restocking
Your body replenishing
No one cares
After lilies and eulogies

So, you feel between nightmares.

In the hours of the morning
When restless souls come to roam
After meditation, deep breathing, counting sheep have been exhausted
And their head just bangs on the door of your mind
Drowning in tears
Hollering into the darkness
Until desperation succumbs to exhaustion
Or is interrupted by the rooster's crow

And you crawl out of your den

Shine your shoes
Wear your Sunday best
Adorn yourself in pearls
Powder your brave face
And go pay your taxes
Praying they don't ever see you cry

SYSTEMIC RACISM: A CASUAL CALAMITY

BY WARSAME ISSE



Casual Calamity

A Giant's Loss

Scars





Keep Going

When Giant's March





The Lost Names

In Defense of the Individual: Sleep in *The Odyssey* and *On the Nature of the Universe*

BY ALANNA DENNIS

Both Homer and Lucretius use sleep to discuss free will and fate, and more generally the relationship between man and nature. Each, however, illuminates the other by stark contrast. For Lucretius, sleep is a metaphor for man's internal will battling the external environment. Nature degrades and attacks the individual, eroding him until nothing meaningful can be achieved. Homer, on the other hand, does not depict free will at odds with determinism, but working together to achieve meaning. To match their intentions, the respective passages have opposing emotional tones. As will be shown, Lucretius' depiction of sleep is largely at odds with the philosophy he otherwise defends and produces an uncharitable reading of *The Odyssey*. On the whole, Homer's simile of a sleeping Odysseus is more cogent and rewarding to the reader, and may better serve Epicurean philosophy.

Lucretius' *On the Nature of the Universe* attempts to dispel fear of the gods and fear of death in favor of *ataraxia*: a state of serenity through the absence of suffering. The foundation of his philosophical view is atomism: he argues that all things are made of atoms, that the soul is mortal (there is no afterlife), that the gods are indifferent, and thus that fear of death or the gods is utterly pointless. He admits that this view is difficult to accept, but ultimately will provide happiness. Indeed, he finds comfort in the universal nature of the world, writing:

> All alike have the same father, from whom all-nourishing mother earth receives the showering drops of moisture. Thus fertilized, she gives birth to smiling crops and lusty trees, to mankind and all breeds of beasts.[1]

The anthropomorphism of the smiling and lusty plant life unifies flora with fauna just as all life is unified under Mother Earth and Father Water. Lucretius uses this sense of unity and belonging to bring comfort to the reader; man is not alone in the world because he belongs to nature. Moreover, there is no dominion of man over nature, which can cause stress and alienation at the same time as material progress. Putting mankind on the same level as all life produces a sense of peace - humans are not fighting for more. Besides emotionally encouraging disciples of his philosophy, this fits well with the third Epicurean maxim: what is good is easy to get. Since material

wealth does not bring happiness, it is more fruitful to see oneself as a part of nature than to dominate. How pleasant then, to simply return one's atoms to mother and father, brother and sister, upon death.

With this in mind, Lucretius' depiction of sleep takes a radically different perspective. To explain the cause of sleep, he describes again the relationship between man and the environment:

> In bodies that breathe, the interior is also battered by air as it is inhaled and exhaled. Since our body is thus bombarded outside and in and the blows penetrate through little pores to its primary parts and primal elements, our limbs are subject in a sense to a gradual demolition.[2]

Now, nature battles daily with the mind and body, in a constant tug-of-war between destruction and recovery. Sleep, he shows, is the necessary internal counterforce to the external environment; without it, man is annihilated. As Lucretius continues, even the simple satisfaction of a good meal or a hard day's work is subverted to cause physical and spiritual illness:

> The heaviest kind of sleep is that which ensues on satiety or exhaustion, since it is then that the atoms are thrown into the greatest confusion under stress of their heavy labour. The same cause makes partial congestion of spirit more deep- seated and the evacuation more extensive, and aggravates the internal separation and dislocation.[3]

His use of violent imagery, with active verbs like "battered," "bombarded," and "aggravates," develops the tension in this new dichotomy. It seems, even, to provoke fear. There is a sense of anxious absence, such as in "separation and dislocation", or in the impending doom implied by his argument. Death, too, is reframed by the dichotomy. Mother Earth and Father Water do not harmoniously recycle atoms, they beat men to death, redefining it as loss. For these reasons, the passage opposes three of the four central maxims. It provokes fear of death and emphasizes a failing struggle to attain the good or endure the terrible, thus frustrating the reader's journey to *ataraxia*.

Of course, Lucretius' depiction of sleep is not simply a flaw in the text. It can be reconciled with the rest of the work by examining a different foundational element of his philosophy: free will. Epicureanism holds that free will exists and is a principal source of meaning in life, self- created as opposed to arising from the indifferent

gods. It also explains behavior that was not easily understood through contemporary sciences, and is thus crucial to making sense of the individual. The *clinamen* is the main invention to allow for free will within the constraints of atomism, wherein by this internal force atoms are given to "swerve" against the natural laws. Evidently, this was an insufficient answer to the question of free will versus determinism. The strength of one necessarily marginalizes the other, consequently he seems to have grappled with Epicureanism's emphasis on materialism. Through this lens, Lucretius does not simply explain the cause of sleep, but responds to the tension inherent in his philosophy. He writes it to illuminate the relationship between the power of nature (i.e. determinism) and the power of man (i.e. free will) and the effect this has on man's meaning and worth. One must only look to the language in his portrayal of sleep to see that he is horrified by the prospect of man not having an independent, internal will. It is not merely that sleep is a necessary recovery from the environment, but that it is a metaphor for the internal force which must counteract the encroachment of natural laws and confused atoms in explaining the lives of men. Like a man eroded to dust by lack of sleep, Lucretius sees that complete determinism would erode the meaning of the individual.

Lucretius' perspective, therefore, is valuable in illuminating Homer's depiction of sleep. Homer similarly uses sleep as a literary device to discuss free will and can be seen to produce a sense of anxiety and erosion of the individual much like Lucretius. When Odysseus washes ashore to Scheria after escaping Calypso's island, he finds himself alone in wild nature, and desperately in need of shelter. Aware of the risk of succumbing to cold or wild animals, he ventures into some trees and lies down for the night, compared to a saved seed of fire:

> Seeing this, long-suffering great Odysseus was happy, and lay down in the middle, and made a pile of leaves over him. As when a man buries a burning log in a black ash heap in a remote place in the country, where none live near as neighbours, and saves the seed of fire, having no other place to get a light from, so Odysseus buried himself in the leaves, and Athene shed a sleep on his eyes so as most quickly to quit him, by veiling his eyes, from the exhaustion of his hard labours.[4]

The "burning log" is instrumental to the man's necessary quotidian activities (like cooking, lighting, and staying warm) just as our hero is instrumental to the gods' prophecies. Homer is almost vulgar in his objectification, reducing his personhood to a base tool for such menial tasks. And just as Odysseus narrowly avoids death, Homer highlights his isolation and exhaustion. Taken in this way, Lucretius might see that the

simile opposes his heroism. If Odysseus' sleep emphasizes his instrumentality, as opposed to his heroic free will, then Lucretius sees exactly what he fears - destruction of the individual. If he can be reduced to such a baseness, is he a hero at all?

While it is true that the issue of free will versus fate is a recurring theme of *The Odyssey* far from creating a cruel dichotomy wherein nature destroys the individual. Instead, Odysseus surrenders to nature for the benefit of his heroism. Homer's perspective is refreshing and practical; unlike Lucretius, the duality of nature is courageously accepted. When Odysseus washes ashore, he is aware of both the potential danger and shelter that nature can provide. Instead of panicking or fighting the night, he weighs his options and chooses to rest under the trees. Finally, Homer writes, "long-suffering great Odysseus was happy"[5]. He is referred to as the "seed of fire"[6] in this simile, resembling the "seed of Zeus"[7] he is called earlier. These attributes are fulfilled when Odysseus slaughters the suitors and demands brimstone and fire from his servant to cleanse his house, his vengeance thereby restoring order for Zeus, the god of xenia, and his family. Here, Homer does note his exhaustion, but more importantly emphasizes the relief that Odysseus experiences and the magnitude of the trials both behind and ahead of him. Indeed, though these trials mean suffering for the hero, they equally represent his purpose. In this way, emphasizing Odysseus' instrumentality does not erode his heroism but ties it to the fates – and it is no small honor to be a hero among invested gods. It is clear that nature, for Homer, enriches the meaning of life.

Furthermore, Homer treats death in a markedly different way than Lucretius. While Lucretius's depiction of sleep provokes fear of death and redefines it as a loss in the battle between man and the environment, Odysseus' death can be interpreted as a rebirth. The man's fire dies, and "Odysseus [buries] himself"[8] but the glowing seed of the fire will rise again. Homer paints this sleep with a sense of importance paralleled in his adventure to Hades, where again he is reborn and returns to the overworld with renewed purpose. And yet, whether or not Odysseus foresees rebirth in death, he seems quite prepared for any eventuality. In this passage, as noted earlier, he soberly and fearlessly weighs his options when faced with peril, unlike the battle that Lucretius outlines. Death is not avoided, but a natural state that the hero is ready to receive, since it is so tightly tied with his purpose and is an anticipated end to his journey.

In conclusion, while the subject of free will versus fate recurs in both poems, it is clear that Homer does not see the question in the same manner as Lucretius. It is a general issue in discussions of free will that, if one's own internal force is what makes meaning and worth of the individual, we are set against nature to the extent

that it determines us. Lucretius is horrified by the prospect of no internal will, and would see Homer's simile as extinguishing Odysseus' heroism. Up to modern times, readings of *The Odyssey* often treat the question of free will in the same way as Lucretius: he is a hero to the extent that he has free will, otherwise, what matters must be outside him. In reality, free will and fate are not at odds for Homer. It is true that the strength of one necessarily marginalizes the other, but both produce meaning for the individual. Moreover, admitting the role of fate seems to relieve Odysseus of undue angst over that which cannot be controlled. He has no need to anxiously avoid death, but soberly faces danger. Too often one seeks inordinate control in life only to cause themself misery, straining against nature much as Lucretius paints in his painful battle of the environment against man. Elsewhere in *On the Nature of the Universe*, such as in explaining the clinamen or the universal parentage of all life, Lucretius' representation of the environment does serve his philosophy, but he falls short when explaining sleep. Homer's appreciation of the duality of nature and man's path to meaning, then, would be a valuable addition to Lucretius' philosophy.

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[1] Lucretius, lines 2.991-5.
[2] Ibid, lines 4.935-940.
[3] Ibid, lines 4.956-961.
[4] Homer, lines 5.486-493.
[5] Ibid, line 5.486.
[6] Ibid, line 5.490.
[7] Ibid, line 5.203.
[8] Ibid, line 5.491.



SATAN'S FALL BY JOELLE GUEDON

Manifesting Afro-Diasporic Cultures through Rituals & Spaces

BY WARSAME ISSE

New Orleans is one of the most culturally eclectic cities in America with ties to France, Spain, and a diverse Afro-Diasporic population. However, in spite of its current reputation for multiculturalism and festive expressions of cultural diversity, the city has a history of cultural erasure and suppression of the African American Community. Restricted access to the democratic process and political arena experienced by African Americans has narrowed the modes of expression available to them. This paper explores how the African American Community of New Orleans has strengthened their cultural identity and combated cultural suppression by creating alternative spaces of expression, particularly within folklore and rituals. Rituals and folklore enable the African American community to create liminal spaces where they can express and transform their identity. The resilience of Afro-Diasporic culture in society is comparable to the community's ability to endure and thrive in an oppressive environment after their forced displacement.

Due to a history of loss and displacement, African Americans have been unable to engage with their culture through the more structured means available to most non-racialized American citizens. In her article titled "Museums, Diasporas and the Sustainability of Intangible Cultural Heritage," Saphinaz-Amal Naguib addresses growing concerns around the loss of cultural identity in Diasporic communities. According to Naguib, all cultural communities have Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH). That is, "the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills [along with] the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated" with a given culture. However, people who live in a country where their culture is prevalent can also uniquely rely on their "tangible cultural heritage, natural heritage"[1]. A person who lives in their country of origin can experience their culture in a variety of ways and see it incorporated into the very structure of the society. Meanwhile, members of a Diaspora are restricted to using their ICH as a means of reaffirming their cultural identity. A Diasporic individual must regularly practice their culture and carry it with them, or risk losing it due to atrophy. Doing so can be a challenging task without the aid of a community. The pervasive presence of a dominant culture can threaten a Diaspora's ICH. Naguib cites migration and homogenization as threats to ICH.[2] The African American Community faces the first obstacle as a result of the slave trade that

displaced them from their countries of origin. The second obstacle for the preservation of ICH is false homogeneity. False homogeneity has been historically demonstrated by the one-drop rule, a prominent legal principle of the Jim Crow era. The principle declared "anyone with one drop of non-white blood as 'coloured.'"[3] The generality of this law conflates a variety of Diasporic communities, thereby ignoring the diversity of cultures and falsely turning the multicultural New Orleans into a "biracial society."[4] Legislators saw a variety of communities as one and the same, not because of any commonality of culture between the different communities, but because they did not adhere to the legislators' idea of American culture at the time. The conflation of different Diasporas threatened their ICH by lawfully imposing a reductive label.

Laws that excluded African Americans from the voting process furthered their erasure. The voting reforms passed in the late 19th century under the Hayes administration came in the form of "poll taxes and literacy tests, which effectively prevented Black people from registering."[5] Systemically suppressing the African American community in this way significantly skewed public opinion. The public appeared to be even more in favor of ideas and policies that promoted "white supremacy."[6] African Americans' lack of influence and representation in the political arena gave a false sense of homogeneity that persists today. Accessibility laws for voting in the United States continue to disproportionately affect racialized individuals. In the 2006 Shelby County v. Holder case, the Voting Right Act was altered to restrict federal oversite. This change subsequently allowed states with a history of racial discrimination to make changes to voting laws as they saw fit. Consequently, voting was made disproportionally more difficult for racialized voters, thus distorting public opinion (Engstrom 531). According to Frantz Fanon, oppression can cause the development of an "inferiority complex" that instills a pressure to "turn white or disappear."[7] Presented with this ultimatum to fit in with dominant white culture or be erased, an individual can become insecure about their African American cultural identity. Historically, the laws and institutions in the United States have had an adverse effect on the preservation of African Americans' ICH.

The practice of Afro-Diasporic spirituality can create liberating liminal spaces. In *Living Folklore*, the term "liminal spaces" is described as the ritualistic process of creating and inhabiting a transitional space that is separate from one's everyday reality. The word liminal is derived from the word "'limen' which means 'on the threshold.'" In this space, one is afforded the freedom "to become something other than what they typically are."[8] This space and time allows for a transformative experience to occur where African Americans are not defined by societal signifiers but by what they decide. This space fosters a new, creative state of mind in which a person can experiment with their identity. In this state, an individual may become and create something beyond the usual confines of everyday life.

Congo Square, located on the edge of the French Quarter of New Orleans, acted as a liminal space in which African Americans could engage with their ICH. Under French colonial rule, Congo Square became a designated space for freed and enslaved African Americans to congregate every Sunday afternoon. Free African Americans were able to establish a marketplace in Congo Square, and the space was made lively with. African-inspired dance, music, and Voodoo rituals.[9] Their use of this space is in line with Joseph Roach's theory of surrogation. This theory illustrates how a Diaspora "reproduces and recreates itself" in order to fill the "vacancies with satisfactory alternates."[10] The Congo Square was an exemplary case of surrogation in practice because of the way that it fostered a mini-society centered on Afrocentric themes to create a sense of home. In the square, African Americans were temporarily able to exist outside of the oppressive roles placed on them in the rest of New Orleans. The Square fostered an environment for reinvention and a community tied together not by slavery or persecution, but by their ICH. Even the name "Congo Square" reflects an attempt to create a space that is reminiscent of Africa and removed from America. The rejection of the original name of the Square, "Place Publique," in favor of Congo Square is an attempt to surrogate the spaces original meaning and purpose.[11] In the act of naming, African Americans claim the space for themselves, reinforce the African centric practices conducted there, and separate it from its racist colonialist surroundings.

Despite the refuge historically provided by Congo Square, the demonization of African American culture practiced within it was used to justify the further oppression of the Black community. In 1850, the *Daily Picayune* published an article vilifying the Black Community for practicing Voodoo. The article claims Voodoo gatherings "br[ought] the slaves into contact with disorderly free negroes [...] to promote discontent, inflame passions, teach them vicious practices, and indispose" enslaved African Americans from fulfilling their duties to their enslavers. This article frames the practice of Voodoo, one of the Black community's modes of practicing their ICH, as a means of corrupting enslaved African Americans. The main grievance was that Voodoo, along with other Afro-Diasporic rituals, instilled enslaved African Americans with resistant natures. It allowed enslaved African Americans to voice their discontentment, which their oppressors interpreted as vicious behavior. In 1858, the "fear" felt towards the Black community grew to such an extent that New Orleans outlawed the assembly of people of African descent. The article heralded the eventual, lawful restriction of African American culture by limiting their ability to perform and practice their ICH[12]. Congo Square was subsequently left vacant and vulnerable to appropriation by the New Orleans government.

By the power of government institutions, the Congo Square was absorbed into the homogeneity of America. In 1893, Congo Square was officially renamed Beauregard Square a tribute to the Confederate Civil War general P. G. T. Beauregard. Hence, a symbol of African American pride and cultural significance was supplanted with a figure from a movement that advocated for the enslavement of Black people. This perversion of the space and its being "absorbed into white New Orleans" denied the prospect of tangible culture for the city's African American community in New Orleans.[13]

After continually being denied tangible heritage, the African American community utilizes the non-places of New Orleans to create a new liminal space in which to build and express their Intangible Culture. A "non-place" is an anthropological term coined by Marc Augé. Non-places are spaces in which one's identity is anonymous and where one cannot make connections with others. These, often temporary, places include the transitional spaces of staircases, hallways, and streets. Non-places are meant to be used to get from one point to another and are not designed to be occupied for long periods of time. They are seen as a means to an end, rather than places that hold meaning and foster connections.[14] In 1885, when the first few groups of Mardi Gras Indians began their march through the streets of New Orleans, one participant remarked how "physical movement through the streets of New Orleans claims new social space, and suggests alternative social orders."[15] For the majority of the year, the streets remain non-places that draw little attention. However, to the Black community of New Orleans, the streets provide an opportunity to articulate their ICH. The streets can be altered into a liminal space and become newly possessed for as spiritual occasions. One Mardi Gras Indian likens the feeling he gets when performing in the festival, to "catching the spirit" in church and to even a voodoo exorcism.[16] He uses this performance to assume a new identity that transcends the limits that society imposes on an individual. Hence, the temporary reinterpretation of external space acts as a catalyst for an internal shift in the performer. The African American community in New Orleans embraces their state of displacement through the Mardi Gras Festival. Thereby subverting the demeaning and reductive ideas associated with both non-places and their African American culture.

Among the numerous definitions of the term "Diaspora," most use it to refer to an identity or group of people. However, some theorists use "Diaspora" to refer to a practice. Diasporic practices might involve what Brent Hayes Edwards calls décalage. He defines the term décalage "as a gap, a space between understandings" where new "articulation[s]" can occur.[17] Edwards introduces this gap of understanding not only to denote the limits of language, but uses language to articulate the limits

of understanding. Diasporic individuals have the opportunity to bridge this gap through the use of multiple languages and, consequently, enhanced articulation. Combining two (or more) languages can allow for the more full expression of an idea. When people from two different cultures exchange ideas mutually, a bond is formed despite whether or not they fully comprehend each other. Edwards presents a situation where two Black Diasporic individuals attempt to communicate with one another in their respective languages. There are mistakes made and translations are "incomplete," but a sense of understanding and "imagined whole" is created by this conversation. The fact that the effort and misunderstanding is mutual creates hybridity. The participants engage in an equal exchange, as neither person expects the other to switch to one's language. Instead, they make an equal effort to find common understanding in this décalage. Meanwhile, equal exchange is more difficult with languages that are rooted in western colonialism and "structured in dominance."[18] Linguistic structure and mentality are linked according to the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. This hypothesis proposes that peoples' understanding of the world, as well as their "cognitive processes and behavior, correspond[s] to features of the lexicon and grammar of the language that they speak."[19] It follows that key cultural traits and behaviours become embedded in language. Consequently, for one language to completely replace another is a form of cultural erasure and indoctrination. However, African Americans from various Diasporic groups have had a relationship of "placement, and structure and resistance" with the domineering western colonialist language.[20] Despite the act of translating often being incomplete, solidarity and respect develop from the shared efforts of various African Diasporas. This mutual exchange allows for hybridity and the creation of a new language, rather than the replacement of one.

The role of language at Mardi Gras demonstrates Edwards' process of articulation. While there is an emphasis on the pageantry of costumes during the Mardi Gras Carnival, another key aspect for the Mardi Gras Indians "is rooted in language."[21] The vocal performances often include a wide variety of songs, from the "ritual boasting of strength, bravery and skill" to confrontational songs. During the festival, the Mardi Gras Indians are comfortable with the verbal exchanges that the festival's setting fosters. This act of cultural expression and exchange illustrates the multifaceted functions that Mardi Gras serves. The events are not only meant to be festive, but cathartic, and vocal performances hold great significance for fostering spaces of free expression. The "jumble" of languages Involved in these songs can get so confusing that not even the performers know all the words they are singing. However, the confusion does not detract from the sense of unity found in these performances.[22] The festival does not promote a hierarchy of languages. Instead of one language

being supplanted by another, they are blended together into something novel. The attendees are able to forge a bond over the eclectic nature of the performance.

Folklore is a form of ICH that can strengthen African Americans cultural identity as well as their sense of individuality in spite of an absence of tangible heritage. In I*dentity and Everyday Life*, Harris M. Berger and Giovanna P. Del Negro establish a connection between cultural identity and folklore. Berger and Del Negro refer to folklore "as an enactment and public statement of cultural identity."[23] This definition can apply to the New Orleans tradition of Jazz Funerals in which funerals are conducted in the form of a parade. As musicians follow the coffin of the deceased, their slow music gradually becomes more upbeat. The change in tempo represents the deceased's life as it turns into a festive and merry celebration. This public display emblematically revives the dead to have "a conversation with the living."[24] In celebrating the deceased, it reaffirms the livings' identity and that of the departed. The ritual destroys boundaries of expression while strengthening the mourners' connection to those who have passed away. Through this alternative means of self-expression, African Americans can gain a deeper sense of acknowledgement and personhood not afforded to them by American institutions and tangible heritage.

African Americans are able to create a sense of cultural continuity through Afro-Diasporic spirituality. African Americans in New Orleans have often established places of spiritual and religious significance that are "outside of established churches and cathedrals."[25] Afro-Diasporic Spirituality is based on the belief that "spiritual forces are present in people, places, and things; they inhabit enclosed times and places."[26] This belief allows for the ICH of African Americans to take a plurality of forms: mundane everyday places, items, and even people themselves can possess a multitude of deeper meanings. This experience serves as a guiding principle for New Orleans Street Parades and festivals within the African American community. The parades are marked by a collective effort to "summon the spirits to change the world."[27] They therefore function as ceremonies where African Americans are able to commune with their ancestors and evoke a sense of continuity between past and present. The continuity demonstrates the Afro-Diasporic philosophical belief that one's grievances are not just voiced once and then forgotten. Rather, the philosophy promotes harkening back to the past to build on previously existing foundations and to frame any societal problems as subjects of constant renegotiation.[28]

The African American community In New Orleans has faced a myriad of institutionalized obstacles to preserving their ICH. Culture is vulnerable to erasure through homogenization, dispersal, and suppression of rights. A lack of institutional channels through which to fully exercise their rights has forced the African American

community to express their intangible culture in more intricate ways: embracing Afro-Diasporic spirituality and folklore have helped the transmission and survival of their heritage. When tangible heritage is denied or limited, African American communities find other means of retaliation. Such was the case when African centric activities in Congo Square saw a diverse group of Diasporas engaging with each other and affirming their culture in a very small section of New Orleans. Liminal spaces have afforded the opportunity to create new identities and realms of belonging. By embracing the flexibility of their ICH, through décalage and other means, the African American community in New Orleans uses the very fringes of society to circumvent forms of cultural suppression.



[1] Naguib, 2180.
[2] Ibid, 2180
[3] Becker, 46.
[4] Ibid, 46.
[5] Ibid, 45
[6] Ibid ,46
[7] Fanon, 74-75
[8] Sims and Stephens, 105.
[9] Becker, 44-45.
[10] Fields, 199.
[11] Becker, 45.
[12] Ibid, 45.
[13] Ibid, 46.
[14] Augé, 122.
[15] Fields, 185.
[16] Ibid, 186.
[17] Ibid, 188.
[18] Ibid, 188.
[19] Tulviste 216.
[20] Fields,188.
[21] Ibid 187
[22] Ibid, 187.
[23] Berger and Del Negro, 129.
[24] Lipsitz, 507.
[25] Ibid, 501.
[26] Ibid 498.
[27] Ibid, 499
[28] Ibid, 503.

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DREAMS IN WHITE

SOPHIE SOBOL

you love and are loved
as my eyelids slow
shoulders slacken, breath sags fall
down down into yourself
it is a slow descent
and you know it well empty
staircase, carpeted basement of
your memories
uncle don's wake
you were four and you played
for hours in the soft hairs of the
bearded floor
under the table it is your domaine
but you still felt the presence of those high up things knees and other such immensities
like snow banks piled ~~for~~
above your head
getting lost in the white light of
uncle don's cloudy chin
no one could ever be as
perfect a santa claus
a lap that could fit all the grandkids
and cheeks rosier than
the happiest baby
swirling hair snowing beard
white light beneath your lids
you are rising back up now
and your eyes fill with snow:
the window in the library

Mirrors and The Fantastical in Jorge Luis Borges' "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius"

BY VALENTINA PUENTES ARDILA

"TLÖN MAY BE A LABYRINTH,
BUT IT IS A LABYRINTH PLOTTED BY MEN,
A LABYRINTH DESTINED TO BE
DECIPHERED BY MEN."

-J.L. BORGES

In the search for the true nature of things, George Berkeley posits that to be, is to be perceived – *esse est percipi* – opposing John Locke's theory on the existence of "the objects of sense."[1] Berkeley participated in a pursuit of discovering the fundamental nature of reality, considering the metaphysics of being, objects, existence, and of the substance of spirit; of the mind. Throughout his literature, Jorge Luis Borges explores different aspects of metaphysics and of philosophy in general. In his *Ficciones* short story "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius," Borges develops Berkeleyan idealism to an extreme, rendering the latter's idealism *ad absurdum*. Borges creates a story that is uniquely layered, and which delves into itself, becoming, in a way, conscious of its possibilities. In exploring the methods in which Borges represents Berkeleyan idealism in "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius," and the different uses of objects and the ways in which they are images of idealism, this essay will explain the symbolic role of these objects, the purpose of the fantasy genre, and will make evident the ways in which Borges critiques Berkeley's idealism.

The memorably first line of Borges's "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" – "I owe the discovery of Uqbar to the conjunction of a mirror and an encyclopedia"[2] – encapsulates the symbolic essence of the story. Both the mirror and the encyclopedia, items of representation, lead to the discovery of the country of Uqbar.[3] Narratively, Uqbar acts as an imperfect representation of what a country could be. The tools used to uncover it are, therefore, linked to different means of replication. The mirror acts as a symbol of symmetry, reflections, and multiplications. Mirrors multiply the existence of an object, from double to in infinitum, and they represent perfect replication in the mirrored image of what is reflected. The encyclopedia, on the other hand, represents

a source of knowledge, categorization, and a representation of things of a certain world. The narrator explains that the source of his discovery is the *Anglo-American Cyclopaedia*, "a literal if inadequate reprint of the 1902 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*."[4] This mirroring of encyclopedias makes clear to the reader that the Cyclopedia is an altered version of the true source, and consequently contains misleading information about another reality. The quote which Bioys Casares remembers from the *Anglo-American Cyclopaedia* is on the country of Uqbar, which is later revealed as a fictional country that follows philosophical idealism. The *Cyclopedia* is, therefore, an embodiment of a source of information containing a different reality within it, and, along with the mirror, represents the distortion, or lack of symmetry. In essence, Uqbar is a misleading and distorted reflection of the materialist reality of the narrator and of Bioys Casares.

The mirrors and encyclopedias of both the narrator and of Bioys Casares' reality reflect the hrönir objects of Tlön. The narrator describes these items as "secondary objects called hrönir and, even though awkward in form, are a little larger than the originals."[5] Hrönir objects are usually deformed duplicates of items lost in reality. The narrator gives the example of a lost pencil which will duplicate itself into perhaps a longer pencil.[6] There can be different degrees of hrönir which dictate the variety and form of deformity an item takes. Perfect hrönir is called *ur* instead of hrönir.[7] Professor of Comparative Literature Shlomy Mualem explains that the *ur*

> is thus 'stranger and more pure' than the *hronir* – stranger because its source is completely internal, deriving from the depths of conceptual reality alone, with no connection to external reality; purer, because in idealistic terms it is the product of the activity of the spirit alone. [...] The first created from expectation, the second from hope.[8]

The *ur* symbolizes the extreme purity of idealism as an object. This depiction of the *ur* depicts the greatest possible reality of idealism as an object. Because it is pure and free from external reality, the *ur* would depict an idea which is present in the mind. Hrönir and the *ur* are therefore an example of the *reductio ad absurdum* form that Borges employs in his idealism, where items appear into reality out of "forgetfulness," "expectation" and "hope."[9] Borges-scholar Evelyn Fishburn argues that mirrors are "tinged with hrön-like qualities, reflection, duplication, [and] falsification."[10] Mirrors and hrönir therefore both act within the story as motifs of reflection, duplication, and falsification. The hrönir reflect the ideas of the person which thinks of it, and these duplications of items present themselves deformed, or *falsified*, into reality. Fishburn argues that encyclopedias also have hrön-like qualities. The *Anglo-American Cyclopaedia*, which Bioys Casares claims to own,

conveniently appears in a bar after not being able to be traced and has four extra pages, making its length 921 pages instead of 917.[11] As an imperfect copy with more information than less, it has the same exact qualities of the hrönir. This slip of reality and the fantastical world of Tlön is the first of many for the narrator.

Borges writes in the fantasy genre, *lo fantastico*, to interpret philosophical truths of idealism. I posit, in alignment with Fishburn's argument that mirrors and encyclopedias have hrön-like qualities, that the mirrors and encyclopedias as instances of hrönir are also examples of the fantasy genre in its treatment of idealism. In other words, Borges uses the fantasy genre to engage with philosophical truths. Borges blurs the line between truth and fantasy, even going so far as to reverse these roles in the story:

> "The metaphysicians of Tlön are not looking for truth, nor even for an approximation of it; they are after a kind of amazement. They consider metaphysics a branch of fantastic literature. They know that a system is nothing more than the subordination of all the aspects of the universe to some one of them."[12]

Where Borges acts as a metaphysician in writing this story and seeking to outline truths within his fiction, he reverses this role with the fictional metaphysicians of Tlön, who seek, rather, a kind of amazement in fantastic literature instead of objective truths about reality.[13] Borges's short story strives to look for truths in idealism and in idealistic worlds, and contrasts the difference with reality. The story is both fantasy and fiction and, as such, presents us with a truth that is non-fiction. This is completely reversed in the above passage, where the metaphysicians of the legend of Tlön "are not looking for truth, nor even an approximation of it."[14] This example questions and highlights the ambiguity of truth in fiction. As Modernist critic John Stark puts it, "[Borges' and Nabokov's] imitation of forms that seem to many people more realistic than fiction convinces the reader that genres are not as distinct as [Barthes] thought and that the difference between reality and imaginative creation is not clear-cut."[15] Borges' short story presents us with the ambiguity of truth within fiction, and the blurring of lines between both the fictional and the real, where they collapse into each other, like the metal cones appearing in the narrator's reality.[16]

Borges blends together fantasy and reality therefore adding a third level of reality to the story. The story takes place in the reality of the narrator, describes the idealistic country of Uqbar and the world of Tlön, and the infinite world of Orbis Tertius.[17] The latter two, form a completely different reality, but remain fantasy, as they are Borges's creations. Borges plays with the constant mirroring of worlds, and eventually brings the fantastical hrönir elements into the reality of the narrator, such as the magnetic

compass with letters that correspond with one of Tlön's alphabets.[18] The entrance of the magnetic compass into this world "was the first intrusion of the fantastic world into the real one."[19] Previously where the hrönir existed within the reality of Tlön, now they have entered the reality of the narrator. The story takes on a sort of consciousness where the narrator's reality becomes aware, and infiltrated, with the reality of idealism within Tlön. The "congenital"[20] idealism of the world of Tlön is slowly seeping in and overtaking the materialism of the narrator's reality. Borges is therefore depicting a mirroring of the worlds of reality and of fantasy into each other by merging both worlds into one reality, thereby closing the infinite-seeming layers of the story.

Borges' fantastical objects, the hrönir, serve as a critique of Berkeleyan idealism in what consists of the substance of elements. To demonstrate radical Berkeleyan idealism that the "mind is the substance of the world"[21] Borges translated thought into existence with the hrönir objects, whose essence do not exist materially, but ideally. This idealistic system, transformed *ad absurdum*, serves to explain the essence of objects as being outside the objects themselves. Berkeley's theory asserts that "from what has been said, it follows that there is not any other substance than *spirit*, or that which perceives."[22] The essence of the *hrönir* objects is not within their existence because, as Mualem asserts using Meinongian theory, objects that are "inherently contradictory" are "logically impossible."[23] This reveals two things: that things are ideas and that ideas are the essence of things. The hrönir objects are "logically impossible"[24] and nonexistent in space, but, rather, in a world that is serial and temporal. Since the way in which these objects exist is not in space, the *hrönir* objects cannot have their essence in space either. What makes up their essence is rather the mind, thoughts, and perception. As described in the story "things duplicate themselves in Tlön. They tend at the same time to efface themselves, to lose their detail when people forget them."[25] An amphitheater has been saved because of the perception of a couple of birds and horses who have passed by it.[26] The essence of the amphitheater is only possible because it has been seen, otherwise it would not exist. It is the fantastical element in fiction that allows this scene to be possible. The depiction of this idealism is completely radical and highlights how ideas are the only reality possible in Tlön, a reality drastically different from the materialistic one of reality, and it is possible through the elements of fantasy in the story.

The function of the fantasy genre in the story serves to contrast reality with that of the fantastical world in order to examine the ontology of one's own world. In the *Postscript* section of the story, the narrator shares that "[the] manifestation of an object which was so tiny and at the same time so heavy left me with an unpleasant sense of abhorrence and fear."[27] After picking up "an intolerably heavy" coin-sized

metal cone and feeling the weight of the cone on his palm, the narrator reflects that perhaps the second object from the world of Tlön has installed itself into his reality. This supernatural occurrence depicts the gradual shifts in reality from a materialistic one into an idealistic one. Borges has therefore laid out the possible reality of a change in realities, if such an idealistic reality would ever be possible. Shlomy Mualem writes that Borges creates a fiction that "prompts the protagonists to reflect on their nature and form of existence."[28] The supernatural appearance of the metal cone leaves him with a sense of abhorrence and with a fear of the consequences of shifting realities. The metal cone as a physical and fantastical object represents "images of divinity in certain religions in Tlön,"[29] and therefore guides the narrator to realize the supernaturality of this object in his own world. This realization shifts his focus of reality towards this fantastical object. Mualem confirms this position stating that the supernatural serves to question one's own reality, he proceeds to quote Tzvetan Todorov saying that "the fantastic occurs when an inexplicable incident violently interposes itself onto reality, demanding the reader's attention and restless hesitation."[30] This passage perfectly explains the shock that the narrator felt when experiencing the metal cones of Tlön in his own world. The appearance of the metal cone is an "inexplicable incident [that] violently interposes itself onto reality,"[31] however, instead of demanding the reader's attention to it, it is demanding the attention of the character of the story, which creates an instant hesitation and fear of the inexplicable event. The postscript part of the story therefore presents the fantastical objects of Tlön into the reality of the narrator, presenting the new reality setting in, one that combines the reality of idealism of Tlön and the reality of the narrator into one new reality.

Borges criticizes the possibilities of idealism, by rendering George Berkeley's theory of idealism *ad absurdum* in order to present the absurdity of such a world. George Berkeley believed that "the mind is the substance of the world."[32] This radical idealism asserts that to be is to be perceived, therefore for a thing to exist it must exist in the mind first as an idea. His idealism essentially claims that objects cannot exist without the mind. Borges has taken Berkeley's *esse est percipi* and created a world that is "congenitally idealist."[33] Everything in this created world, "their language with its derivatives – religion, language, and metaphysics presupposes idealism. For them, the world is not a concurrence of objects in space, but a heterogenous series of independent acts. It is serial and temporal, but not spatial."[34] Philosophical idealism influences and creates the world in which it exists. The entire world of Tlön is created by ideas and perceptions of the mind and is not spatial, as there are no material objects that exist outside of the mind. Borges effectively explores ontology through idealism, more precisely through Berkeley's idealism, where "to be" is "to be perceived." Borges explores existence and reality through the lens of

idealism and renders it ad absurdum to represent the absurdity of an existence that is dependent on perception and the mind alone.

Borges critiques idealism in order to present the evil of a world that is inherently idealist. Towards the end of "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius," the narrator recalls that "symmetrical system[s] which gave the appearance of order [such as] dialectical materialism, anti-Semitism, [and] Nazism [were] enough to fascinate men."[35] The narrator asks "why not fall under the spell of Tlön and submit to the minute and vast evidence of an ordered planet?"[36] Borges categorizes the imaginary and legendary world of Tlön as a symmetrical and ordered world, comparing it to the other symmetrical systems of anti-Semitism and Nazism. John Stark argues that symmetry is a form of limitation, that it is an evil, "because it limits possibilities."[37] In "Literature of Exhaustion" Stark argues that "Borges and Nabokov represent symmetry, a kind of limitation, and on its opposite, exhaustion by two images:"[38] that of the mirror for symmetry and of the labyrinth for exhaustion. Borges uses the image of the mirror to represent how it multiplies images that already exist in the world, instead of exhausting new possibilities. Stark argues that this desiring of a symmetrical world, reflecting and exhausting its own limits rather than new possibilities is an evil, comparable to the systems of anti-Semitism, Nazism, and dialectical materialism.

Borges's treatment of Berkeley's idealism in "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" is rendered into a critique of the absurdity of idealism. Objects in the story, namely the mirror and the encyclopedia, serve as examples of hrönir to depict the subtle transition of Tlön's idealism into the reality of the narrator. Borges conceived this story in a manner in which each layer either overlaps with another layer of the story; like the philosophical systems of Tlön closely resembling those in reality; explores the seemingly infinite multitudes within it; such as the infinite possibilities of nations in the world of Tlön; and exhausts the possibilities within it; such as the story of the narrator and of Bioys Casares. In examining these objects, this paper has laid out the purpose of the fantastical genre, and the ways in which it highlights and criticizes Berkeleyan idealism. Conclusively, "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" explores an impossible reality as a fantastical world and the ways in which it allows us to examine our own reality. Borges' overlapping fantastical worlds and realities symbolize the constant *becoming* of worlds never truly being *being*. Much like the hrönir are in a constant state of becoming, so are the realities which Borges presents in this short story, thus constantly becoming a newer version of a reality. Analyzing Borges's work allows us to reflect on the reality in which we live, how fiction and fantasy reveal the strangeness of reality, and lastly, the meaning of being in a world that is constantly becoming.

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[1] Grayling, 227.
[2] Borges, 17.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid, 29.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid, 30.
[8] Mualem, 39.
[9] Borges, 29-30.
[10] Fishburn, 57.
[11] Borges, 18.
[12] Ibid, 25.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Stark, 140.
[16] Borges, 33.
[17] Stark, 141.
[18] Borges, 32.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Mualem, 37. 21 Ibid.
[22] Grayling, 228.
[23] Muelem, 42.
[24] Borges, 23.
[25] Ibid, 30.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid, 33.
[28] Mualem, 35.
[29] Borges, 33.
[30] Mualem, 35.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Grayling, 230.
[33] Borges, 23.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid, 34.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Stark, 143.
[38] Ibid.

FLIES

SOPHIE SOBOL

Hello! good morning!
I jump into the pool made for one
your attention is a living thing
but maybe I leave in the night
would you follow me to the coyotes den?
I sing in full-throated garble
I squint at the paralytic sun
I am sensitive to loving things around you
there are flies in my guitar
is my music more beautiful?
is my rhythm more grounded?
are my lyrics more truthful?
Maybe they know the old dog is dying
They line the windows to block out the sun
so that she can slip from darkness into darkness
It's useless, I grumble,
she's blind anyway
In the house of memory,
take the back door
and if you know where you are headed
choose to forget the key

The Controversy of the Clitoris: The Visible Vulva in Carolee Schneemann's Eye Body

BY SARAH DES ROSIERS-LEGAULT

Gender essentialist ideas that circulate throughout western culture have come to shape how we understand the roles of artist, subject and viewer. Thus, women in the art world, and beyond, have been reduced to an atemporal, socially ascribed essence. Judy Chicago and Miriam Shapiro argue that: "There is a contradiction in the experience of a woman who is also an artist. She feels herself to be 'subject' in a world which treats her as 'object'."[1] Indeed, socially constructed gender identities have been characterized by two polarizing essences, resulting in a cultural understanding of the active artist as inherently masculine and the passive subject as inherently feminine. Women in the late twentieth century subverted these dynamics by allowing what had traditionally been unseen to be seen: the vulva. Prior to such feminist movements, the portrayal of female genitalia in canonical pieces across all media had most often been no more than the "V" of the pelvic area. The reality of the vulva, the clitoris, the labia, has been virtually non-existent in the art world with few exceptions. But even these exceptions tend to preserve the dynamic between the essentially active male artist and the essentially passive female subject. Moreover, when the vulva has been visible, it has been separated from the female body, a prime example being Courbet's *Origine du Monde* where the vulva alone is reduced to a symbol of the origin of the world (See fig. 1). The reality of the vagina being virtually unseen or conceived as separate from the self fragments the woman from her own genitals, her own sexuality, and her own agency over her eroticism. In 1963, Carolee Schneemann's *Eye Body: 36 Transformative Actions for Camera* was immediately deemed "obscene" and "pornographic" by critics.[2] The piece featured a series of photographs of her naked body covered and surrounded by her artistic materials. Schneemann intended to conceive her body beyond the cultural ideas that surround it, as both "image maker and image... the body may remain erotic, sexual, desired, desiring, but it is as votive: written over in a text of stroke and gesture discovered by my female



Fig.1: Courbet, Gustave: "The Origin of the World."1866."Venus of Urbino." 1538.

will."[3] According to Schneemann, critics and viewers alike scorned the piece due to her visible clitoris in the image titled *Eye Body #5* (See Fig. 2). It will be argued that *Eye Body* was deemed obscene because the exposed vulva does not enforce the fragmented female self, but rather presents Schneemann as whole. Further, not only does Schneemann reconcile this division between woman and vulva, but also between woman and artist through her undeniable roles as both subject and object of the piece. Thus, it is a clitoris plastered on what has essentially been deemed masculine. First, this paper will investigate Schneemann's artistic intention alongside the public reception of *Eye Body*. Next, the conditions surrounding the female nude and how the vulva itself has been represented in both the art world as well as within popular culture will be examined.

Fig 2: Schneemann, Carolee. "Eye Body #5." 1963.

Through *Eye Body*'s explicit portrayal of Schneemann's body as part of the necessary materials for creation, the artist's female body becomes both the subject and object of creation. Consequently, the piece overtly rejects gender essentialist beliefs. Although renowned for her performative work, Schneemann began as a painter inspired by abstract expressionism. She was enamoured by the style's ability to produce the body in motion. She eventually allowed the motion to move beyond the canvas by adding physical constructions to her paintings. The piece *Eye Body: 36 Transformative Actions* grew from this transition off the canvas.[4] Schneemann said, "I include my body as a collage extension of the painting - construction materials; never suspecting that the body's going to dominate the perception of that work."[5] Her body is not an addition to the painting or her materials, rather she imagines her body as an essential part of the materials required for artistic creation. Thus, the female body becomes an active part of creation and her work evades any association with a masculine essence. In addition, Schneemann being the subject of the photograph distorts the viewers' gaze. Rebecca Schneider writes:

> *Eye Body* established her artist's body as "visual territory," as if to declare: If I am a token, then I'll be a token to reckon with. But the work also suggested a complex theoretical terrain of perspectival vision on the flip. *Eye Body* suggested embodied vision, a bodily eye - sighted eyes - artist's eyes - not only in the seer, but in the body of the seen.[6]

The female body is the passive object of the gaze, but Schneemann remains active by virtue of her undeniable agency as an artist. She herself is both eye and body, the gazed upon as well as the one gazing. Schneider argues that this doubling across "explicit terrain of engenderment" through the manipulation of both her "own live female body and her artist's agency," resulted in the "Art Stud Club"[i] rejecting Schneemann.[7] Schneemann being both obviously 'woman' and obviously 'artist' was irreconcilable with the male-dominated art world.

The public scrutiny surrounding *Eye Body #5* is the result of both gender essentialist perspectives on the roles of artist and subject as well as Schneemann's exposed clitoris. The medium of photography enables an immediacy that painting, or sculpture might lack. This allows Schneemann to be presented as undoubtedly herself in the flesh, not a representation of herself. Therefore, the overt image of Schneemann is difficult to reconcile with the masculine essence associated with the artist. Schneider writes:

> Whether she ultimately wished it, the object of her body was unavoidably also *herself*-the nude as the artist, not just as the artist's (active) object. That the active, creating force of the artist should manifest as *explicitly female* meant that Schneemann's "actions" were loaded with contradiction in a culture which aligned active with masculine and passive with feminine.[8]

Schneemann explicitly asserts her femininity through her nudity creating contradictions in gendered cultural perceptions. Schneider argues the piece is not obscene due to her nudity, but rather because of her agency as both woman and artist simultaneously. However, Schneemann writes that the negative reception of the piece was due to *Eye Body #5*: the photograph featuring a full-frontal nude whereupon close inspection her clitoris is visible.[9] Upon the release of the photo series, this particular image prompted questions such as "what is the meaning of this 'obscene' image? Why is it in the art world rather than a 'porno' world?"[10] Schneemann argues that she was given one of two roles to fill: "that of pornographer or emissary of Aphrodite," and that these were the categories of the constructed realms of either "erotic" or "obscene."[11] The combination of both Schneemann's observation that the controversy was her visible clitoris and Schneider's position that her female agency made the image obscene reveals a more complete understanding of public scrutiny.

[i] "Art Stud Club" is what Schneemann termed the male-dominated art world, particularly referring to those men that ruled the Fluxus movement of her generation. Indeed, "George Maciunus, father of Fluxus, deemed her work too "messy" for inclusion" (Schneider, 35).

If the vulva is considered to be the most obscene image of femininity in western culture, and if society seeks to associate a male principle to the artist, whether male or female, then it follows that her exposed clitoris is a complete emasculation of how society has conceived the artist.

Female bodies have been displayed in art and culture in direct opposition to actual lived experience which reduces the portrayal of women in popular culture to a symbol of eroticism. The disconnection between reality and representation results in a fragmented experience for women, where they are either themselves or their eroticism. Schneemann writes that "our experience of our bodies has not corresponded to cultural depiction."[12] The stories of our bodies have been narrated by men, juxtaposed with the relationship we have with our bodies. If Schneemann's exposed vulva was so controversial, what then is the history of representation when it comes to female genitalia? As Lisa Tickner states, "Whilst the image of woman as fetishized object, repository for male sexual fantasies and fears, is 'acceptable' in our society, the image of the vulva itself which the fetish seeks to displace, is obscene."[13] The male fetishization of women does not include the vulva. Consequently, we see the nude body everywhere, however, the vulva itself has been largely unseen. Emma Rees argues that the artists who depict the vagina depict a never- known body, writing that "the tension between the polarities of me and my body grows until body and self are ruptured. The vulva becomes autonomized, 'it' finds a life of its own and its 'I' is left flailing in misapprehension and fear."[14] Therefore, the self becomes fractured from the body. The vulva becomes its own separate entity in both public and personal spheres. Women walk around divorced from their own bodies due to popular culture's fear of their genitals, but Schneemann imposes a female narrative onto her body. Schneemann's project, whether a conscious one or not, reconciles the separation between a woman and her genitalia, uniting the semantic separation of the "I" and the "it" of the vulva.

Even though the image of women is ever-present in art, she has paradoxically been absent as the female body becomes a vessel for masculine desire. This reduction of woman to symbol has neglected to include the vulva and consequently, female genitalia has been culturally othered; Tickner writes that "despite her ubiquitous presence, women as such are largely absent from art. We are dealing with the sign "woman" emptied of its original content and refilled with masculine anxieties and desires."[15] Women being used to signify male desire implies a fragmented understanding of women, between themselves and an eroticism that has been chosen for them. Consequently, the vulva has become an enigma. Indeed, according to Tickner, the mystery of the unseen vulva not only pervades the public art world and also the private:

> Women's sexual organs are shrouded in mystery. . . When little girls begin to ask questions their mothers provide them, if they are lucky, with crude diagrams of the sexual apparatus, in which the organs of pleasure feature much less prominently than the intricacies of tubes and ovaries. . . The little girl is not encouraged to explore her own genitals or to identify the tissues of which they are composed (...) The very idea is distasteful.[16]

Fig. 3: Titian. "Venus of Urbino." 1538.

This mysticism around the vagina means that when vulvar imagery is shown, it is a "mark of our otherness."[17] Therefore, the vulva is never just erotic, but is also deeply political. Schneemann's visible clitoris throws the image beyond eroticism and into the realm of the political, making her art important for the reconciliation between women and their bodies in both private and public spheres. She is revealing what culture has decided should remain unseen, placing her in direct contention with what she herself has called the "wall of men" that rule the art world.[18] She is marking her otherness, her difference from men, all while fulfilling the 'masculine' role of the artist.

While there exists a multitude of exceptions that reveal how the naked female body has served as inspiration to artists, it is rare that more than the pubic triangle is depicted. Thus, the female body is paradoxically eroticised and concealed. Doctors Di Marino and Lepidi ask the question: "But what about the end of the clitoris, the only visible part of the bulbo-clitoral organ? How has it been perceived, understood, described or represented by the artists?"[19] They argue that while representations of the "hypogastric region" are admirable and numerous, paintings showing a woman lying down with her thighs apart and her perineum exposed are rare.[20] Overwhelmingly, paintings of the female nude have been depictions of the harmonious curves of the mons Venus, the pubic triangle, and the hips, all while excluding the vulva. Indeed, while the vulva might be shown, the actual clitoris has rarely been seen. Even in Courbet's very overt depiction of female genitalia in his *L'Origine du Monde*, the clitoris remains invisible.[21] Historically, it seems that artists

have preferred to depict the nude as simultaneously erotic and concealed:

> Overall, painters have preferred representations of masturbation, of the clitoral caress and of autoerotism rather than direct paintings of the clitoris. As such, their paintings are part of the representations of "la femme dans tous ses états" ("the woman in all her states"). The most representative painting of this type is that by the famous Venetian painter, Tiziano Vecelli, referred to as Titian: Venus d'Urbino.[22]

Venus d'Urbino (See fig. 3) is the perfect example of this predilection to depict scenes of masturbation. Her hand, placed over the pubic triangle, works both to eroticize her through the masturbatory position while also concealing the vulva. This preference in male artists reveals that the ideal depiction of femininity is both erotic and void of the obscene vagina. Moreover, the clitoris is arguably the most controversial organ that Schneemann could have exposed, being that it exists for the sole purpose of the female orgasm. Schneemann is exposing the most erotic area of the female body. A zone most artists, while perhaps depicting the vulva, have neglected to include in their works. Schneemann is not made erotic on the terms of what has been historically constructed by male artists to be so, but through the actual erotic zone of the female body which has been so often concealed: the clitoris.

Courbet's *L'Origine du Monde* demonstrates how female iconography has separated the vulva from the self, ultimately resulting in a dualistic characterization of women. Rees posits that the "decapitation of [Courbet's] muse" separates the "I" of the woman depicted in the painting from her genitals, ever enforcing an already deeply cultured separation.[23] The self and the body are two irreconcilable parts within the painting. Moreover, the subject of *L'Origine* may or may not be holding a gaze with the viewer, ultimately removing her agency as a participant in the tripartite relationship between viewer, subject, and artist. Rees contrasts the painting with the intense gaze of Courbet's *La Clairvoyant* (See Fig. 4), positing that she is:

> Virtually the other half of L'Origine. Courbet seems to be telling us, if we put these paintings side by side, [the viewer] cannot simultaneously gaze on the [vulva]and be gazed upon by the model. Our eyes move from one to the other and there is a choice to be made. The mysticism of the sexual organs is echoed in the mysticism of the clairvoyant's gaze. Her chin is tilted slightly downwards and her dark eyes fix on us, her mouth set in a stern line. Here is a woman who is not presented solely as sexual object, but who is mysterious, dangerous and darkly erotic.[24]

Fig. 4: Courbet, Gustave. "The Seer." c. 1855.

The clairvoyant embodies the mysticism of Courbet's decapitated vulva, she is the separated 'I' of *Origine du Monde*. Rees argues that throughout literary history, female characters have either been an embodiment of *Clairvoyant or Origin*, sometimes both, but rarely at the same time.[25] Thus, all female iconography in art has been dualistic. Courbet's separate paintings reveal how feminine identity has been fragmented as well as how women have been divorced from their vulvas. Is Schneemann not both *Clairvoyant* and *Origin* at once? I encourage my reader to look at Fig 1, 2 and 4 together. Schneemann's bottom half is positioned similarly to *Origin*, the same open exposure of the legs. While her face, jarringly similar to that of *Clairvoyant*, holds a directed gaze— albeit not directly looking at us— carrying the same intense eroticism and mystery. The image of Schneemann is the reconciliation of both these severed halves which have divided the portrayal of women across all mediums. She is the whole of these fractured identities, the reconciliation of the "I" and the vulva evades the pervading patriarchal categorization of the female body. This is indeed what made her clitoris so controversial, she is not only reconciling women to their own bodies but doing so in what has been deemed a male role.

To conclude, gender essentialism is ever-present in the dynamics of the art world and consequently, it shapes the engagement we have with pieces such as Schneemann's *Eye/Body*. Indeed, "the determinant of obscenity lies not in words or things, but in attitudes that people have about words and things."[26] Schneemann's clitoris is not obscene in and of itself; the obscenity stems from Schneemann's role as both object and subject within the piece as well as the historical tendency to eroticize women while concealing their genitals. Women artists have wrestled with an art world that perceives them as the passive object while they attempt to align themselves with the masculine, active role of the subject. When Schneemann places her nude body within her work as the subject and the object of the photograph, her undeniable identity as both woman and artist results in the failure to assimilate within the masculine essence of the artist. In addition, the vulva hasn't been included in the historical eroticization of women which has led to a mystification of female genitalia. Therefore, women have been alienated from their own vulvas resulting in a fractured sense of the body and the self. Consequently, Schneemann's piece

is deemed obscene because she reconciles the divide between woman and artist as well as the divide between woman and vulva. Through the agency she gains by uniting these scattered pieces of identity, she emasculates the artist with the simple exposure of her clitoris.

1 Chicago & Shapiro, 40.
2 Schneemann, 29.
3 Ibid, 1.
4 Cotter, New York Times Obituaries.
5 Richards interview.
6 Schneider, 34-35.
7 Schneemann, 35.
8 Schneider, 35-36.
9 Schneemann, 29.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, 28.
13 Tickner, 243.
14 Rees, 34.
15 Tickner, 247.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Richards interview.
19 Di Marino and Lepidi, section 17,1.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Rees, 73.
24 Ibid, 73-74.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid, 273.

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FLYING DREAM

JOELLE GUÉDON

Opening one eye to chatter,
it's never good news,
I am left heavy and hollow.
Moments before,
I had been frantically leaving messages for my future self—
proof that this really happened—
on the high beams of the old house,
unreachable without this incredible gift
which I never received.
Awake, my mind splits like wood
slowly splintering
between reality and the memory of flying
which leaves my body like smoke—
slowly rising—
and the more I grasp at it, the more it scatters to nothing



DAYOOBID

BY WARSAME ISSE





















The Early Marx and the Late Hegel: Comments Against a Naive View of the Hegel-Marx Relationship

BY BRYAN LEE

The development of historical materialism stems from a dissatisfaction from both Marx and Engels of the philosophical systems of their times. Marx's early philosophical works, such as the *Manuscripts* and the *German Ideology*, more or less revolve around the issues of what was understood as "idealism" and "materialism". It is important to emphasize this fact: the early works of Marx formalizes a departure from a tradition and motivates Marx's move towards a scientific approach. In other words, it is Marx's rupture from *mere* philosophy and into material analysis as he prepares to write his *Capital*. His early works then acts as a polemic against the Young Hegelians and idealists of his time - Marx is here to settle the score. Much has been said on whether or not this departure is successful: a version of this question motivates much of the division surrounding the Marx-Hegel literature. In this paper, I provide a detailed comparison of Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* with two of Marx's early works, the *Paris Manuscripts* and *The German Ideology*. I posit that the notion of a significant "break" is threatened by the presence of important similarities in their conceptual distinctions and ontological schemas. In turn, I take to task the naive views on Hegel's idealism and Marx's materialism: not only does Hegel have a textured understanding of what constitutes the concrete world, Marx also utilizes important abstract and metaphysical distinctions that motivates his materialism.

Through "idealism," Marx engages with the abstract philosophy of his predecessors, such as Hegel and Fichte, which he accuses of failing "to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material surroundings."[1] In other words, German speculative philosophy's overreliance on categories of abstraction creates, in turn, a consciousness of humans not as the *real* object in the world, but as an abstracted concept of "human". The general view "has been that Marx turns Hegel back on his feet by grounding "ideas," i.e., consciousness in the material conditions of life, in the concrete sensuous, living man and his means of production."[2] This view of the Idealist-Marxist relation is the typical one and is supported by Marx himself.* Nevertheless, this understanding of the relationship between Hegel and Marx is a misleading heuristic: in a more

* In the Afterwards of *Capital* vol. 1, Marx writes: "with him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."

detailed reading, it is unclear *how* Marx fundamentally differentiates himself from his predecessor.

To illustrate the above point, consider this first part in Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, where he states the following:

> Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are commonly described as *mere concepts*. On the contrary, it shows that the latter are one-sided and lacking in truth, and that it is the *concept* alone (not what is so often called by that name, but which is merely an abstract determination of the understanding) which has *actuality*, and in such a way that it gives actuality to itself. Everything other than this actuality which is posited by the concept itself is transitory *existence* [*Dasein*], external contingency, opinion, *appearance without essence*, *untruth*, deception, etc [(italics mine)]. The *shape* which the concept assumes in its actualization, and which is essential for cognition of the *concept* itself, is different from its *form* of being purely as concept, and is the other essential moment of the Idea.[3]

To state a simple inversion would be overly reductionist of the relationship between Hegel's *mere* "abstract categories" and Marx's real categories (*real*, for it relates to the world empirically and through actual objects in the world). Within Hegel himself, we see a similar rebuking of things "other than this *actuality*": in Hegel, a *concept* without its matching relationship with *existence* resorts itself to being untruths. In fact, this distinction between *concept* and its *existence* (the division of which Hegel will reformat as the *form* of the will and the *content* of the will) seems to paint Hegel as sympathetic to the marxist cause of freeing consciousness from categories of abstraction. It follows that it is necessary for concepts to be tethered to a particularizing reality *in concreto*. The homology between §1 and Marx's system is difficult to ignore: in the *Manuscripts*, Marx demands that "appearance be explained as the realization of an essence"[4] in which *appearance* and *essence* mirror Hegel's own form-content and concept-existence distinction. To add ambiguity to the presence of any actual gap between Marx and Hegel, the addition that is found beneath §1 gives further credence to a less materialist Hegel:

> The concept and its existence [*Existenz*] are two aspects [of the same thing], separate and united, like soul and body. [...] A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice versa. [...] Nothing lives which is not in some way Idea. The Idea of right is freedom, and in order to be truly apprehended. It must be recognizable in its concept and in the concept's existence [*Dasein*].[5]

An orthodox reading of this passage, from the perspective of marxist scholarship, would be to note the heavily teleological and abstract aspect of Hegel's philosophy: Marx moves away from a philosophy of history that revolves around an abstract *Idea*, and merely adopted the formal aspects of Hegel's philosophy. Likewise, the world understood by the German idealists are through "concepts" prior to a focused investigation of physical reality. Nevertheless, close readings of Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* seems to suggest that, later on in his life, Hegel's philosophy was much more materialistic than it was previously thought of.

I would even venture so far as to say that Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* can be read as a work of natural philosophy. Warranting such a reading are passages such as the addition of §21:

> Truth in philosophy means that the concept corresponds to reality. A body, for example, is reality, and the soul is the concept. But soul and body ought to match one another; a dead body therefore still has an existence [*Existenz*], but no longer a true one, for it is a conceptless existence [*Dasein*]: that is why the dead body decomposes. The will in its truth is such that what it wills, i.e. its content, is identical with the will itself, so that freedom is willed by freedom.[6]

We identify with more clarity an understanding of a correspondence theory of truth, in which reality can be identified through the proper alignment of a will that is self-conscious, i.e. the proper correspondence between the conceptual to its existent counterpart. In the *Manuscripts*, the dynamic is preserved by waiving the separation between *Nature* and humanity: he famously states that "[n]ature is man's *inorganic body*"[7] and that man likewise performs as the conscious/organic body of Nature. Insofar as the *real* essence of the world is revealed through a return to an unalienated form of existence, this "man," as member of a "species being," yearns for a return to a state in which his *activity* is no longer objectified into an object exterior to himself: by doing so, "man" embodies the totality of nature as nature conscious of itself. Likewise, the symbiotic relationship between *theoria* (consciousness) and *praxis* (action) is bilateral: only together can the Marxian man truly distinguish himself from animals. I understand this to be simply a more explicit restatement of Hegelian bilateralism. It follows that the heuristic device of the inverted pyramid is misleading at best: In terms of the object of study, the addition explicitly states an equivalency between the constitution of the Idea and that of the body as a "conceptless existence," and explains why "the dead body decomposes". Hegel and Marx, then, are in sync as it comes to their dual conception of humans and materiality.

To note, my observations are not wholly unique. The literature on the Hegel-Marx connection, especially as it pertains to the former's methodological relevance to the latter, often provide similar observations. The two broad approaches within this "systematic dialectic" literature are the homology-thesis people and the materialists. Although my use of "homology" suggests that the resemblance I identified is a *mere* congruence in form, my argument from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* makes the more substantive claim that Hegel and Marx are both working with the same substantive subject (as the materialists would state). The literature surrounding the break between the *Manuscripts* and the *German Ideology* also mirrors this: the *Manuscript* is often noted for its abstraction, whereas the *German Ideology* is noted for its historicizing and concretizing effort. This seems to map well unto the *Philosophy of Right*, which is understood to be both.

What justifies Marx, then, to understand himself in opposite terms from Hegel? In "Philosophy and Practice in Marx," Tairako cites a passage from Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, where it states:

> This nonsense is created by Hegel, when he isolates affairs and effects of the state as the abstract independent factors; but he forgets that these factors equal the human functions and, therefore, represent the modes of existence and the action of social qualities of the human kind.[8]

By portraying Hegel as less of an idealist than commonly thought of, and in turn, by portraying Marx closer to Hegel, we realize that the differences between the two do not stem from so great of a monumental inversion. I tend to agree with the contentious opinion of Alain Badiou when he interpreted Hegel as not-idealist: insofar as the object of study goes, Marx and Hegel seem to be concerned with similar substantive things. Considering this and the noted sections of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, Marx then is grossly overlooking Hegel's textured understanding of concrete world.

An alternative account for a Hegel-Marx distinction centers around a perspectival shift. In this account, the fundamental difference for Marx then stems less from the "object of cognition but to the subject of cognition.[9] Tairako writes:

> Marx opposes the existing "fundamental problem of philosophy": which is more fundamental in the world, the spiritual or the material? This is because that fundamental problem of philosophy is built upon the assumption constructed by the philosophers before Marx: the world is reduced to the "object of cognition."[10]

According to this view, these philosophers prior to him failed to acknowledge the primacy of human *activity* in their idealist philosophy of history: the philosophers of the *Vormärz* "wanted history to be progressive and rational, or directed in a teleological sense towards the goal of human freedom. [...] Virtually everyone wanted a teleology without God"[11] all the while failing to account, in their "materialist philosophy" for the *actual fact* of human productive capabilities as something that precedes human rationality. Though Marx adopts the formal tool of Hegelian dialectics, Marxism posits a malleable essence: *species-being* as a concept is a fully realized *relationship* between humans and nature that takes on different shapes throughout different historical eras. Ostensibly then, Marx begins with the analysis of the toolmaking *human hand* prior to that of the *human mind*. I believe this account to be a more accurate picture of the Hegel-Marx relationship. To grant this, however, still suggests a far smaller difference than it is customarily suggested.

The purpose of this essay was to clarify what I understand to be a pervasive and misleading understanding of the Hegel-Marx relationship. In clarifying this relationship, we remove the risk of serious obfuscation of either authors' works. Hegel is, through closer inspection, not speaking merely in metaphysical abstractions - his concepts double as scientific or natural forces. Likewise, to understand Marx in this more nuanced fashion allows for more fruitful readings of Marx. "Does Marx have a conception of justice?"; "Must we eschew the Labor Theory of Value?" These questions are often obfuscated by naive characterizations of Marx. By understanding these authors in their own right, we access sharper lines of enquiry.*

* In relation to the question of justice in Marx, see Norman Geras' "The Controversy About Marx and Justice," *Marxist Theory*, Ed. A Callinicos, OUP 1989. As for the significance of the labour theory of value beyond its usage as an outmoded social-scientific metric, John Rawls' *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy* among others contains interesting observations on the function and philosophical purpose of the labor theory in Marx's work.

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[1] *German Ideology*, 149.
[2] Myuskovic, 157.
[3] Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, §1.
[4] Kain, "Marx's Theory of Ideas," 359.
[5] Ibid.
[6] *The Philosophy of Right*, §21.
[7] *EPM*, 75.
[8] *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* as quoted in Tairako, 47.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Barbour, 77.

SUNSET OFF THE BACK PORCH

JOELLE GUÉDON

Look at the clouds,
you can see them dissolve
as the sun splits in two
and the sky breaks into song.
When the clouds clear,
it is not so much
the sky that lifts but
your spine which straightens.
Stooped from the blanket-heavy load
of living in a mind which, splintered,
rejected you
when you had nowhere else to go—
crawling forward, knuckle-white,
like swimming in pudding,
to huge-small victories:
getting up,
getting dressed,
living in this space.
But the sun is dipping low,
its light lodges somewhere
in your throat
then suddenly, the knot
loosens—becomes
a thread which tugs up through
and your crown, opening your voice,
and you slip back into yourself—
whole.

Allen Ginsberg's "Howl": An American Appropriation of French Literature

BY MAUD BELAIR

Another significant discrepancy between Cordier and Lebel's translation and my own is our use of different verb tenses. Cordier and Lebel use the passé simple to describe the actions of "best minds."[8] This choice results in a much less active voice engaging with the activities Ginsberg claims these people are forced into doing. In the context of the list of afflictions that the beat generation has suffered, the repeated engagement with such realities is an important aspect of the poem that gets erased through the use of the passé simple. The English simple past, which resembles the French imparfait much more closely, is the tense used in my translation of passages concerning those "who" do things. For example, translating "who ate"[9] to "qui mangeaient" (imparfait)[10] rather than to "qui mangèrent"[11] (passé simple), implies the continuous action of eating more strongly than the latter.

Howl: Original Draft Facsimile, Transcript and Variant Versions, published in 1986, thirty years after Ginsberg's poem, aims to set the record straight in terms of influence[12] Through a comparison of drafts, the erasure of French Surrealist and Modernist inspiration becomes obvious. The dedication to Carl Solomon is the first indication of French influence. Solomon had introduced Ginsberg to poets such as Antonin Artaud. The Frenchman, who Solomon had seen in Paris "dancing down the street repeating be-bop phrases — in such a voice — the body rigid, like a bolt of lightning 'radiating' energy" was written into the drafts of *Howl* twice and removed by Ginsberg both times.[13] It is unclear to what degree Ginsberg had access to Artaud's work but the presence of Artaud's name in the original drafts confirm him as a source of inspiration.[14] The rambling, electrifying nature of *Howl*, even in its final form, can in part be attributed to "Ginsberg's intense interest in the spoken rhythm of poetry consciously matched that night with Artaud's goal to achieve a visceral impact on the audience's nerves through voice."[15] His adaptation of French ramblings, which tend to be much more lengthy and evocative than those in English, mimics a typically francophone quality of long ultra-descriptive sentences which Ginsberg uses to describe the level of moral corruption he has borne witness to.

Another habit of Ginsberg's first covertly finds its roots in the composition of *Howl*: the translation and inclusion of passages of French poets subsequently passed off as his own. Ginsberg translated passages from French poems only to weave them

into his own work before they were even formally published and available in English. For instance, Ginsberg claims to have generated the frame "dolmen realms"[16] from a vague recollection of Jean Genet's *Miracle de la rose* in the *Parisian Review*.[17] The inclusion of a sentence which he could not wholly assure was his own, without the use of an explicit citation, is an interesting choice for Ginsberg. The idea that Ginsberg contributed to the meaning of the phrase enough to consider it an original idea seems to justify, for him, how he presents it as his own.

The work of Guillaume Appolinare gets similarly appropriated in Howl. Appolinaire's poetic approach is recognizable in Ginsberg's mention of "hydrogen jukeboxes.'"[18] Ginsberg emulates Appolinaire's techniques of "montage of time & space surrealist juxtaposition of opposites, compression of images, mind gaps or dissociations."[19] These techniques can further be likened to the paintings of Paul Césanne, in which he "[creates] gaps the viewer [has] to imaginatively bridge, so too wild juxtapositions in verbal language could achieve equivalent stimulus."[20] In creating a narrative gap within the poem, Ginsberg thereby challenges his readers to make sense of nonsensical statements and inserts himself into a tradition of surrealist writing.

Using literary tools learned from French Surrealist and Modernist writing, Ginsberg creates a text which possesses a distinctly French character. From the precision of its vocabulary down to the overall comparably lengthy sentences (which rarely occur in the translation of texts from French to English), *Howl* lends itself particularly well to French. The translation from Cordier and Lebel, while satisfactory, fails to identify Ginsberg's appropriation of Artaud, Genet and Appolinaire's styles. This oversight contributes to the lack of analysis of *Howl* as a result of the marriage between a new American and a long French literary tradition.

Howl
BY ALLEN GINSBERG
For Carl Solomon

I

1. I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving hysterical naked,

2. dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn looking for an angry fix,

3. angelheaded hipsters burning for the ancient heavenly connection to the starry dynamo in the machinery of night,

4. who poverty and tatters and hollow-eyed and high sat up smoking in the supernatural darkness of cold-water flats floating across the tops of cities contemplating jazz,

5. who bared their brains to Heaven under the El and saw Mohammedan angels staggering on tenement roofs illuminated,

6. who passed through universities with radiant cool eyes hallucinating Arkansas and Blake-light tragedy among the scholars of war,

Howl
PAR ALLEN GINSBERG
Pour Carl Solomon
(traduit par Maud Belair)

I

J'ai vu les meilleurs esprits de ma génération détruits par la folie, affamés hystériques nus,

se traînant à travers les rues nègres à l'aube à la recherche d'une dose colérique.

des hipsters à tête d'ange brûlant pour une liaison antique avec la dynamo étoilée dans la machinerie de la nuit,

qui pauvres en lambeaux aux yeux-creux et drogués fumant assis dans la noirceur surnaturelle de logements à eau froide flottant à travers le dessus de villes contemplant du jazz,

qui dénudaient leurs cerveaux aux cieux sous le train surélevé et voyaient des anges mahométans titubant sur des toits d'immeubles illuminés,

qui passaient à travers des universités avec un calme rayonnant yeux hallucinant l'Arkansas et les tragédies de Blake auprès des érudits de la guerre,

7. who were expelled from the academies for crazy & publishing obscene odes on the windows of the skull,

qui ont été expulsés des académies pour folie et la publication d'odes obscènes sur les fenêtres du crâne,

8. who cowered in unshaven rooms in underwear, burning their money in wastebaskets and listening to the Terror through the wall,

qui se recroquevillaient en sous-vêtements dans des chambres non-rasés brûlant leur argent dans des corbeilles en écoutant la terreur à travers le mur,

9. who got busted in their pubic beards returning through Laredo with a belt of marijuana for New York,

qui ont été découverts dans leurs barbes pubiennes en passant à travers Laredo avec une ceinture de marijuana pour New York,

10. who ate fire in paint hotels or drank turpentine in Paradise Alley, death, or purgatoried their torsos night after night

qui mangeaient du feu dans des hôtels à peinture ou buvaient de la térébenthine dans Paradise Alley, la mort, ou leur torses purgatoriés nuit après nuit,

11. with dreams, with drugs, with waking nightmares, alcohol and cock and endless balls,

avec rêves, avec drogues, avec cauchemars éveillés, alcool et queues et une infinité de couilles,

12. incomparable blind streets of shuddering cloud and lightning in the mind leaping toward poles of Canada & Paterson, illuminating all the motionless world of Time between,

d'incomparables rues aveugles de nuages tremblants et d'éclairs dans l'esprit sautant vers les pôles du Canada et Paterson, illuminant le monde immobile entre eux,

13. Peyote solidities of halls, backyard green tree cemetery dawns, wine drunkenness over the rooftops, storefront boroughs of teahead joyride neon blinking traffic light, sun and moon and tree vibrations in the roaring winter dusks of Brooklyn, ashcan rantings and kind king light of mind,

solidités de Peyotl de corridors, arbre vert cour-arrière cimetière à l'aube, saoulés au vin au-dessus des toits, quartiers vitrine à virées de fumeurs néon clignotant feux de circulation, soleil et lune et vibrations d'arbres dans les crépuscules rugissants d'hiver de Brooklyn, déclamations au cendriers et roi gentil lumière d'esprit,

14. who chained themselves to subways for the endless ride from Battery to holy Bronx on benzedrine until the noise of wheels and children brought them down shuddering mouth-wracked and battered bleak of brain all drained of brilliance in the drear light of Zoo,

qui se sont enchaînés pleins de Benzedrine aux métros pour le voyage interminable de Battery jusqu'au sacré Bronx jusqu'à ce que le bruit des roues et des enfants les dégrise frémissant bouche-bés et vaincus mornes de cerveau égoutté de génie dans la lumière maussade du Zoo,

15. who sank all night in submarine light of Bickford's floated out and sat through the stale beer afternoon in desolate Fugazzi's, listening to the crack of doom on the hydrogen jukebox,

qui ont coulé toute la nuit dans la lumière sous-marine de Bickford's qui flotta et s'assit à travers l'après-midi de bière éventée dans des Fugazzi délaissés, écoutant le craquement de désespoir sur le juke-box à hydrogène

16. who talked continuously seventy hours from park to pad to bar to Bellevue to museum to the Brooklyn Bridge,

qui parlaient continuellement soixante-dix heures du parc à la maison au bar à Bellevue au musée jusqu'au Brooklyn Bridge,

17. a lost battalion of platonic conversationalists jumping down the stoops off fire escapes off windowsills off Empire State out of the moon,

un bataillon perdu de causeurs platoniques sautant des seuils des escaliers de secours des fenêtres de l'Empire State de la lune,

18. yacketayakking screaming vomiting whispering facts and memories and anecdotes and eyeball kicks and shocks of hospitals and jails and wars,

jasant criant vomissant chuchotant des faits des souvenirs des anecdotes des coups d'yeux des chocs d'hôpitaux de prisons et de guerres,

19. whole intellects disgorged in total recall for seven days and nights with brilliant eyes, meat for the Synagogue cast on the pavement,

des intellects entiers dégorgés en mémoire intégrale pour sept jours et nuits avec des yeux scintillants, viande pour la Synagogue lancée sur la rue,

20. who vanished into nowhere Zen New Jersey leaving a trail of ambiguous picture postcards of Atlantic City Hall,

qui sont disparus dans le nulle-part Zen de New Jersey laissant une piste de cartes postales photographiques ambiguës du Hall d'Atlantic City,

21. suffering Eastern sweats and Tangerian bone-grindings and migraines of China under junk-withdrawal in Newark's bleak furnished room,

souffrant les sueurs de l'Est et le broiement d'os à Tanger et les migraines de la Chine sous le sevrage de drogue dans la chambre meublée maussade de Newark,

22. who wandered around and around at midnight in the railroad yard wondering where to go, and went, leaving no broken hearts,

qui erraient autour et autour à minuit sur la voie ferrée songeant où aller, et partaient, sans laisser des cœurs brisés,

23. who lit cigarettes in boxcars boxcars boxcars racketing through snow toward lonesome farms in grandfather night,

qui allumaient des cigarettes dans des wagons couverts wagons couverts wagons couverts vociférant à travers la neige vers des fermes solitaires dans la nuit grand-père,

24. who studied Plotinus Poe St. John of the Cross telepathy and bop kabbalah because the cosmos instinctively vibrated at their feet in Kansas,

qui étudiaient Plotinus Poe Saint Jean de la croix télépathie et cabale pop à cause du cosmos qui vibrait instinctivement à leurs pieds,

25. who loned it through the streets of Idaho seeking visionary indian angels who were visionary indian angels,

qui en solitude à travers les rues d'Idaho à la recherche d'anges visionnaires indigènes qui étaient des anges visionnaires indigènes,

26. who thought they were only mad when Baltimore gleamed in supernatural ecstasy,

qui pensaient qu'ils étaient seulement fous quand Baltimore luisait d'extase surnaturelle,

27. who jumped in limousines with the Chinaman of Oklahoma on the impulse of winter midnight streetlight smalltown rain,

qui sautaient dans des limousines avec les hommes chinois d'Oklahoma avec l'impulsion de minuit hivernal lampadaire pluie village,

28. who lounged hungry and lonesome through Houston seeking jazz or sex or soup, and followed the brilliant Spaniard to converse about America and Eternity, a hopeless task, and so took ship to Africa,

qui flânaient affamés et en solitude à travers Houston recherchant du jazz du sexe de la soupe, et suivirent l'espagnol ingénieux à discuter à propos de l'Amérique et l'éternité, une tache désespérée, et de cette façon prirent un bateau pour l'Afrique,

29. who disappeared into the volcanoes of Mexico leaving behind nothing but the shadow of dungarees and the lava and ash of poetry scattered in fireplace Chicago,

qui disparurent dans les volcans du Mexique laissant rien à part l'ombre de salopettes et la lave et cendre de la poésie éparpillée dans une cheminée Chicago,

30. who reappeared on the West Coast investigating the FBI in beards and shorts with big pacifist eyes sexy in their dark skin passing out incomprehensible leaflets,

qui réapparurent sur la côte-ouest enquêtant le FBI en barbes et en shorts avec de grands yeux pacifistes sexy dans leurs peaux foncées distribuant des pamphlets incompréhensibles,

31. who burned cigarette holes in their arms protesting the narcotic tobacco haze of Capitalism,

qui brûlaient des trous de cigarettes sur leurs bras manifestant la brume narcotique capitaliste du Tabac,

32. who distributed Supercommunist pamphlets in Union Square weeping and undressing while the sirens of Los Alamos wailed them down, and wailed down Wall, and the Staten Island ferry also wailed,

qui distribuaient des pamphlets super- communistes à Union Square larmoyant et déshabillant pendant que les sirènes de Los Alamos gémisse pour les arrêter, et gémisse pour les arrêter, et le traversier de Staten Island gémissait aussi,

33. who broke down crying in white gymnasiums naked and trembling before the machinery of other skeletons,

qui éclataient en larmes dans des gymnases blancs nus et tremblants devant la mécanique d'autres squelettes,

34. who bit detectives in the neck and shrieked with delight in policecars for committing no crime but their own wild cooking pederasty and intoxication,

qui mordaient des détectives dans le cou et hurlaient de ravissement dans des voitures de police pour avoir commis aucun crime à l'exception de leur propre folie cuisant leur pédérastie et intoxication,

35. who howled on their knees in the subway and were dragged off the roof waving genitals and manuscripts,

qui hurlaient à genoux dans le métro et furent trainés du toit en agitant leurs organes génitaux et leurs manuscrits,

36. who let themselves be fucked in the ass by saintly motorcyclists, and screamed with joy,

qui se laissaient fourrer dans le cul par de saints motocyclistes et criaient de joie,

37. who blew and were blown by those human seraphim, the sailors, caresses of Atlantic and Caribbean love,

qui suçaient et laissaient sucer par ces séraphins humains, les marins, des caresses d'amour atlantique et caraïbes,

38. who balled in the morning in the evenings in rosegardens and the grass of public parks and cemeteries scattering their semen freely to whomever come who may,

qui baisaient au matin et en soirée dans les jardins de roses et le gazon de parcs publics et de cimetières éparpillant leur semence librement à peu importe qui,

39. who hiccuped endlessly trying to giggle but wound up with a sob behind a partition in a Turkish Bath when the blond & naked angel came to pierce them with a sword,

qui hoquetaient sans cesse en essayant de rire mais aboutissant avec un sanglot derrière une cloison dans un bain turc quand l'ange blond et nu est venu les percer avec une épée,

40. who lost their loveboys to the three old shrews of fate the one eyed shrew of the heterosexual dollar the one eyed shrew that winks out of the womb and the one eyed shrew that does nothing but sit on her ass and snip the intellectual golden threads of the craftsman's loom,

qui perdirent leurs garçons bien aimés aux trois vieilles mégères du destin la mégère à un œil du dollar hétérosexuel la mégère à un œil qui cligne hors de l'utérus et la mégère à un œil qui fait rien à part rester assise sur son cul et couper les ficelles d'or intellectuelles du métier à tisser de l'artisan,

41. who copulated ecstatic and insatiate with a bottle of beer a sweetheart a package of cigarettes a candle and fell off the bed, and continued along the floor and down the hall and ended fainting on the wall with a vision of ultimate cunt and come eluding the last gyzym of consciousness,

qui copulaient extasiés et insatiables avec une bouteille de bière un chéri un paquet de cigarettes une chandelle et tombés en bas du lit, et continuaient le long du plancher et du couloir et terminent s'évanouissant sur le mur avec une apparition d'une vulve ultime et vient évader le gyzyme de la conscience,

42. who sweetened the snatches of a million girls trembling in the sunset, and were red eyed in the morning but prepared to sweeten the snatch of the sunrise, flashing buttocks under barns and naked in the lake,

qui sucraient les saisies d'un million de filles tremblant dans le coucher du soleil, aux yeux rouges au matin mais préparées à sucrer la saisie du lever du soleil, montrant leurs fesses sous des granges et nues dans le lac,

43. who went out whoring through Colorado in myriad stolen night-cars, N.C., secret hero of these poems, cocksman and Adonis of Denver—joy to the memory of his innumerable lays of girls in empty lots & diner backyards, moviehouses' rickety rows, on mountaintops in caves or with gaunt waitresses in familiar roadside lonely petticoat upliftings & especially secret gas-station solipsisms of johns, & hometown alleys too,

qui ont été se prostituer à travers le Colorado dans myriade voitures de nuit volées, héro secret de ces poèmes, baiseur et Adonis de Denver - joie aux souvenirs d'innombrables filles longées dans des terrains vides et cours de casse-croûtes, rangées de cinémas délabrées, sur le sommet de montagnes dans des cavernes ou avec la serveuse décharnée le long d'une rue de campagne jupons solitaires édifiants et surtout le solipsisme secret des toilettes de stations-service et ruelles de ville natale aussi,

44. who faded out in vast sordid movies, were shifted in dreams, woke on a sudden Manhattan, and picked themselves up out of basements hung- over with heartless Tokay and horrors of Third Avenue iron dreams & stumbled to unemployment offices,

qui délavés dans d'innombrables films sordides, été transportés en rêves, éveillés sur un Manhattan soudain, et se ramassaient hors de sous-sols gueule de bois avec du Tokay sans-cœur et horreurs de rêves de fer de la Troisième avenue et titubent jusqu'au bureau de chômage,

45. who walked all night with their shoes full of blood on the snowbank docks waiting for a door in the East River to open to a room full of steam-heat and opium,

qui marchaient toute la nuit avec leurs chaussures pleines de sang sur les quais bancs de neige attendant une porte dans l'East River ouvrant une pièce pleine de vapeur chaude et d'opium,

46. who created great suicidal dramas on the apartment cliff-banks of the Hudson under the wartime blue floodlight of the moon & their heads shall be crowned with laurel in oblivion,

qui créaient de grands drames suicidaires sur les bancs de falaises d'appartements de l'Hudson sous l'éclairage bleu guerre de la lune et leurs têtes seront couronnés avec lauriers dans l'oubli,

47. who ate the lamb stew of the imagination or digested the crab at the muddy bottom of the rivers of Bowery,

qui mangeaient le ragoût d'agneau de l'imagination ou digéraient le crabe sur le fond boueux des rivières de Bowery,

48. who wept at the romance of the streets with their pushcarts full of onions and bad music,

qui sanglotaient à la romance des rues avec leurs chariots pleins d'oignons et de mauvaise musique,

49. who sat in boxes breathing in the darkness under the bridge, and rose up to build harpsichords in their lofts,

qui s'asseyaient dans des boîtes respirant dans la noirceur sous le pont et se levaient pour construire des clavecins dans leurs lofts,

50. who coughed on the sixth floor of Harlem crowned with flame under the tubercular sky surrounded by orange crates of theology,

qui toussaient sur le sixième étage de Harlem couronnés de feu sous le ciel tuberculeux entourés de caisses oranges de théologie,

51. who scribbled all night rocking and rolling over lofty incantations which in the yellow morning were stanzas of gibberish,

qui griffonnaient toute la nuit se balançant au-dessus d'incantations hautaines qui dans le matin jaune étaient des vers de charabia,

52. who cooked rotten animals lung heart feet tail borsht & tortillas dreaming of the pure vegetable kingdom,

qui cuisinaient des animaux pourris poumon cœur pied queue borsch et tortillas rêvant du royaume légumes purs,

53. who plunged themselves under meat trucks looking for an egg,

qui se jetaient sous des camions à viande en cherchant un œuf,

54. who threw their watches off the roof to cast their ballot for Eternity outside of Time, & alarm clocks fell on their heads every day for the next decade,

qui lançaient leurs montres du toit pour voter au scrutin pour l'éternité à l'extérieur du temps et des cadrans tombèrent sur leurs têtes chaque jour pour la prochaine décennie,

55. who cut their wrists three times successively unsuccessfully, gave up and were forced to open antique stores where they thought they were growing old and cried,

qui s'étaient coupés les poignets trois fois successivement sans succès, abandonnèrent et furent obligés à ouvrir des antiquaires en pensant qu'ils devenaient vieux et pleurèrent,

56. who were burned alive in their innocent flannel suits on Madison Avenue amid blasts of leaden verse & the tanked-up clatter of the iron regiments of fashion & the nitroglycerine shrieks of the fairies of advertising & the mustard gas of sinister intelligent editors, or were run down by the drunken taxicabs of Absolute Reality,

qui furent brûlés vivants dans leurs complets en flanelle innocents sur Madison Avenue parmi les explosions de couplets et le brouhaha de tanks aux régiments de plomb de mode et la nitroglycérine hurle des fées de publicités et le gaz-moutarde d'éditeurs sinistres intelligents, ou qui étaient poursuivis par les taxis ivres de la réalité absolue,

57. who jumped off the Brooklyn Bridge this actually happened and walked away unknown and forgotten into the ghostly daze of Chinatown soup alleyways & firetrucks, not even one free beer,

qui avaient sauté du Brooklyn Bridge c'est vraiment arrivé et quittaient anonymes et oubliés dans l'assourdissement fantomatique des soupes de ruelles de Chinatown et de camions de pompier, et même pas une bière gratuite,

58. who sang out of their windows in despair, fell out of the subway window, jumped in the filthy Passaic, leaped on negroes, cried all over the street, danced on broken wineglasses barefoot smashed phonograph records of nostalgic

qui chantaient de leurs fenêtres en désespoir, tombaient des fenêtres de métro, sautaient dans le sale Passaic, bondissaient sur des nègres, criaient partout dans les rues, dansaient pieds-nus sur des verres de vin brisés vinyles de phonographe de

European 1930s German jazz finished the whiskey and threw up groaning into the bloody toilet, moans in their ears and the blast of colossal steamwhistles,

Jazz européen nostalgique Allemand de 1930 finissaient le whiskey et vomissaient en gémissant dans la toilette ensanglantée, geignements dans leurs oreilles et la rafale de colossaux sifflets à vapeur,

59. who barreled down the highways of the past journeying to each other's hotrod- Golgotha jail-solitude watch or Birmingham jazz incarnation,

qui dévalaient les autoroutes du passé voyageant l'un vers la solitude prisonnière gangster-golgotha de l'autre pour regarder ou incarner du Birmingham jazz,

60. who drove crosscountry seventytwo hours to find out if I had a vision or you had a vision or he had a vision to find out Eternity,

qui ont conduit soixante-douze heures pour découvrir si j'ai eu une vision ou si tu as eu une vision ou s'il a eu une vision pour découvrir l'éternité,

61. who journeyed to Denver, who died in Denver, who came back to Denver & waited in vain, who watched over Denver & brooded & loned in Denver and finally went away to find out the Time, & now Denver is lonesome for her heroes,

qui voyageaient à Denver, qui mourraient à Denver, qui revenaient à Denver et qui attendaient en vain, qui surveillaient Denver et couvaient et solitaires à Denver et quittent finalement pour trouver le Temps, et maintenant Denver est en manque de ses héros,

62. who fell on their knees in hopeless cathedrals praying for each other's salvation and light and breasts, until the soul illuminated its hair for a second,

qui sont tombés sur leurs genoux dans des cathédrales sans-espoir en priant l'un pour la délivrance de l'autre et lumière et seins, jusqu'à ce que l'âme illumine ses cheveux pour un instant,

63. who crashed through their minds in jail waiting for impossible criminals with golden heads and the charm of reality in their hearts who sang sweet blues to Alcatraz

qui carambolaient à travers leurs esprits en prison attendant d'impossibles criminels aux têtes dorées et le charme de la réalité dans leurs cœurs qui chantent le blues sucré à Alcatraz,

64. who retired to Mexico to cultivate a habit, or Rocky Mount to tender Buddha or Tangiers to boys or Southern Pacific to the black locomotive or Harvard to Narcissus to Woodlawn to the daisychain or grave,

qui se retiraient au Mexique pour cultiver une habitude, ou un mont rocheux pour tendre Buddha ou Tangiers pour garçons ou sud-pacifique pour la locomotive noire ou Harvard pour Narcisse pour Woodlawn pour la guirlande de marguerites ou la tombe,

65. who demanded sanity trials accusing the radio of hypnotism & were left with their insanity & their hands & a hung jury,

qui exigeaient des procès de santé mentale accusant la radio d'hypnotisme et furent laissés avec leur démence et leurs mains et un juré sans majorité,

66. who threw potato salad at CCNY lecturers on Dadaism and subsequently presented themselves on the granite steps of the madhouse with shaven heads and harlequin speech of suicide, demanding instantaneous lobotomy,

qui ont lancé de la salade de patates aux conférenciers sur le Dadaïsme à CCNY et se sont subséquemment présentés sur les marches de granite de la maison de fous avec têtes rasées et un discours harlequin de suicide, exigeant une lobotomie instantanée,

67. and who were given instead the concrete void of insulin Metrazol electricity hydrotherapy psychotherapy occupational therapy pingpong & amnesia,

et qui ont été donnés au lieu le néant concret d'insuline Metrazol électricité hydrothérapie psychothérapie thérapie occupationnelle pingpong et amnésie,

68 who in humorless protest overturned only one symbolic pingpong table, resting briefly in catatonia,

qui en manifestation sans humour renversèrent seulement une table symbolique de pingpong, se reposant brièvement en catatonie,

69. returning years later truly bald except for a wig of blood, and tears and fingers, to the visible madman doom of the wards of the madtowns of the East,

revenant des années plus tard véritablement chauves sauf une perruque de sang, de larmes et doigts, pour l'homme visiblement fou le désespoir des gardes des villes folles de l'est,

70. Pilgrim State's Rockland's and Greystone's foetid halls, bickering with the echoes of the soul, rocking and rolling in the midnight solitude-bench dolmen-realms of love, dream of life a nightmare, bodies turned to stone as heavy as the moon,

71. with mother finally ******, and the last fantastic book flung out of the tenement window, and the last door closed at 4 A.M. and the last telephone slammed at the wall in reply and the last furnished room emptied down to the last piece of mental furniture, a yellow paper rose twisted on a wire hanger in the closet, and even that imaginary, nothing but a hopeful little bit of hallucination—

72. ah, Carl, while you are not safe I am not safe, and now you're really in the total animal soup of time—

73. and who therefore ran through the icy streets obsessed with a sudden flash of the alchemy of the use of the ellipsis catalogue a variable measure and the vibrating plane,

74. who dreamt and made incarnate gaps in Time & Space through images juxtaposed, and trapped the archangel of the soul between 2 visual images and joined the elemental verbs and set the noun and dash of consciousness together jumping with sensation of Pater Omnipotens Aeterna Deus

les halls fétides de Pilgrim State Rockland et Greystone, se chamaillant avec les échos de l'âme, se balançant à minuit dans le banc de solitude du royaume dolmen d'amour, rêve de vie un cauchemar, corps transformés en pierres aussi lourdes que la lune,

avec mère finalement ******, et le dernier livre fantastique jeté de la fenêtre de l'immeuble, et la dernière porte fermée à quatre heures du matin et le dernier téléphone claqué au mur en réponse et la dernière chambre meublée, une rose en papier jaune tordue autour d'un cintre dans la garde-robe, et même cet imaginaire, rien à part une petite hallucination optimiste—

ah Carl, tant que tu n'es pas en sécurité je ne suis pas en sécurité, et maintenant tu es vraiment dans la soupe animale du temps—

et qui dorénavant courut à travers les rues glacées obsédé d'un clin soudain de l'alchimie de l'utilisation d'ellipses catalogue une mesure variable et une plane vibrante,

qui rêva et construisit des écarts incarnés dans le temps et l'espace à travers des images juxtaposées et piégea l'archange de l'âme entre deux images visuelles et rejoignit les herbes élémentaires et plaça le nom et une pincée de conscience ensemble sautant avec la sensation de Pater Omnipotens Aeterna Deus

75. to recreate the syntax and measure of poor human prose and stand before you speechless and intelligent and shaking with shame, rejected yet confessing out the soul to conform to the rhythm of thought in his naked and endless head,

pour recréer la syntaxe et la mesure de mauvaise prose humaine et être debout devant toi sans mots et intelligent et tremblant de honte, rejeté pourtant avouant depuis mon âme de conformer au rythme de la pensée dans sa tête nue et infinie,

76. the madman bum and angel beat in Time, unknown, yet putting down here what might be left to say in time come after death,

le clochard fou et ange frappent au temps, inconnus pourtant remettant ici ce qui pourrait rester à dire au moment venu après la mort,

77. and rose reincarnate in the ghostly clothes of jazz in the goldhorn shadow of the band and blew the suffering of America's naked mind for love into an eli eli lamma lamma sabacthani saxophone cry that shivered the cities down to the last radio

et se relevèrent réincarnées dans les vêtements fantomatiques du jazz dans l'ombre de la trompe d'or du groupe et soufflaient la souffrance de l'esprit nu de l'Amérique dans un cri de saxophone eli eli lamma sabacthani qui tremblait les villes jusqu'à la dernière radio

78. with the absolute heart of the poem of life butchered out of their own bodies good to eat a thousand years.

avec le cœur absolu du poème de la vie arraché hors de leurs propres corps bons à manger mille ans.

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[1] Ginsberg, 10.
[2] Cordier and Lebel, 9
[3] Appendix, Stanza 13.
[4] Ginsberg, 16, 9.
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[10] Appendix, Stanza 47.
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[12] Full Title: *Howl: Original Draft Facsimile, Transcript and Variant Versions*, Fully Annotated by Author with Contemporaneous *Correspondence*, Account of First Public Reading, Legal Skirmishes, Precursor Texts and Bibliography.
[13] Lane, 131.
[14] Ibid, 131
[15] Ibid, 131
[16] Ginsberg, 19.
[17] Lane, 138.
[18] Ginsberg, 11.
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Strix Varia

Joelle Guédon

The snow dampens all sound
as we eat the last of the autumn apples,
turned soft, wrinkled,
but honey-sweet,
and look up the newest addition to the neighbourhood.

Her colours fade into her surroundings,
she appears wedged between snow and tree bark,
the planes of her face lying flat with the branches.

Let's pull the book from the shelf
and look up feathered predators under "O"
which traces the domed head and eyes
that even now watch the front door—

startling the squirrels who steal seeds,
forgetting to look over their shoulders.

Large, brown, halo-headed—fairly common,
unlike the shy Spotted or grandiloquent Gray.
She sits three hands high, heel to fingertip—
raptor-talon to masked crown.

Her voice is accented into eight hoots, in two groups of four:
Who cooks for you? Who cooks for you-all?
Also simply a *hoo-aww*.

She gathers her name to her chest,
the barred streaks reaching lengthwise across her belly
carving out distinction from her spotted cousin
whose startled appearance is so unlike her own—
her eyes are soft and smiling.

Her world is shades of grey through her binocular gaze—
dark mirrors in a slowrolling head,
now snow-capped in her stillness.

She is like the trees who appear to be sleeping,
their branches drooped with the heavy burden of winter,
but their roots are wide awake, impossibly slow,
preparing for spring which is still far away—

She sits perched in a haze of serenity,
gazing down through dark globes of
gentle patience
shielding death-quick ears—
ready.

Deadbeat Daddy

BY KATIA STAPLETON

My memories are
faded, like the hazy and
speckled images on those
1970's box televisions. I
have this one memory
that's surprisingly
crisp, and I some
times let the rerun
play in my mind because
it's in full colour. I know that
it's Saturday morning and I'm
sitting in the back of my dad's 99
Accord, basking in he bitter smell of his cigarette
fumes. The booster seat's belt digs into my clavicles, securing me
into my throne as we happily weave through the labyrinth of our suburban
subdivision. I close one eye, stick my thumb to the window, and watch as
my tiny finger hides the giant trees that line the street. I start to wonder
where we're headed until the raido answers, telling me to *go ask Alice when
she's ten feet tall*. Then the belt hugs my chest tighter, the loose change frees
itself from the cracks in our rubber floor mats and pennies float into the air, and
the car comes to a halting and jolting STOP - we've crashed. In the whiplash and
confusion, I'm whisked away - too fast - then caged - out of the booster now into
the backseat of a sheriff's car. The sirens' kaleidoscopic reds and blues bounce
off the dashboard and the radio is just muffled voices offering commands instead
of advice. Have I been bad? Why are the police taking me away? The sheriff
drops me off at the wrong place, I didn't know where we were going but...
it wasn't supposed to be here. Daddy isn't with me anymore and the
policeman has just lefft me at my grandfather's house. I try to tell him
that a mistake's been made, *Mister you have the wrong address*,
but I'm quickly hushed by the tall and towering officers.

*yes the driver was under the influence... and the girls' grandpa will have
temporary custody for the next couple hours.*

Crisp, and clear. Maybe - perhaps - probably... I think this scorching memory could have been cooler if there had been rabbit holes nearby for me to tmble into and tuck myself away.

QUARANTINE BY DAPHNE DUFETEL-LAMARQUE



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

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